the index of Appearance and Reality to see whether I could avoid offending Mr Bradley in any way; but, if we may judge by the index of his book, nothing ever really happens in his philosophy, any more than in the prophetic books of Blake, and all that the real can do is to appear. However, I have done what I could in order to confine myself within the limits laid down for me, and would distinguish merely between one and the same content, and the mode of its appearance at different centres, for it is not so much identity of content, as of process that concerns us. And, since this identity of process is only attained "the higher we mount from the facts of sense,"1 there seems reason for seeking in that quarter especially, conditions of the communion of souls. That is to say, the point at which identity of process seems to be realised by different souls, is the furthest away from the range within which—to use Mr Bradley's phrase "souls influence one another by means of their bodies."

But if an individualist psychology is a contradiction, as we have seen reason to hold, we find ourselves drawing the conclusions to which we are committed, even on the principles of Mr Bradley. "All psychology in its practice is compelled to admit the working power of identity." 2 And again he says: "In the course of the soul's internal history, we must admit that the sameness of 2 Op. cit., 355

1 Appearance and Reality, 345.

its states is an actual mover.' "1 We are bound to extend the interpretation of identity which is thus affirmed for the individual soul, to groups of souls. The identity of feeling, of aspiration, of judgment, is a mover. In other words, the communion of souls is something more than a mere similarity.

Another criticism of the same writer is met by the theory of the oversoul. "Most of those," we are assured, "who insist on what they call the personality of God, are intellectually dishonest. They desire one thing, and to reach it they argue for another. . . . The Deity which they want is of course finite, a person much like themselves, with thoughts and feelings limited and mutable in the process of time. They desire a person in the sense of a self, amongst and over against other selves, moved by personal relation and feelings towards these others-feelings and relations which are altered by the conduct of the others." 2 I am not aware of any considerable theologians against whom Mr Bradley's accusation holds. The communion of the soul with God is not as of one self with another, but as of the soul coming to its true self in the spirit; God being, in the words of Augustine, "the life of life." By denying the communion of souls, Mr Bradley destroys inevitably the other parts of the theological system.

Let us now consider for a moment the objections directed by Ritschl and his school against the mystical union of the soul with God.

1 Appearance and Reality, 353.

We will

consider these objections in the form of the conclusion to which they are supposed to lead, namely, that the union of the soul with God, or of Jesus with God, is simply a union of intention. But to speak in this way is really to touch upon the deeps of the soul. Nothing can be more profound than the harmony which has for its centre the springs of conduct. In fact the notion of a oneness of will is simply the explicit form of the thought that is implicit in the mystical union. Hence the sincere use of the third petition in the Lord's Prayer has a mystical meaning, or, to express this better, aspiration cannot go beyond this petition.

Lastly, the individual comes to his full rights in the oversoul. There is no conflict between the oversoul and the characteristic qualities of genius. In fact the special character of genius is guarded against the ridiculous method of Lombroso by marking off the "normal" from the "average," and also from the "morbid "; a task which beforehand would seem rather superfluous. In the complex

human personality, the community of feeling, etc., in the oversoul, accompanies the flowering of supreme genius. Homer and Shakespeare and Goethe are at once the most unique and the most universal of minds. They fulfil their office in the revelation of the human spirit by reflecting the true meaning of that revelation to the utmost. And this is precisely what the average mind cannot do l'homme sensuel moyen might indeed be described as the precise negation of the oversoul,

CHAPTER IV

THE SOUL'S AWAKENING

Complexity of process-Diversity and modesty-The possibility of instantaneous conversion-Relation to final perseverance— Conversion as instantaneous change of motive-As causing the introspective habit-And so self-torment-Effect on doctrineShrinking from ridicule—Humour—Introspection and preaching-Development of introspection-Search for consistencyClarification of feeling-Faith and experience-Sin.

THE

HE soul, as it develops, enters into fresh relations with the oversoul. A more or less complete terminology has been given to one particular stage in this development, that, namely, in which the soul first becomes conscious of its relation to the oversoul. The new birth, conversion, reconciliation, justification, election, all denote rather aspects of a process than a complete experience. They are an instance, further, of a principle on which stress has been laid; that there is a difference of form as well as of content in different experiences. The development of the soul takes place in such a way that no single description of any stage—or at least of any later stage-in that development, can apply to all persons. It is lamentable to think how many commentaries have been vainly composed upon

the letters of St Paul, for lack of remembering the simple and obvious fact that the religious life which he described was the one he knew, namely, his own; and that only, by a strange coincidence, can it tally to any considerable extent with the religious life of another man.

Many instances suggest themselves which show the serious consequences which follow for the spiritual life, from the assumption that we can enter upon it only in one way. The discipline of the Jesuit novice is avowedly intended to stifle individual character and leave in its place the passive obedience of an instrument. Hence we

can understand why one and the same course is imposed upon all. But although this discipline is wonderfully adapted to the purpose for which it is designed, it seems to have contributed to the curious mediocrity above which the members of the society have so rarely risen, and below which they have not often fallen. The Society of Jesus has been wonderfully prolific in minds of the second rank, but it has fallen short, with a few rare exceptions, of the breath of genius-that gust of the spirit that only blows where the air is free.

So also in a very different quarter, a uniform plan of salvation has been imposed upon thousands of persons by the later exponents of the evangelical revival, who have been unconscious that what they called the plan of salvation was simply the reduction of St Paul's experience to