THE INCOMPETENCY OF REASON, AND THE FITNESS OF REVELATION.

REV. R. S. CANDLISH, A.M.

ST. GEORGE'S CHURCH, EDINBURGH, SEPTEMBER 14, 1834*.

"Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you."-Acrs, xvii. 23.

THIS discourse of St. Paul is an admirable specimen of that sound discretion, in the exercise of which, without compromising principle-yea, rather for the very purpose of asserting and enforcing principle-he "became all things to all men." For it was not his doctrine that he accommodated to the views of his hearers: that he never changed or modified: the truth which he taught was always the same truth, for it was the truth as it is in Jesus. It was simply his manner of stating, and illustrating, and proving the truth, that he varied according to circumstances, to suit the different classes with which he had to deal, and the different degrees and states of knowledge with which he came in contact; that so the truth might have a favourable hearing. He became all things to all men, if by any means he might gain some.

This is plainly necessary in every attempt to convince and persuade reasonable men. There must be some mutually acknowledged principle; we must take some common ground on which to build our argument; and that ground must differ in regard to different individuals and classes of individuals. Thus, in arguing with the Jews on the one hand, and the Gentiles on the other, concerning the truth and reasonableness of the Gospel, the Apostle did not adopt the same mode; he proceeded according to the different principles they were willing to acknowledge. In the case of the Jews, the common ground he had with them was, the Old Testament Scriptures. In the case of the Gentiles, the common ground was, what are called the articles of natural religion, whether the discoveries of reason or the traditional remains of original revelation. Yet still the Apostle always aimed at the same result, the bringing both Jews and Gentiles to the knowledge and the belief of the grace and the judgment of God in Christ. Here in particular, in the Areopagus of Athens, and addressing the chief men of that learned and polite city, he takes a tone of high moral dignity, well befitting the place and the audience: the place-that venerable hall of judgment where, in circumstances not altogether unlike his own, the wisest of men once pleaded the cause of a sounder faith against the bigotry of his more ignorant countrymen: the audience-the select and chosen among those whose profound wisdom, on all subjects of human thought, is still the admiration and the delight of the world. He met them on their own field, and fought them with their own

• For the benefit of the Gaelic Schools.

weapons: yet he spared them not; he shunned not to declare the whole counsel of God.

The discourse begins with a bold uncompromising charge of ignorance of what they professed much to study the Divine Nature; and ends with a solemn statement of the resurrection of Christ from his vicarious grave, as proving both the present grace and the future judgment of the Lord; and so he fulfils the design which is pronounced in the words of the text, "Whom ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you."

Now, the charge brought against these men of Athens, placed as they were in the very centre and strong hold of the highest cultivation of human reason, may be regarded as equivalent to a charge of insufficiency or incompetency against that reason itself in its best estate: and the Apostle's undertaking to instruct these learned reasoners, is equivalent to an assertion of the fitness of revelation to supply the deficiency and to help out the infirmity of human reason; which points, accordingly, we propose now to consider; premising only further, that, when we speak in accordance with common language, on the subject of natural religion, or the religion of reason as distinguished from revelation, we do not mean to hold either that natural reason would have been able to originate such a religion, or that religion should have been so originated: the first of which assertions is at least very doubtful; and the second is opposed both to reason and Scripture; both indicating a primeval religion imperfectly preserved, and corrupted by tradition; or (it may be) that there is an amount of religious truth which natural reason, when once it has got a hold of, can ascertain and prove; which, however, is to be received on the evidence of argument, and which may fitly prepare the way for the more proper and peculiar discoveries of revelation, to be received on the evidence of the testimony of God, the faith of the record of God.

The religion, then, of these Athenians may be regarded as representing the religion of natural reason, as it existed under the most favourable circumstances: and that religion is here pronounced to be insufficient, not by the advocate of revelation rejecting reason altogether as quite inadmissible in such a question, but by one who himself, in the sequel, appeals to reason as good, so far as it goes, though it does not go far enough. "I perceive," says the Apostle, “that in all things ye are too superstitious"-too prone, that is, to the fear of invisible powers. Such is the meaning of the word: to stand in awe, in dread of something formidable, unseen, and unknown. Accordingly the Apostle so explains his own accusation in the twenty-third verse: taking advantage of an inscription which he observed on one of their own altars, he shows them to be ignorant according to their own confession, in regard to the object of their worship, and therefore superstitious in worshipping him. "Ye men of Athens, I perceive that in all things ye are too superstitious. For as I passed by, and beheld your devotions, I found an altar with this inscription, To the unknown God."

Now, their ignorance in regard to the object of their worship was two-fold: both as to the nature of God in himself, and as to the character which God assumes in relation to his creatures. First of all, they knew not what he was; nor, secondly, did they know how he was dealing with them. In the twentyfourth and twenty-ninth verses, we see what ideas they entertained concerning

the nature of God. They believed that he dwelt in temples made with hands, or that he was like to gold or silver graven by art and man's device. And then, again, in the twenty-fifth verse, we see what ideas they entertained of God in his relation to his reasonable creatures: they conceived of him as being worshipped and propitiated with men's offerings, as though he needed something.

But more, they worshipped God in ignorance of his real nature; they did not know him as a spiritual subsistence. They conceived of him as having a bodily structure, occupying an earthly habitation. The Godhead they considered to be well represented by idols of gold or silver, graven by man's device, and fitly and literally lodged in temples made with hands.

Now, in so far as ignorance on this point is concerned, it is not chargeable as a defect on natural religion, or the religion of reason: it is the fault of those who will not use their natural religion aright on the subject. For mark: the Apostle, in replying to such unworthy views of the Divine Nature, appeals to natural reason itself as quite sufficient to have taught men better. He argues with them on the principles of their own common sense. In the twenty-fourth verse: He who made and upholds all things, the great First Cause, the Ruler of the universe, must be an intelligent mind: he cannot be, as you suppose, like a stock or a stone: your own reason must show that his nature is a spiritual nature. And this is further evident from the consideration of your own nature. He who made you rational intelligent beings, must be himself a Rational Intelligent Spirit. This is the Apostle's argument in the twenty-ninth verse; for having occasion to quote the sentiment of one of their own poets-“We are all his offspring"-he returned again to the subject of the nature of God, and uses this as arguing, that there must be some correspondence between the cause and the effect.

In considering, therefore, the world around us, so full of proofs of design; and our own spirits, so fearfully and wonderfully made, natural religion is sufficient to teach us that there must be a great designing Cause, a Spiritual Being, whose intelligence pervades all his works. So far human reason, rightly exercised, is a sure and competent teacher of religion; and as such the Apostle Paul recognises it in the first chapter of Romans, when he says that, the invisible things of God, even his eternal power and Godhead, are clearly seen in the things that he hath made; so that men are without excuse, because when they night have known God as a spiritual being, they "changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things."

Ignorance, then, superstition on this part of the subject (we mean, the nature of God as a spiritual being), is not an evil for which natural religion is fairly responsible. Reason, judging from the evidence of design, of intention, and contrivance the wise adaptation of good means and modes to good ends in the constitution of external nature, and the constitution of every human being, can confidently announce this fundamental truth of religion, that there is a Supreme Intelligence, a Spiritual Being, whose energy is above, around, and in all his creatures. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy works." All his works praise him: and the more we know of the vast extent and the arrangements of these works, the more we know of the wondrous riches and understanding of the Infinite Mind which planned them all.

It is the reward of science, as in enlarged views she grasps unlimited space, and views in their progress the unnumbered orbs, and almost seems to regulate the majesty of their movements; so that the wandering planet returns after long absence at the very instant of its appointed time, as though at the bidding of her potent spell: or, again, as with keen and prying eyes she searches every nook and recess of this earth, and drags to light tokens and traces of another world, and finds in all new proofs of exquisite and beautifully adjusted harmony of design; or, again, as she tortures every substance of nature with inquisitorial research, to extort the secrets of its structure, and observes, with increasing intensity of interest, the bones, and sinews, and nerves, of this marvellously compacted frame of ours: oh, is it not the great and glorious reward of science, to see, at every step she takes in these her several and various paths, the almighty, the intelligent mind of a God; and instead of impiously arrogating to herself a poor and ephemeral honour for the discoveries that she makes, joyfully and cheerfully to ascribe to the Creator alone all the glory and all the praise of that consummate unerring wisdom which these discoveries do more and more every day, from all his works, convince us in all corners of his dominions do abound.

Far, very far, then, be it from any devout mind, out of an unreasonable jealousy, to resist or stay the progress of discovery, or to look with suspicious eye on efforts for the advancement of knowledge. To enlarge the information as to the nature of the universe, can never be dangerous to him who engages in it, and necessarily leads to discoveries of Him who is the God of Truth. Full scope is given to inquire into all the wonders, whether of the natural world without, or the mental world within. It is your dignity, it is your duty so to inquire. You are men; and you are commanded to be men in understanding: and as men you are to assert your privilege of investigating all the works of your Creator: and in so doing you are to follow truth wherever it may lead. You are not constituted the judges of consequences and results: your business is with the truth itself; not to determine what should be, but to discover what is. This is the course becoming alike the reason and the infirmity of man ; these are the limits within which you are safely and surely set. Cast your eye all around; only prosecute your investigations with due caution, and put them faithfully and fairly together; and you may fearlessly go on to the conclusion which is suggested, that they shall all tend to shed new lustre on the wisdom in which the Lord has made all his manifold works.

Doubtless it may be said, and said truly, that such minute inquiry into the secrets of nature, is not necessary to evince the knowledge of nature's God: there need not be any such extensive accumulation of proofs and evidences; the argument of design lies on the very surface of creation, so plain that even he who runs may read; and the statement of the argument in a single sentence, is enough to show the existence of a Being not confined to temples made with hands, nor like unto gold, or silver, or stone-a Spirit infinite in power and wisdom. Even unlearned men, from a single such evidence of design, may be made to see the nature of God, and the absurdity of those conceptions of the Deity which vulgar superstition creates. Yet it is not unsatisfactory to put the question to a more rigorous test, to trace out more fully the operations of the Divine Understanding: and every pursuit is profitable, as well as pleasing,

which tends to enlarge our views of the Eternal Mind, removing us to a still greater distance from those fancied deities whom the heathen worship.

Thus far, then, natural religion is competent to remove the ignorance which the Apostle charges upon the Athenians, and giving right views of God as the intelligent Being, the Source of all design, the Father of spirits. This is enough to know God: but this does not fully declare to us that God who is to be the object of our worship. To know what God is, as the Great First Cause, is much; but something more is necessary, even to know him in his relation to ourselves, his designs and doings with regard to us. This is essential to all true religion; this is wanting to complete our knowledge of God: this is it that gives to religion its distinctness and its depth. All our views of God would be unintelligible, or too indefinite without it. When we conceive of Him as he is in himself, dwelling in light inaccessible and full of glory, we attain some sort of dim conception of infinite and eternal grandeur; and even emotions of sublimity may arise within us. But there is no hold taken of the understanding; there is no impression made upon the heart. We turn from this abstract contemplation of the glory of God, to the brightness of that glory as it is revealed in all his works. We look to him as the Author of nature, and the Upholder of nature's operations. Here we tread a surer and firmer ground; here we have something that satisfies us: but it does not satisfy us altogether. "All men," it was said of old—“ all men long for God:" but what sort of god is it that they long for; or how is it that they seek to know him? Not as he is in himself—not as he is to be known in his works-not as he is in relation to them, intelligent and responsible beings. But this is being regardful of God, what he is in relation to us, and how he deals with us: this is the question which presses urgently on the mind: and this we are bound to entertain. To avoid it is to avoid, by far, the most momentous view of God. To rest content without an adequate and satisfying solution of this question, is to know God very partially indeed; and so to subject ourselves, if we worship him at all, to the charge of "ignorantly" worshipping, and therefore being superstitious. You do but half know God if you only know him as the Maker of all things, and the Father of an intelligent offspring.

And yet there are many who only thus know him; many who profess to be very religious, and very intellectual in their religion, far removed from any thing like the gross folly of "changing the glory of God into an image made like to corruptible man." Their deity is a pure abstraction of the mind-the spirit, the soul of the universe. And yet, even against such, it were not hard to bring forward a charge of superstition. "What!" they may say, "charge superstition upon us? We strongly and scornfully disavow the imputation. What religion can be more rational than ours-what views of the Godhead more pure and spiritual? All that in the least savours of sense, or feeling, or emotion, we exclude carefully and scrupulously. What is there in our notions of the Godhead the least like to superstition?" Yes; but do you not studiously exclude the consideration of God, in his relation to yourselves? Do you take any account of his moral government, his judicial superintendence of your conduct, his right of interference in your concerns? And suppose it should appear, even according to the dictates of sound rational reason, that there is something more to be discovered and known concerning God, than merely that