considerable influence in its election, but as intended to represent also the different great interests of the State. The Commons, he says, consist of all such men of any property in the kingdom as have not seats in the House of Lords, every one of which has a voice in Parliament, either personally or by his representatives. In a free state, every man, says the Commentator, who is supposed a free agent, ought to be, in some measure, his own governor, and therefore a part at least of the whole legislative power should reside in the whole body of the people. The counties are therefore represented by knights elected by the proprietors of lands; the cities and boroughs are represented by citizens and burgesses, chosen by the mercantile part, or supposed trading interest, of the nation.*

Paley also takes the same view as regards the constitution of the representative assembly of the nation, and its object being to represent not merely numbers, but the various great and leading interests in the state. He says, that, by annexing the right of voting for members of the House of Commons to different qualifications in different places, each order and profession of men in the community become virtually represented; that is, men of all orders and professions, statesmen, courtiers, country gentlemen, lawyers, merchants, ma* Commentaries, vol. i. b. i. c. ii.

nufacturers, soldiers, sailors, interested in the pros. perity, and experienced in the occupation of their respective professions, obtain seats in Parliament. And that the elections, at the same time, are so connected with the influence of landed property, as to afford a certainty that a considerable number of men of great estates will be returned to Parliament; and are also so modified, that men the most eminent and successful in their respective professions are the most likely, by their riches, or the weight of their stations, to prevail in these competitions.*

Similar views are expressed, and the principle here advocated is upheld, by that profound philosophical writer and distinguished politician, Burke, who tells us that nothing is a due and adequate representation of a State that does not represent its ability as well as its property. And in answer to the inquiry, "Whether twenty-four millions ought to prevail over two hundred thousand ?" he replies, "True, if the constitution of a kingdom be a problem of arithmetic." He adds: "The property of France does not govern it: of course property is destroyed, and rational liberty has no existence." †

Such is the constitutional theory of a represen

* Moral Philosophy, vol. ii. b. vi.

† Reflections on the French Revolution.

tative system propounded by these different great writers and political philosophers, where, however varying from one another on many points, they all agree in the necessity of making the leading interest of the State, and not the mere will of the majority of the populace, the predominating influence.

In opposition, however, to the doctrines here maintained, and according to the theory of many in the present day, as developed both in the Reform Act and in the principles propounded by them; the only legitimate interest and influence in the representative body of the nation is that of numbers, which alone are contended to form the real representative element in a free State, and which ought, we are told, to prevail in legislation on all matters, whether relating to property or to persons. The general and leading interests of the State, according to this creed, ought to have no influence in the House of Commons.

The main question, therefore, now at issue, which it is my present object to raise, and which it appears extraordinary has not before been mooted, is this. Ought interests, or ought numbers only, to form the representative element in a State? The cry of the mob, and the principle of the Reform Act, go to establish the latter doctrine. In opposition to them I, however, venture humbly to

submit to the candid reader that the former is the true and the real constitutional theory of representation.

Although I do not deny the right of the people to representation, and to a full, and fair, and direct representation in the House of Commons; yet, on the other hand, I do also contend that the interest of numbers, or what is vulgarly termed the voice of the million, is not the only interest, but merely one out of the several, which ought to exercise influence in the representative assembly of the nation.

It was some time ago declared upon very high authority, and very general assent has, I believe, been given to the proposition, that a measure may be legitimately passed through the House of Commons, though the opinion of a numerical majority of the nation is directly against it. And, in support of this doctrine, it may be observed that, of the whole nation, probably one half at least understand nothing of the nature or merits of the question. Ought, then, their voices to overpower the opinions and votes of those who are acquainted with the matter? Moreover, the higher and more complicated any question is, the less likely is it to be understood by the mass of the people. Which, then, should the Legislature adopt, the opinion of the

* Lord Aberdeen's Speech in the House of Lords on the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, July, 1851.

majority who do not, or of the minority who do, understand the question? If the Legislature is bound to adopt the opinion of the majority, then error may be the proper basis of legislation, and a vast saving of valuable public time might be forthwith effected by altogether dispensing with argument and debate. But if the opinion of a minority who understand the question is to prevail, what becomes of the theory that the voice of the multitude is the only fair representation of the State? If, however, the influence of numbers is not the legitimate representative element of a nation, what is? Can any voice be more mildly deliberative, any mind more intelligent, than that of the mob? This question shall be answered presently, when we come to analyse the different interests, and to define the real representative elements of a State.

Again, it may very often happen with regard to any particular measure which is in course of discussion, that the people will consider it only as to its general and theoretical, without at all regarding it as to its particular and practical, application. The Free-trade question affords us a case exactly in point. It may be admitted, for the sake of illustration, that the opinion of the majority of the nation was decidedly in favour of what is almost an undeniable proposition, that Free-trade in the abstract is a most desirable thing. But it does not