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APPENDIX.

EXTRACTS FROM

VATTELL'S LAW OF NATIONS.

[THE TITLES, MARGINAL ABSTRACTS, AND NOTES, ARE BY MR. BURKE, EXCEPTING SUCH OF THE
NOTES AS ARE HERE DISTINGUISHED.]

that it should be suppressed. To form and sup

CASES OF INTERFERENCE WITH INDE- port an unjust pretension, is to do an injury not

PENDENT POWERS.

BOOK II. CHAP. IV. § 53.

Ir then there is any where a nation of a restless and mischievous disposition, always ready to injure others, to traverse their designs, and to raise domestick troubles, it is not to be doubted, that all have a right to join in order to repress, chastise, and put it ever after out of its power to injure them. Such should be the just fruits of the policy which Machiavel praises in Cæsar Borgia. The conduct followed by Philip II. king of Spain, was adapted to unite all Europe against him; and it was from just reasons that Henry the Great formed the design of humbling a power, formidable by its forces, and pernicious by its maxims. § 70. Let us apply to the unjust, what we have said above, (§ 53,) of a mischievous, or maleficent nation. If there be any that makes an open profession of trampling justice under foot, of despising and violating the right of others,† whenever it finds an opportunity, the interest of human society will authorize all others to unite, in order to humble and chastise it. We do not here forget the maxim established in our preliminaries, that it does not belong to nations to usurp the power of being judges of each other. In particular cases, liable to the least doubt, it ought not to be supposed, that each of the parties may have some right and the injustice of that which has committed the injury may proceed from errour, and not from a general contempt of justice. But if, by constant maxims, and by a continued conduct, one nation shews, that it has evidently this pernicious disposition, and that it considers no right as sacred, the safety of the human race requires

This is the case of France-Semonville at Turin-Jacobin clubs-Liegois meeting-Flemish meeting-La Fayette's answer -Cloot's embassy-Avignon.

only to him who is interested in this pretension, but to mock at justice in general, and to injure all nations.

To succour

ranny.

The lish Revolu

56. If the prince, attacking the fundamental laws, gives his subjects against tya legal right to resist him; if tyranny, becoming insupportable, obliges the nation to rise in their defence; every foreign power has a right to succour an oppressed people who implore their assistance. The English justly com- Case of Engplained of James the Second. nobility, and the most distinguished tion. patriots, resolved to put a check on his enterprises, which manifestly tended to overthrow the constitution, and to destroy the liberties and the religion of the people; and therefore applied for assistance to the United Provinces. The authority of the prince of Orange had, doubtless, an influence on the deliberations of the states-general; but it did not make them commit injustice; for when a people, from good reasons, take up arms against an oppressor, justice and generosity require, that brave men should be assisted in the defence of their liberties. Whenever, therefore, Case of civil a civil war is kindled in a state, war. foreign powers may assist that party which appears to them to have justice on their side. He who assists an odious tyrant, he who declares FOR AN UNJUST AND REBELLIOUS PEOPLE, offends against his duty. When the bands of the political society are broken, or at least suspended, between the sovereign Sovereign and and his people, they may then be his people when distinct considered as two distinct powers; powers. and since each is independent of all foreign authority, nobody has a right to judge them. Either may be in the right; and each of

rant.

An odious tyRebellious people.

+ The French acknowledge no power not directly emanating from the people.

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Not to be

jects to a re

volt.

But we ought not to abuse this pursued to an maxim for authorizing odious proextreme. ceedings against the tranquillity of states. It is a violation of the law of nations to Endeavour to persuade those subjects to revolt who persuade sub actually obey their sovereign, though they complain of his government. The practice of nations is conformable to our maxims. When the German protestants came to the assistance of the reformed in France, the court never undertook to treat them otherwise than as common enemies, and according to the laws of war. France at the same time assisted the Netherlands, which took up arms against Spain, and did not pretend that her troops should be considered upon any other footing than as auxiliaries in a regular war. But no power avoids cite subjects complaining of an atrocious injury, if any one attempts by his emissaries to excite his subjects to revolt.

Attempt to ex

to revolt.

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BOOK II. CHAP. XII. § 196.

It is asked if that alliance subsists with the king, and the royal family, when by some revolution they are deprived of their crown? We have lately remarked, (§ 194,) that a personal alliance expires with the reign of him who contracted it: but that is to be understood of an alliance with

By the seventh Article of the Treaty of TRIPLE ALLIANCE, between France, England, and Holland, signed at the Hague, in the year 1717, it is stipulated, "that if the kingdoms, countries, "or provinces, of any of the allies, are disturbed by intestine " quarrels, or by rebellions, on account of the said successions, "[the protestant succession to the throne of Great Britain, and "the succession to the throne of France, as settled by the treaty "of Utrecht,] or under any other pretext whatever, the ally thus in "trouble shall have full right to demand of his allies the succours "above mentioned;" that is to say, the same succours as in the case of an invasion from any foreign power; 8000 foot and 2000 horse to be furnished by France or England, and 4000 foot and 1000 horse by the States General.

ance to preserve a king

the state, limited as to its duration, to the reign of the contracting king. This of which we are here speaking is of another nature. For though it binds the state, since it is bound by all the publick acts of its sovereign, it is made directly in favour of the king and his family; it When an alliwould therefore be absurd for it to terminate at the moment when they takes place. have need of it, and at an event against which it was made. Besides, the king does not King does not lose his quality merely by the loss of lose his quality by the his kingdom. If he is stripped of loss of his it unjustly by an usurper, or by re- kingdom. bels, he preserves his rights, in the number of which are his alliances.

But who shall judge, if the king be dethroned lawfully or by violence? An independent nation acknowledges no judge. If the body of the nation declares the king deprived of his rights by the abuse he has made of them, and deposes him, it may justly do it when its grievances are well founded, and no other power has a right to censure it. The personal ally of this king ought not then to assist him against the nation that has made use of its right in deposing him if he attempts it, he injures that nation. England declared war against Louis the XIV. in the year 1688, for supporting the interest of James the Second, who was deposed in form by the nation. The same country declared war against him a second time, at the beginning of the present century, because that prince acknowledged the son of the deposed James, under the name of James the Third. In doubtful cases, and when the body of the nation has not pronounced or HAS NOT PRONOUNCED FREELY, a sovereign may naturally support and defend an ally, and it is then that the voluntary law of nations subsists between different states. The party that has driven out the king pretends to have right on its side: this unhappy king and his ally flatter themselves with having the same advantage; and as they have no common judge upon earth, they have no other method to take but to apply to arms to terminate the dispute: they therefore engage in a formal war.

aid may be Case wherein given to a deposed king.

In short, when the foreign prince has faithfully fulfilled his engagements towards an Not obliged to unfortunate monarch, when he has pursue his right beyond done in his defence, or to procure his a certain restoration, all he was obliged to per- point. form in virtue of the alliance; if his efforts are ineffectual, the dethroned prince cannot require him to support an endless war in his favour, or expect that he will eternally remain the enemy of

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By the fourth Article of the Treaty of QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE, between England, France, Holland, and the emperour of Germany, signed in the year 1718, the contracting powers "promise "and oblige themselves that they will and ought to maintain, guarantee, and defend the right and succession to the kingdom "of France, according to the tenour of the treaties made at Utrecht the 11th day of April 1713; and this they shall perform against all persons whatsoever who may presume to disturb the "order of the said succession, in contradiction to the previous acts "and treaties subsequent thereon."

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The above treaties have been revived and confirmed by every subsequent treaty of peace between Great Britain and France.-EDIT.

Case of de

SYSTEM OF EUROPE.

the nation, or of the sovereign who has deprived | just and ambitious dispositions, by doing the least him of the throne. He must think of peace, injustice to another, every nation may avail themabandon the ally, and consider him as having selves of the occasion, and join their forces to those himself abandoned his right, through necessity. of the party injured, in order to reduce that ambiThus Louis XIV. was obliged to abandon James tious power, and disable it from so easily oppressthe Second, and to acknowledge King William, ing its neighbours, or keeping them in continual though he had at first treated him as an usurper. awe and fear. For an injury gives a nation a The same question presents itself in real alli- right to provide for its future safety, by taking ances, and, in general, in all alliances made with away from the violator the means of oppression. the state, and not in particular with a king for the It is lawful, and even praise-worthy, to assist those defence of his person. An ally ought, who are oppressed, or unjustly attacked. fence against doubtless, to be defended against subjects. every invasion, against every foreign violence, and even against his rebellious subjects; in the same manner a republick ought to be de- § 47. Europe forms a political system, a body, fended against the enterprises of one who attempts where the whole is connected by the relations and to destroy the publick liberty. But it ought to different interests of nations inhabiting this part of be remembered, that an ally of the state, or the the world. It is not, as anciently, a confused nation, is not its judge. If the nation has de- | heap of detached pieces, each of which thought itposed its king in form; if the people of a repub- self very little concerned in the fate of others, and lick have driven out their magistrates and set seldom regarded things which did not immediately themselves at liberty, or acknowledged the au- relate to it. The continual attention of sovereigns thority of an usurper, either expressly or tacitly; to what is on the carpet, the constant residence of to oppose these domestick regulations, by disput- ministers, and the perpetual negociations, make ing their justice or validity, would be to interfere Europe a kind of a republick, the in the government of the nation, and to do it an members of which, though indepen- publick to injury (see § 54, and following of this book). dent, unite, through the ties of com- preserve order and liberty. The ally remains the ally of the state, notwith- | mon interest for the maintenance of standing the change that has happened in it. How-order and liberty. Hence arose that famous ever, when this change renders the al- scheme of the political equilibrium, or balance of liance useless, dangerous, or dis- power; by which is understood such a disposition agreeable, it may renounce it: for it of things, as no power is able absolutely to premay say, upon a good foundation, that dominate, or to prescribe laws to others.

Case where

real alliances

may be renounced.

it would not have entered into an alliance with that nation, had it been under the present form of government.

We may say here, what we have said on a personal alliance: however just the cause of that king may be, who is driven from the throne, either by his subjects or by a foreign usurper; his allies Not an eter- are not obliged to support an eternal

Europe a re

§ 49. Confederacies would be a sure way of preserving the equilibrium, and supporting the liberty of nations, did all princes thoroughly understand their true interests, and regulate all their steps for the good of the state.

CONTRIBUTIONS IN THE ENEMY'S
COUNTRY.

BOOK III. CHAP. IX.

$165.

nal war. war in his favour. After having made ineffectual efforts to restore him, they must at length give peace to their people, and come to an accommodation with the usurper, and for that Instead of the pillage of the country, and depurpose treat with him as with a lawful sovereign. fenceless places, a custom has been substituted Louis XIV., exhausted by a bloody and unsuc- more humane and more advantageous to the sovecessful war, offered at Gertruydenburgh to abandon reign making war: I mean that of contributions. his grandson, whom he had placed on the throne Whoever carries on a just war has a right of of Spain and, when affairs had changed their ap-making the enemy's country contribute to the suppearance, Charles of Austria, the rival of Philip, saw himself, in his turn, abandoned by his allies. They grew weary of exhausting their states, in order to give him the possession of a crown, which they believed to be his due, but which, to all appearance, they should never be able to procure for him.

port of the army, and towards defraying all the charges of the war. Thus he obtains a part of what is due to him, and the subjects of the enemy, on submitting to this imposition, are secured from pillage, and the country is preserved but a general who would not sully his reputa- To be motion is to moderate his contributions, derate. and proportion them to those on whom they are imposed. An excess in this point is not without the reproach of cruelty and inhumanity if it It is still easier to prove, that should shews less ferocity than ravage and destruction, it this formidable power betray any un-glares with avarice.

DANGEROUS POWER.
BOOK III. CHAP. III. § 45.

All nations
may join.
Contributions raised by the Duke of Brunswick in France.

Compare these with the contributions raised by the French in the Netherlands.-EDIT.

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evident danger, or without doing it a remarkable prejudice.*

ASYLUM.

BOOK I. CHAP. XIX. § 232.

If an exile or banished man is driven from his country for any crime, it does not belong to the nation in which he has taken refuge to punish him for a fault committed in a foreign country. For nature gives to mankind and to nations the right of punishing only for their defence and safety; whence it follows that he can only be punished by those whom he has offended.

FOREIGN MINISTERS.

BOOK IV. CHAP. 5. § 66.

The obligation does not go so far as to suffer at all times, perpetual ministers, who are desirous of residing with a sovereign, though they have nothing to negociate. It is natural, indeed, and very agreeable to the sentiments which nations owe to each other, that these resident ministers, when there is nothing to be feared from their stay, should be friendly received; but if there be any solid reason against this, what is for the good of the state ought unquestionably to be preferred; and the foreign sovereign cannot take it amiss if his minister, who has concluded the affairs of his commission, and has no other affairs to negociate, be desired to depart. The custom of keeping every where ministers continually resident is now so strongly established, that the refusal of a conformity to it would, without very good reasons, give offence. These reasons may arise from particular conjunctures; but there are also common reasons always subsisting, and such as relate to the constitution of a government, and the state of a nation. The republicks have often very good reasons for the latter kind, to excuse themselves from continually suffering foreign ministers, who corrupt the citizens, in order to gain them over to their masters, to the great prejudice of the republick, and fomenting of the parties, &c. And should they only diffuse among a nation, formerly plain, frugal, and virtuous, a taste for luxury, Ibid. § 230. Every nation has a right of refus-avidity for money, and the manners of courts, these ing to admit a stranger into the country, when he cannot enter into it without putting it into

§ 233. But this reason shews, that if the justice of each nation ought in general to be confined to the punishment of crimes committed within its own territories, we ought to except from this rule the villains who, by the quality and habitual frequency of their crimes, violate all publick security, and declare themselves the enemies of the human race. Poisoners, assassins, and incendiaries by profession, may be exterminated wherever they are seized; for they attack and injure all nations, by trampling under foot the foundations of the common safety. Thus pirates are brought to the gibbet, by the first into whose hands they fall. If the sovereign of the country where those crimes have been committed re-claims the authors of them, in order to bring them to punishment, they ought to be restored to him, as one who is principally interested in punishing them in an exemplary manner: and it being proper to convict the guilty, and to try them according to some form of law; this is a second [not sole] reason, why malefactors are usually delivered up at the desire of the state where their crimes have been committed.

The third article of the treaty of triple alliance, and the latter part of the fourth article of the treaty of quadruple alliance

would be more than sufficient for wise and provident rulers to dismiss them.

stipulates, that no kind of refuge or protection shall be given to rebellious subjects of the contracting powers.-EDIT.

↑ Dismission of M. Chauvelin.-EDIT.

OBSERVATIONS

ON THE

CONDUCT OF THE MINORITY,

PARTICULARLY IN THE

LAST SESSION OF PARLIAMENT;

ADDRESSED TO

THE DUKE OF PORTLAND AND LORD FITZWILLIAM.

1793.

LETTER TO HIS GRACE THE DUKE OF PORTLAND.

MY DEAR LORD,

THE paper, which I take the liberty of sending to your Grace, was, for the greater part, written during the last session. A few days after the prorogation some few observations were added. I was resolved however to let it lie by me for a considerable time; that in viewing the matter at a proper distance, and when the sharpness of recent impressions had been worn off, I might be better able to form a just estimate of the value of my first opinions.

I have just now read it over very coolly and deliberately. My latest judgment owns my first sentiments and reasonings, in their full force, with regard both to persons and things.

During a period of four years, the state of the world, except for some few and short intervals, has filled me with a good deal of serious inquietude. I considered a general war against jacobins and jacobinism, as the only possible chance of saving Europe (and England as included in Europe) from a truly frightful revolution. For this I have been censured, as receiving through weakness, or spreading through fraud and artifice, a false alarm. Whatever others may think of the matter, that alarm, in my mind, is by no means quieted. The state of affairs abroad is not so much mended, as to make me, for one, full of confidence. At home, I see no abatement whatsoever in the zeal of the partisans of jacobinism towards their cause, nor any cessation in their efforts to do mischief. What is doing by Lord Lauderdale on the first scene of Lord George Gordon's actions, and in his spirit, is not calculated to remove my apprehensions. They pursue their first

object with as much eagerness as ever, but with more dexterity. Under the plausible name of peace, by which they delude or are deluded, they would deliver us unarmed, and defenceless, to the confederation of jacobins, whose center is indeed in France, but whose rays proceed in every direction throughout the world. I understand that Mr. Coke, of Norfolk, has been lately very busy in spreading a disaffection to this war (which we carry on for our being) in the county in which his property gives him so great an influence. It is truly alarming to see so large a part of the aristocratick interest engaged in the cause of the new species of democracy, which is openly attacking, or secretly undermining, the system of property by which mankind has hitherto been governed. But we are not to delude ourselves. No man can be connected with a party which professes publickly to admire, or may be justly suspected of secretly abetting, this French Revolution, who must not be drawn into its vortex, and become the instrument of its designs.

What I have written is in the manner of apology. I have given it that form, as being the most respectful; but I do not stand in need of any apology for my principles, my sentiments, or my conduct. I wish the paper I lay before your Grace to be considered as my most deliberate, solemn, and even testamentary protest against the proceedings and doctrines which have hitherto produced so much mischief in the world, and which will infallibly produce more, and possibly greater. It is my protest against the delusion, by which some have been taught to look upon this jacobin

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