sion to the judgment of the reader, we cannot forbear remarking that, in any given passage, if one interpretation suppose an anomaly or peculiarity of idiom, and another be agreeable to the usual grammatical construction, there is, from the very nature of language, a primâ facie evidence in favour of the latter. Not content with skirmishing about the outposts, Mr. D. proceeds to attack the strong hold of the adverse party, boldly affirming that the whole doctrine concerning the secondary sense of N requires to be more correctly stated; and that, when so stated, it will be seen to leave no authority to the idea of a sinoffering in this particular place.

"The true secondary signification of the word, I take upon me to assert, is not precisely sin-offering at all; but something for sin; or some adjunct relative to it; as its price; whether that price be a ransom, or a punishment: and when the term is put for a sin-offering, that precise sense is derived to it through the more general idea which Į have here stated: in which the restricted signification of offering cannot be held to be essential to it, or even strictly to belong to it. And therefore, although sin-offering is not an improper phrase, as it stands in our version, in the context of the Levitical law, (where the institution and the description of the offering are the subject of the text,) yet the word by itself, can be no more, in its secondary signification, than the λurpov, or the Town of sin, indifferently. It is either the context, or it is an occasional and accidental use, which invests it with the specific character of an offering. This remark I expect to be fully confirmed by those who will reflect for a moment on the true principle of the Hebrew language, in the derivation of its secondary senses. But I appeal to some proofs of it. First, I appeal to the Septuagint. The Septuagint translators have shewn what they thought of the term, and of its true extent, by commonly translating it περὶ ἁμαρτίας, οι ὑπὲρ apaprías: without any appendage of offering. (In some readings of the Septuagint, it is simply ȧuaprías éoriv: a correct and consistent translation.) Secondly, I appeal to the actual force of the word NO, as expressive of punishment; sin-suffering as well as sinoffering. So the English translators have twice rendered it: Lament. iv. 6. Ezek. xiv. 19." (P. 55.) Whence he concludes: 66 If this account be a correct one, UN in Gen. iv. 7. if it is there to be understood in its secondary sense, may as well be the punishment of sin, as an atonement for it." (P. 58.)

Surely this is a very lame and impotent conclusion; and Mr. Davison's opponents might reply, as it should seem most justly, that if his account be the true one, л in Gen. iv. 7. may as well be the atonement for sin, as the punishment of it. Nor does it correspond with his notion in the out-set, that "the idea of a sin-offering in this particular place," does not belong to NП. The assertion also, that the secondary signification

of it " is not precisely sin-offering at all; but something for sin; or some adjunct relative to it," is so nice a distinction as to be scarcely discernible; or, more properly speaking, it is a distinction without a difference. That it sometimes is expressive of punishment, is not denied; but that it likewise signifies a sinoffering, a sense acknowledged by the lexicographers from Buxtorf to Gesenius, cannot in fairness be controverted by those who will consult, by the aid of the Concordance, the texts where it is usually so understood. That the Septuagint translators thought thus of the term, appears clear from their rendering it so frequently by περὶ ἁμαρτίας, or ὑπὲρ ἁμαρτίας, elliptical expressions, denoting an offering or sacrifice for sin *. We are anxious to assert this signification, a signification indeed not absolutely denied by Mr. D., because we fear the renunciation of it would diminish the force of some texts which are brought forward to shew the piacular virtue of sacrifice in reference to the doctrine of atonement. And if the sense of a sin-offering belong to N, the question recurs, whether it is to be admitted in the passage under consideration-a deep and arduous question; but one to the solution of which the author's arguments, which we have just adduced, in no way contribute.

To the second ground of the new interpretation of Gen. iv. 7. derived from the peculiar force of the verb 27, Mr. Davison replies, by acknowledging the sense of the word to be unquestionably that of couching, or lying down as a beast; but at the same time maintaining its application here in a figurative sense; the boldness of which, he thinks, is paralleled by Deut. xxix. 20. "But then the anger of the Lord, and his jealousy shall smoke against that man, and all the curses that are written in this book, All this may no

ורבצה בו כל האלה ".shall lie upon him

doubt be true; but still others will be of opinion, that the proposed exposition derives much strength from the employment of a term undoubtedly descriptive of an animal crouching or lying down, and therefore peculiarly applicable to a sin-offering; whereas the idea of sin lying couched at the door, is, to say the least, a bold image, and but little consistent with the simplicity and soberness of the Pentateuchal narrative.

1

We shall not stay to notice Mr. Davison's comments on Abp. Magee's explication of Theodotion's version of Gen. iv. 7. and on I Cor. v. 21. which follow next in order, nor his perhaps too severe strictures on Lightfoot; but proceed to place before our readers his examination of Heb. xii. 24. so often appealed to as

* See Schleusner's Lex. in Lxx. in voc. Bos. Ellips. Gr. in Ivoía. See also Tromius et Suicer on the word ἁμαρτία.

confirming the divine origin of sacrifice. "And to Jesus the Mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling that speaketh better things than that of Abel." The comparison which is here made, Abp. Magee understands to be between the sacrifice offered by Abel, and that of Christ; not between the blood of Abel himself, and that of the Redeemer: and upon the former ground of the comparison, he argues for a corresponding nature of the two sacrifices; consequently that the sacrifice of Abel was an expiatory one. (p. 73.) In opposition to this, Mr. D. contends, that the most safe, the most direct, and the most complete application of the Apostle's words, is to a comparison between the blood of Abel shed, and that of the Redeemer; and that, even supposing the reference to be to Abel's oblation, the inference would be but doubtful which concludes a corresponding nature of the two sacrifices, so compared as being both expiatory.

The order of inquiry would demand, in the next place, an examination of those grounds of Abp. Magee's system, which are laid in the general correspondency of the primitive and the Mosaic worship; but our author interrupts the thread of his discourse to relate the opinion of Outram on primitive sacrifice, an opinion which cannot be held important on either side, since this valuable writer declines discussing the point in dispute-the origin of sacrifice *. Mr. D. adverts, however, (p. 84, et seq.) to the relative state of religion in the primitive and the Mosaic times; and the sum of his reasoning is, that as the ceremonial law did not then exist, the moral only could be the rule of duty in the primitive world: but expiation for moral sin was not the privilege of the Mosaic dispensation; and therefore, if an institute of atonement had been granted in the first period of things, the Divine economy would have been retrograde. If the worshipper under the law sought in vain for a sacrifice to take away sin, we must be slow to believe that the penitent before the

*We submit whether, though he abstains from giving any opinion, the following does not seem to prove, that he in reality favoured the theory of the divine origin of sacrifice. "De sacrificiorum ortu-ego nihil omnino malim, quam quicquam pro certo pronunciare. Id unum hoc in loco visum est, hos, qui sua cujusque sponte primo sacrificatum judicant, etiamsi forte quibusdam in locis incautius loqui videantur; hunc tamen sacrificandi ritum ad naturæ leges proprie dictas, æternas utique et immutabiles non referre; sed ad ejusmodi instituta quæ ratio naturalis excogitaverit tanquam ad conspicuum Dei cultum apta satis et idonea. Prius illud si qui fecerint ex eo falsi arguuntur, quod Christus sacrificandi ritus apud veteres olim usitatos penetus apud suos delevit; qui idem tamen tantum abfuit, ut ullas aboleret naturæ leges, ut has omnes autoritate sua ratas, certas, ac firmas fecerit." De Sacrificiis, lib. i. cap. 1. § 6. He who thus expresses himself, was surely more inclined to attri bute the origin of sacrifice to institution, than to natural reason.

law stood on better ground. This may be regarded as his answer to the last class of Abp. Magee's arguments for the divine institution of sacrifice, and it is certainly acute and ingenious; but yet it is built upon assumptions which are not proved, and of which the proof would be difficult. If sacrifice was divinely instituted, a ceremonial law must have existed in the patriarchal ages; and to aver that it was not, is to assume the matter in dispute. The institution of the sabbath must be considered to be in some degree of a ceremonial nature. That expiation for moral sin was not the privilege of the Mosaic dispensation, is a proposition, the truth of which is denied not only by some of the most distinguished writers, but also by one to whom Mr. Davison pays well-merited deference, by the learned and judicious Outram*. Nor, supposing the premises to be sound, would the conclusion, which he is labouring to establish, be indubitable; for there might be reasons why sacrifices of expiation were given in the primitive times, and denied under the law.

Having completed his review of the historical evidence applicable to the inquiry, our author proceeds to the doctrinal evidence,-which he thus states:

6

"The doctrinal evidence by which the divine institution of sacrifice is thought to be evinced, is briefly this: What is not commanded by God, cannot be a worship acceptable to him.' For, first, the worshipper cannot render it in faith; since' faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God,' (Rom. x. 17.); and, secondly, there is a sentence of reprobation pronounced in Scripture upon will-worship,' the mere invention of human reason, (Col. ii. 23.) In the strength of these objections to all voluntary institutions of religion, there is thought to be contained the valid conclusion, that sacrifice must have been God's own ordinance to render it capable of his approbation." (P. 97.)

We shall not follow the learned author throughout his reply to this statement of the doctrinal evidence-a reply characterized by his accustomed penetration and controversial skill; but shall content ourselves with one or two observations.

In the zeal to oppose an adverse system, Mr. Davison seems to allow too much merit to spontaneous piety. God's will is the only measure of right and wrong in all moral actions; and, if he have given us a revelation, it must contain every thing essential, otherwise it would be an imperfect revelation. But we are

* De Sacrificiis, lib. i. cap. 12, 13. See also Grotius, De Satisfact. Christi, cap. 10; Richie's Peculiar Doctrines of Revelation, part 3; Magee, Discourses, &c. No. 37.

not to suppose that a special commandment is given for every pious office, that every instance of moral and religious duty must be made a matter of positive revelation. This was the ruling error of Puritanism, so admirably exposed by the incomparable Hooker. Leading truths, and general principles, are alone declared; while the application is left to the sober judgment of men. The law of nature and of reason is also confirmed by the Holy Scriptures; so that it becomes a co-existent rule of duty, and whatever is sanctioned by it, is for that reason obligatory upon the conscience. There is, nevertheless, a broad line of distinction between duties so sanctioned, and duties commanded in the sacred writings: they are both binding, but binding upon different grounds: and though it is a palpable error to reject the obligation of the law of nature, it is equally so to place it, in a religious point of view, on the same footing with the law of revelation. If the Bible, and the Bible alone, be the religion of Protestants, every thing entitled to the epithet "religious," must be founded on the Bible. Actions may be fit, may be expedient, may be required from other considerations; but, if they be not founded on the Bible, they cannot be called Christian duties. It is dangerous to hold up any practice, not authorized by revelation, as a religious duty; a moral one it may be, and, as such, binding upon the conscience; but to enforce it on religious grounds, is to open a door for all the inventions of Papal will-worship. As no article of Christian faith, so no branch of Christian practice is to be received as such, unless it can be proved by certain warranty of Holy Writ; not indeed always enjoined by a positive enactment, but sometimes deduced by inferential reasoning, yet in all cases resting on the fundamental truths and principles of religion.

Supposing, with our author, that there may be acceptable religious services without a positive revelation; and supposing further, that the Scripture has no where authorized us to treat those sacrifices as shut out from acceptance, simply because they might not be commanded and instituted by a revelation, it may be doubted whether this will meet the exigencies of the case before us. The stress of the argument built upon the divine acceptance of the patriarchal sacrifices, appears to be not that they could by no means have been acceptable without a divine command, but that their being accepted is presumptive evidence of such a command. With respect to Abel's sacrifice, for instance, it is more probable, from the very circumstance of its being approved by the Almighty, that it was an act of obedience to a sacred direction, than a spontaneous offering. Though to assert with Abp. Magee, that the early sacrifices