the Trial of the Witnesses; where he will find this point stated and explained in such a manner that no man, that is less a sceptic than the Considerer, can have any doubt about it. The Considerer has made a show of answering this part of the Trial, without stating the author's argument, without seeming to understand one word of the scope of it, and without citing one sentence fairly. So far as that author is concerned, it is sufficient to say in his own words, what is the real truth," that he has said nothing on this occasion but what any man who never saw ice might say against a hundred honest witnesses, who assert that water turns to ice in cold climates."

Of the reason and possibility of miracles in general, I shall now beg leave to talk with him. He is very frank in declaring his opinion with regard to this point, and I have laid it before the reader in his own words. Nothing can well be stronger than the language in which he has expressed it. He seems plainly to declare that miracles are not only impossible in a moral, but in a physical sense; that they are not only inconsistent with the moral attributes, but impossible even to the power of God.

But be this as it will. I shall take the arguments as he himself has stated them, and examine them by the rules of common language and common sense. He has indeed so involved himself in words, that when he has a meaning, it is not easy to come at it. Reason, right reason, truth, and the nature of things, are words of great weight in the apprehensions of most men. Let us see what place they hold in the Considerer's estimation. "What conceptions any man frames to himself of the course of nature from his own experience and observation, are not prejudices and ima

ginations, but what sense and reason are concerned about. This is the very foundation of that right reason, which can never contradict the truth of things." In the first edition it stands thus: "this is the very foundation of right reason; and reason formed from hence can never contradict the truth of things."

If every man's notion of the course of nature is the very foundation, &c. of right reason, then right reason varies as much as people's notions of the course of nature. It is then right reason that says the sun goes round the earth, for this the vulgar reckon to be the course of nature. It is right reason also, to say the sun is fixed, and the planets move round him; for this appears from the experience and observation of astronomers to be the course of nature. But how absurd is it to make right reason depend on the notions which men entertain of the course of nature; when it is the very office and business of reason to rectify the errors which men perpetually fall into in the judg ments they make in this case. Experience and observation show that a cane half in the water and half out is crooked; but reason, on the principle of true science, informs us otherwise. Here then experience and observation are on one side, and reason on the other; and the same conclusion holds true in a thousand instances, and every instance indeed where men make a wrong judgment of what they see. And the fault in this case does not lie in the experience and observation, but in the reasoning on them. Thus men do not err in their observation when they say that water never grows solid in hot climates; but they err in reasoning on this observation, and concluding that the case can never be otherwise. That men die and come not to life again here, is a true observation;

but will this observation prove that it can never be otherwise? We see by observation the effects of the course of nature, but this course of nature depends on causes removed out of our sight. Observation shows how these causes operate generally, but cannot show that they are immutable, and must operate invariably in every instance.

But let us see how he reasons the point of miracles. Take the proposition as it stands, with the reason annexed. "Things asserted which are contrary to the experience and reason of all mankind, and what they know of the law and usual course of nature, (that is, miracles,) are to the common sense and understanding of man utterly impossible." We must rectify the proposition before we come to the reason. In the first part, which is intended as a description of miracles, the Considerer assumes too much; a miracle is indeed contrary to common experience and the usual course of nature, but why contrary to reason? If by reason he means right reason or truth, it is supposing the very thing in question. If he means the faculty of reason, it will come to the same thing, supposing that faculty to be rightly used, otherwise it is nothing to the purpose.

66

With the Considerer's leave, then, I shall expunge the word "reason," (which will not injure the argument,) and the proposition will stand thus: things asserted, which are contrary to the experience of all mankind, and to what they know of the laws and usual course of nature, (that is, miracles,) are, to the common sense and understanding of men, utterly impossible." Now comes the reason; "because such assertions contradict all men's notions of such laws that are known by experience." That is to say, things contrary to experience are impossible, because they are contrary to

experience; or things contrary to what men know of the laws of nature are impossible, because they are contrary to what men know of the laws of nature. This is what the Considerer calls giving a

reason.

But I cannot yet part with the proposition. Miracles, it seems, "are to the common sense and understanding of men impossible." How are we to understand this expression? Does he mean impossible to the reason of men, or impossible to the conceptions of men? Impossible to the reason of man they are not, because the reason of man tells him there is a being who originally gave laws to matter, and regulates the course of nature; and consequently who can, if he pleases, alter or suspend those laws, and change the course of nature. If he means that miracles are impossible to the conceptions of men, it is granted: that is, it is granted that men do not conceive how they are wrought; they do not conceive how or in what manner a dead body is raised to life, nor how or in what manner a word only should give a blind man sight. In this sense the Considerer's proposition may be true, but then it is nothing to his purpose. Miracles are inconceivable; yes, and so are many things that happen every day, which we do not reckon miraculous. It is inconceivable how matter acts on matter, either in gravitation, attraction, magnetism, or in any other well known operation; but we do not therefore give the lie to our senses, and say it does not act, because we cannot conceive how it acts. So that if the Considerer means that miracles are impossible to the reason of men, it is evidently false; if he means that they are impossible to the conceptions of men, it may be true, but is quite beside his purpose.

But let us see how this point is argued in the next page. Perhaps we shall meet with a better reason there. "To believe it possible, (that is, for a dead body to rise again,) contradicts this maxim, that nature is steady and uniform in her operations."" Nature, or the laws of nature, would doubtless, when not controlled by the author of nature, operate steadily and uniformly. A lion would produce a lion, an acorn an oak: matter would continue to gravitate, human beings to die, and dead bodies to mix with the earth, and not come to life again. What does the maxim prove then? Only that a dead body cannot come to life again in the natural way. Nobody disputes this with the Considerer. The question is, whether it may not be done in a supernatural way; whether the great Author of nature, whenever he thinks it convenient, cannot supersede or suspend the general laws of nature. Will the Considerer deny this? If he believes a God and a providence, as he professes to do, he cannot. Well; but it contradicts the aforesaid maxim, because, "one miracle or action done contrary to her (that is, nature's) laws, contradicts all her regular springs and movements, and all that mankind calls truth and reason. How does such an action contradict all nature's uniform movements? Does it imply that her movements are not uniform when uncontrolled? Nothing like it. Does it imply that they are not uniform in that particular instance? that is, that her movements in that instance are contrary to the general course of nature? Most certainly it does, for it is of the essence of a miracle to be contrary to the general course of nature. What then? This proves nothing: it is only giving the thing in dispute as a reason against itself. But let us hear the other part of the reason: "a miracle con