A vote for a representative of such society or institution should be conferred by membership, proprietorship, or annual subscription, for three years previous to giving such vote. The proportion of

representatives returned by each interest would probably be in the following order: - By the learned, professional, and commercial corporate bodies, 150; by the property voters, 150; by the professional voters, 150; by the personal voters, 150.

It appears essential to keep separate and distinct each class of voters, in order that every class may be independently represented, and that no one class may overwhelm the interests of the other. For instance, in a county or borough containing 1000 personal voters, 500 professional voters, and 250 property voters, if this was not done, the first would overwhelm and virtually disfranchise the other two.

It seems expedient also to give seats ex officio in the House of Commons, but without the privilege of voting, to all those members of the Government whose presence in the House of Commons is deemed desirable, and for the real service of the nation; such as the different Secretaries of State, and the Lawofficers of the Crown. By this means, a minister would be enabled to select the best, and ablest, and most useful men that were to be found, instead of, as is now the case, restricting his choice to those whose popularity with the constituencies has secured them a seat in Parliament, and who are the most likely to be re-elected, but who, in other

respects, may be little qualified for the duties demanded of them. In addition to this, such a measure would afford to the Government the means of introducing into the House of Commons any particular men whose services, either from their talents or their information, seemed peculiarly to be required there. In a national assembly, which is not only representative, but deliberative also, the presence of such persons is most desirable. It is indeed absolutely essential, to render such a body efficient and perfect.

The plan here proposed is, surely, not only more fair for the various great interests of the State, but it is more liberal, and tends more to secure an efficient representation of the mass of the people, than any which has been either devised or demanded. It, however, does more than this,-which is equally important with the other, it excludes from the representation those, and those alone, who are not only incapable of rightly exercising the suffrage, but who would ruin the interest of that portion of the people who do so exercise it.

But in addition to and independent of each of the different interests in the State being duly represented in its legislative assembly, through the members elected to it by these various constituencies, it is further essential that men of the highest intelligence, and of the most extensive

information in the country, connected with these several interests, should also form part of such a body. As the first of these requirements is necessary to its constitution as an efficient representative assembly, so the other is no less indispensable in order to render it efficiently deliberative; for both which purposes, and for the one as much as for the other, the House of Commons is intended to serve.

Not only, however, ought the State to obtain the services of the ablest men in the House of Commons, but the services also of those who are best fitted to be its ministers. And it can hardly be a matter of doubt that the affairs of the nation would be far more efficiently administered, and the most valuable talent permanently secured to the service of the country,-besides which (no mean consideration of itself), inefficient administrators, whose only claim to office is some party distinction, wholly independent of, it may be inconsistent with, administrative capability, would be as permanently kept out,-if, as in the case of the judges, the great officers of state, more especially the Principal Secretaries, were to be appointed to their offices entirely independent of party, and solely on account of their peculiar fitness to fill them, and the confidence which their characters had inspired. Each of these officers

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might, of course, be rendered removable, as is the case with the judges, on the address of both Houses of Parliament. In the post of Prime Minister and certain other officers with whom might rest the State patronage, enough would still remain as the prizes of party warfare; though, probably, in an equal ratio as these prizes were diminished, would public patriotism be found to increase. The desirableness of rendering the Chancellorship independent of such paltry contests and chances has long been felt, and is pretty generally acknowledged. The danger and disgrace to this great country of a recent "ministerial crisis " may possibly conduce to incline many to the opinion here advanced.

There is no doubt, moreover, that the country ought to secure the best administrative talent in its Principal Secretaries of State which the nation affords, and that whether oratorical ability, or popular manners with a constituency (which are wholly foreign to, and not often coexistent with the first) be combined with it or not. Indeed, according to the strict constitutional principle, not only are the ministers of the crown not required to be present in Parliament, but by an express enactment they are positively excluded from it. And were such only retained as the public service peculiarly required, it would un