Creation proves a God". As thus: 1st. From our own knowledge and experience we are assured. that some things which exist had a beginning, for we ourselves can state the time when they were not. If any thing which exists had a beginning, it follows that, by tracing up the order or series of such production, we must at last come to something which had no beginning, for this plain reason, nothing can be a beginning to itself. Whatever had no beginning, must be from all eternity P.

2dly. Again, whatever exists, was either made or not made.

If it was not made, we come at once to the idea of an independent, efficient cause, or first principle.

• "Res aliquas esse, quæ esse cœperint, sensu ipso et confessione omnium constat. Eæ autem res sibi non fuerunt causa ut essent, nam quod non est, agere non potest, nec ipsa res esse potuit, antiquam esset. Sequitur igitur, ut aliunde habuerint sui originem: quod non tantum de illis rebus, quas ipsi aut conspicimus aut conspeximus fatendum est; sed et de iis unde illæ ortum habent, donec tandem ad aliquam causam perveniamus, quæ esse nunquam cœperit, quæque sit, ut loqui solemus, non contingenter, sed necessario." Grotius de Verit. Rel. Chris. lib. 1. § 2.

33.

P Wollaston's Religion of Nature, sect. v. § 1. p. 114. Clarke on the Attributes, prop. 1. Pearson on the Creed, art. 1. p. Locke on Human Understanding, book 4. chap. x. § 3-8.

If it was made, it was made by some other; (for to suppose that any thing produced itself, would be to allow that it was and was not, in the same respect, at the same time, which is absurd ;) that other was in like manner produced. Till we arrive at length at something which was never made. Or we must admit one of three impossibilities; either that the series of such productions is infinite in number, or that a finite number of them are infinite in duration, or that the effect produced its cause. Whatever was never made, must be self-existent.

3dly. Again; all things in existence answer some end. Whatever hath its being for some end, that end is the cause of its production. Every thing in existence is so ordained, that the end of each has produced the harmony of the whole. The harmony of the whole proves one supreme Cause'; possessed of infinite wisdom, to regulate all things; of infinite power, to govern

4 Rennell on Scepticism, chap. x. Bentley's Confutation of Atheism, Serm. III. § 1. p. 89-95.

That the links in the series cannot be infinite in number or duration, is hence apparent. Each, by our supposition, is made by the one immediately preceding it. But whenever any thing is made, there must be some fixed assignable time when it was made; which is incompatible with the idea of eternity.

"Si duo, essent, aut plures Dei libere agentes et volentes, possent contraria velle; impediretur alter ab altero, quo minus quod vellet efficeretur: impediri autem posse Deo indignum est." Grotius. De Verit. Rel. Christ. lib. 1. § 2.

all things; of infinite goodness, to have produced so beautiful and admirable a system'.

There must therefore be a Being who had no beginning, i. e. who has existed from all eternity; who was never made; consequently is self-existent; who is the supreme cause of all things; and, as such, possessed of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness. Such a Being is the God we adore".

Q. Was not your argument complete when you proved the existence of a Being who had no beginning, and was never made, i. e. who was from all eternity, and self-existent ?

A. No; for neither of these proofs went the length of shewing that there were not more Gods than one. Though they might therefore con

t Barrow on "the Being of God proved from the Frame of

the World." Vol. ii. Serm. VI.

Cicero proves the being of God thus: "Si est aliquid in rerum naturâ, quod hominis meus, quod ratio, quod vis, quod potestas humana efficere non possit: est certe id, quod illud effecit, homine melius. Atqui res cœlestes, omnesque eæ, quarum est ordo sempiternus, ab homine confici non possunt. Est igitur id, quo illa conficiuntur, homine melius. Id autem quid potius dixeris, quam Deum? Etenim si Dei non sunt, quid esse potest in rerum naturâ hominè melius? In eo enim solo ratio est, quâ nihil potest esse præstantius. Esse autem hominem, qui nihil in omni mundo melius esse quàm se putet, desipientis arrogantiæ est. Ergo est aliquid melius. Est igitur profecto Deus." Cic. De Natur. Deor. lib. 11. § 6.

vince the Atheist, they were not sufficient to silence the objections of the Polytheist the unity of God, that doctrine which forms a leading and necessary feature in our notion of the Divinity, was consequently proved in the third place.

Q. Having proved the being and unity of God. from the constitution of human nature, and the beauty and harmony which reign throughout the creation, may you not advance another step, and establish the existence of the Deity by a consideration of those supernatural events, which are independent of the laws of nature, and exceed human power?

A. Miracles prove a Deity; for they are evidently the work of some Being, whose power can control and alter the fixed operations of nature, in such a way as man cannot attain unto, or even conceive. He who, by the might of his hand, and the fiat of his will, could turn back the waters of the sea, so that they stood as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, whilst the Israelites passed through the midst of the sea, as upon dry ground; he who could stop the sun in its course, and say unto the moon, stand thou still in the valley of Ajalon, and it was stayed, whilst he delivered up the wicked nation of the Amorites to destruction: such a

Exod. xiv. 21, 22.

y Joshua x. 12..

Being, with such miraculous powers, is, must be, God, even the same who made the world.

Prophecy is evidently super-human; for man can only reason and draw conclusions from what he sees and knows; and even the knowledge and foresight of the chiefest of men, is erring and limited. Whereas, prophecy is an exhibition of infinite knowledge, and unerring foresight. Man can only conjecture; prophecy declares with certainty. What man indeed could even venture to surmise, with any show of reason, what characters would arise, and fill the pages of history; say, a hundred years hence? Whereas the birth of Josiah, and his destruction of the altars of Bethel, which Jeroboam, the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin, had set up, were foretold several hundred years before the com+ ing of that prince, who exactly fulfilled the precise part the prophet of the Lord had foredoomed he should act. The destruction of Babylon, that mighty city, with its hundred gates of solid brass, was proclaimed by the Lord two hundred years before it took place; and at the same time, the renowned conqueror, who was to execute the will of the Almighty in that great work, was singled out by name. We might instance the tri

Three hundred and forty.

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* 1 Kings xiii. 1. 6. 2 Kings xxiii. 15, 16.

b

Cyrus. See Isaiah xliv. 18.xlv. 1. 3. Jeremiah xxix. 10.