respect the impressions, which occasional deviations from the usual tenour of conduct, make upon the mind of the person most interested; in which, both the feelings and indications of ill-will are of a more transitory nature; so that they deserve not to be confounded with perma. nent hatred.

We shall now proceed to consider those emotions and affections which are inspired by the contemplation of Evil; and in which neither malevolence, nor any of the selfish affections, are necessary ingredients.

II. The Displacency which is indicated by unfavourable opinions of conduct and disposition. This gives rise to the following emotions and affections.

Horror. Horror is that very strong and painful emotion, which is excited by the view or contemplation of something peculiarly atrocious in the conduct of another; by some vice which exceeds the usual extravagance of vice; enormities that surpass the bounds of common depravity-such as impurities too gross to be named, profligacies too shocking to be repeated,

and cruelties which make us shudder at the recital. It may also be excited by the extremes of agony, mental or corporeal, or by sufferings and punishments at which our natures recoil.

This passion may be deemed the antipode of admiration. The one is inspired by the contemplation of surpassing excellency; the other by the excess of vice and wretchedness. As that is one of the most pleasing sensations we can possibly enjoy, this is among the most painful we can possibly suffer. Scenes of the above description excite a tremour upon the mind, a species of terror, scarcely equalled by the most lively apprehensions of danger.

Indignation expresses a strong and elevated disapprobation of mind, which is also inspired by something flagitious in the conduct of another. But it does not always suppose that excess of depravity which alone is capable of committing deeds of horror. Indignation always refers to culpability of conduct; and cannot, like the passion of horror, be extended to distress either of mind or body. It is produced by the violation of some indispensible obligation, connected with circumstances peculiarly aggravating;by acts of treachery, the abuse of confidence base ingratitude, &c. which we cannot con

template without being provoked to anger, and feeling a generous resentment; though we should not be interested in the consequences of the conduct we condemn. Indignant emotions are always excited by particular incidents.

Contempt. This is a more calm and deliberate affection of the mind. It directs its chief attention to the character and disposition, which is capable of committing unworthy and disgraceful actions. Its objects are radical baseness, and radical imbecility where it ought not to exist. Thus we despise the man who is capable of fraud, deceit, falsehood, and every species of moral depravity, which indicates an extraordinary degree of meanness. The man who makes great pretensions to more exalted powers, and better qualities than he really possesses, and the man who vainly boasts of much more than he can perform, or courts our admiration of accomplishments of which he is destitute, or which he posesses in a very inferior degree, renders himself also an object of contempt.

Thus the characters which are sunk below the common level of humanity, and those which arrogantly and impotently attempt to rise above it, are universally deemed the proper objects of this emotion.

Both indignation and contempt are accompanied with a certain elevation of mind. The observer feels and enjoys a conscious superiority, when he compares himself with the offender. This sense of superiority is more strongly marked in contempt. When it rises

to a certain height it indicates,

Disdain. Disdain is such a degree of contempt as precludes any commerce with the party despised. It considers him as totally unworthy of our notice;-even of our reprehension, which always supposes a possibility of reclaim. It feels as if there was something so repulsive in the character of the aggressor, that he is no longer entitled to the rights of social intercourse.

Contempt and disdain are often accompanied with a satirical smile, which strongly insinuates that basenesss and meanness are also intermixed with large portions of folly.

Irrision. This term is employed to express an affection, inspired by any peculiarity in sentiment, disposition, or conduct, that we deem an offence against some acknowledged law of congruity, some standard of propriety universally received and respected; but which is not of sufficient magnitude to excite anger, or any of its ramifications. It chiefly refers to

something odd, whimsical, absurd, which is calculated to excite laughter, rather than incur our displeasure. Various mistakes, and egregious blúnders, which indicate culpable ignorance, inattentions, and extravagances, are the proper objects of irrision.

The above seem to be the principal emotions and affections which are inspired by the contemplation of conduct and character. They are strong marks of displacency, which does not arise from malevolence in our dispositions, but on the contrary, from the warm love of beneficent virtue. Nor are they necessarily connected with personal injuries, though a sense of injuries will infallibly impart great energy

to each emotion.

As anger is the guardian of our own personal interests, thus is the present class of emotions and affections destined to be the guardians of virtue, decency, and propriety in general. It is remarkable that the mind is affected by transgressions against these, in exact proportion to the degrees of culpability obvious in the offence. Horror rouses within us such a degree of resentment, as becomes the severest reproof to the enormities at which it shudders; and when excited by deeds of cruelty it calls up