leges without injury, not merely to the other interests in the State, but more especially to themselves.

It cannot be denied that not only do the poor stand as much in need of being fairly and fully represented in the House of Commons as do any other interests in the State already enumerated, but they have as great a constitutional right to it as any of them. They are not only bound equally with the rich by all the laws that are made, and have to share in the payment, either directly or indirectly, of all the taxes; but it is especially requisite that they should have representatives in Parliament who understand, and who will devote themselves to their interests. This is, indeed, also more or less the case with the other interests already enumerated, all of which require not only to be represented, but that each should be directly represented, and each in proportion to its relative importance. In order, however, to ensure this, it is essential that such a representation of them, and such only, should be framed, as that their real and true interests should be represented; and not that the influences of anarchy or corruption be permitted to gain the ascendancy under the mask of friendship towards this interest, but which are in reality its greatest bane.

While, therefore, I contend that the interest of numbers ought not to be the only influence, or the

38 INTERESTS INDEPENDENT OF REPRESENTATION.

predominating influence in the representation, I am far from contending that it ought not to have an influence, or that that influence should not be extensive. I am not for depriving the mob of all power, though I am resolute for dethroning him. I trust that he may be allowed to exercise his fair sway, but I never will consent to exalt him into a despot.

There are, indeed, certain other interests in the State, which, though they require protection to the fullest extent, as they are essential to its wellbeing, yet may be said to be independent of representation, being either so firmly established in their influence, or so united with other interests, as not to need this. Thus the interest of the sovereign is of this class; inasmuch as, besides forming a distinct branch of the State, his influence over the legislature is so great as to require no representatives there. So also, with regard to the judicial, and naval, and military interests of the nation, which are so bound up with the interest of the sovereign, the general interest of the State, and the private interests of all the members of the Legislature, as to need no representatives of their own to guard them.

Certain of these authorities do, indeed, on particular occasions, require to have representatives in Parliament, but whose presence there is essential

not so much to protect their interests as to afford information upon any matter connected with the discharge of their duties, with which it is desirable for Parliament to be acquainted. This, however, is of course rather for the advantage of Parliament than for that of the parties so far represented there. And information of this kind it is always the province of the officers of government in those departments to afford, as it is their duty also to protect these interests when assailed.

The representation of the minority as well as of the majority in each constituency, has been urged by some very enlightened and philosophical reformers, as a desirable mode of giving due weight to the opinions of those who, although they are not able to secure the election of a member, are nevertheless, both from their numbers and their intelligence, fairly entitled to have a representative. But I submit that if, in accordance with the principles here advocated, each interest in the State is duly and fairly represented, there will be no longer any occasion to provide for the representation of the minority in a constituency, inasmuch as the legitimate influence of the opinions and interests entertained by such minority will, where these are of real value and deserving of representation, have been already provided for in the State.

It is of essential importance that the different

great interests of the State, which we have already been considering, should not only be all represented, but that, as much as possible, they should all harmonise, and act cordially together. However opposed to each other as regards their own individual welfare any of them may be, they are, nevertheless, all united as regards their common interest in the public good. An injury to any one, or to any part, is, in reality, an injury to the whole, as much in the case of the State as in that of the man; and the interests of virtue and of intelligence are, in truth, not more united than are those of wealth and commerce, or even those of wealth and of the poor, neither of which will attain a high degree of prosperity independent of the other. However these varied interests may emulate, they should never be permitted to injure one another.

It follows, therefore, that any State will be perfect according as its various interests are fairly and efficiently represented, as they are represented in due proportion, and as they harmonise well together. It is useful to possess as complete a model as we can, although we may never be able to copy it exactly. We do well to be proceeding on the road towards perfection, although we may never arrive there. So also is it desirable to lay down correct principles, and to act upon them, even

though we are persuaded of never being able to carry them out to their full extent. A perfect State may be as ideal as a perfect man; but this is, surely, no reason why perfection is not to be sought after by both.

That government is equally as bad in which wealth and commerce are overlooked and intelligence only is regarded, as that in which intelligence is disregarded and wealth and commerce only are considered. The rich and the poor ought, moreover, not to be viewed as opposing interests, but as essential parts of one and the same State. The object of the true statesman will be not merely to promote the present influence of his party, but the permanent interest of his country; and his care should be devoted to the welfare not of this or that branch of trade or wealth, but to the wellbeing of every department. His aim should, moreover, be not to raise rivalries between, but to conciliate and concentrate these various interests. Aristotle pronounces that to be the most perfect State in which popular and aristocratic powers are harmoniously blended into one equitable system of polity, benefiting all, and doing injury to none.

The constitutions of States are, however, like the bodies of individuals, not only liable to many defects and diseases, but subject to constant decay. Many errors in legislation might be pointed out