questions, those which relate to the form and constitution of political bodies are of the first magnitude; and such as concern the regulation of the representative system of any State bear most directly upon the welfare and the interests of the people. On subjects of this nature it is, therefore, of the utmost consequence that the guiding principles should be certain, and that they should be correct. The two leading defects ordinarily attendant both on the framing and the discussion of the different great legislative and constitutional measures of the present day, appear to be the neglecting to consider them as regards their first principles, and the want of a sufficiently comprehensive view of the matter.

It may seem, indeed, to many, to be a task of no mean difficulty to determine and define what the representative body of a great and civilised nation ought to consist of, and above all of what it should be the representative, and what interests should there predominate and obtain the leading influence: whether the whole nation should be thus represented, with all its interests together and equally; or whether certain only of those interests should exercise influence in the legislative council.

If we compare the State to the man, as has, indeed, been finely and philosophically done by Plato,-where he has been followed, moreover, by

some of the greatest and most profound political writers and philosophers, both in ancient and modern times, we may, without adopting Platonism, have afforded to us the most comprehensive and just view of the real nature and operation of the various contradictory influences, energies, and powers, which are existent in, and conduce to the development and discipline of each. Thus the higher faculties of the soul, and its purer aspirations, which in the man ought to exercise the predominant influence, he compares to the influence of the wisest and best men in the commonwealth, while the dominion of the appetites and passions he assimilates to mob rule. Wisdom alone, he tells us, is entitled to and capacitated for the supreme government, just as reason is the monarch of the mind. And, as in the man, the passions and lower impulses of our nature should ever be subjugated to the intellect and the moral sense, so in a State, intelligence and virtue should predominate over folly and licentiousness.*

Aristotle, too, however varying from Plato, whom he appears to take every opportunity of contradicting, agrees with him in all that is essential to the theory advanced by him, and here contended to be the only correct principle, that the higher interests and influences in the State, those of virtue and * Republic, b. ii. vii. ix.

intelligence, ought ever to predominate, whether as regards its general constitution or its representative body. Of Aristotle's Treatise on Politics, that great philosopher and liberal politician, Locke, remarks, after referring to his own mode of treating the question of Government, "Aristotle is allowed a master in this science, and few enter into this consideration of Government without reading his Politics."* Aristotle, like Plato, compares the State to the man, and with him contends for the supremacy of the higher influences only in both, and asserts that the same energies and habits constitute the happiness both of individuals and of nations. As regards the influence of numbers being allowed to be the predominating interest in the State, he tells us that as the majority of the people are poor, their justice will therefore be rapacity; and that as the majority are ignorant, their policy therefore will be folly. That they are influenced by impetuous passions, and are therefore unfit to be intrusted with the government.† But neither, on the other hand, does he contend for the supremacy of the rich alone. Excessive wealth and excessive poverty, he says, are equally productive of that restless temper which subverts laws and ruins States. He consequently declares

that those are the best commonwealths wherein men of moderate fortunes abound and exercise influence, and such a wise legislator should endeavour to secure. In another part * he tells us that "Governments are good and nations happy in proportion to the preponderancy of the middle ranks, and their ability to defy the pride and oppression of the great, as well as to resist the rapacity and malignity of the vulgar." But he also states, what is peculiarly applicable to the present crisis, that "Governments are invariably liable to be shaken when the natural influence of wealth or of nobility is resisted by the weight of numbers, and the independence of industry." In the succeeding book he inquires, "How is the regard due to property, a thing essential to the existence of States, to be reconciled with the interest of the people at large, and the rights of the majority?" He then contends forcibly against the influence of numbers being allowed to prevail over that of wealth, as destructive at once of the existence of the State.

Locke, indeed, in his "Treatise of Government," does appear, at first sight, to favour the theory which is the one opposite to that which I am endeavouring to establish, and to hold the opinion that the mere numerical majority in a nation,

* B. vii.

† Ibid.

Ibid.

without reference to the influences of property or intelligence, ought to predominate in the government of a state. He says, "Men being by nature all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another without his own consent, which is done by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community. When any

number of men have so consented to make one community or government, they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest."* But it is to be borne in mind that he is treating here only of the first formation of a political society, and not of framing for it a settled form of government. In the constitution for Carolina, which was drawn up by this great philosopher, so far from universal suffrage being contemplated, or the votes of the majority being allowed to bind the nation, he proposed to confer the electoral franchise on those only who had a certain interest in the land.†

Our great constitutional writer, Sir William Blackstone, speaks of the House of Commons as the representative body not merely of the people at large, who, all will admit, ought to have a very * Treatise of Government, part ii. c. viii. † Locke's Works, vol. x.