has been the greatest propagator (if we may except Paley) of this fatally erroneous view." P. 88.

Sumner, in his Essay on the Attributes, (vol. ii. 15, 195,) considers the object of our existence here to be "that we might exercise, according to our opportunities, in our progress through the world, the various powers of reason and virtue with which we are endowed. That there is moreover an evident determination in favour of virtue is shewn," he adds, "by the tendency of virtue to promote happiness, to gain superiority, to acquire the love and approbation of mankind; while vice on the other hand is not only punished as detrimental to society, but excites general abhorrence, as it were from some innate principle, however in many instances perverted."

Our author notices as "the three extremes of the present day, the vulgar notions of Socinianism, Armenianism, (Arminianism) and Calvanism, (Calvinism):” he is clearly, therefore, not of the latter creed; and we may conclude our references to authorities favouring the doctrine of a moral sense, by reminding him that the Bishop of Winchester considers this sense as not annihilated; all feelings of the distinction of right and wrong as not eradicated-there remaining, on the other hand, some power of advancing towards the favour of God, some dispositions and desires and affections, which, variously exercised and cultivated, produce varying degrees of virtue.

We have referred our readers to these authorities from a wish to convince them, that our own views upon the subject have at least some tolerable foundation whereon to rest. We do not see what possible advantage can accrue from separating sound morality and religion, let the definition of morality be what it may. Impressed by what we fondly conceive to be a scriptural truth, that the end of the commandment is charity, and that the genuineness of our faith is to be ascertained by its fruits, we were somewhat startled to find a Christian writer talking of "the difficulties he experienced in beating down the prevailing error that good works were the end of religion." P. 272.

In fact, we accord most fully with the writer himself, who, with amiable inconsistency, in speaking of certain sympathetic feelings, which we should designate as analogous, or nearly allied, to a moral sense, says, "may they not be ramea fragmenta, some disjointed parts which escaped spoliation, and were suffered to adhere to the stock, when the spirit of evil triumphed over man." P. 76. In a word, it is a bold philosophy that practically disuniting the heart of man from the Author of its being, rejects, with little ceremony, principles which irresistibly govern

the belief and conduct of the majority of mankind in the common concerns of life; and to which the philosopher himself must yield, after he imagines he has confuted them.

Our author, in further discussing the doctrine of original sin, enlarges upon the subject of man's inability. He maintains, with considerable ingenuity and logical precision, that morality and immorality, according to the generally received doctrine, are not attended with their corresponding effects of temporal reward or punishment.

"If," says he," it can be shewn, that in all cases, without indulging to that excess which produces mental and bodily pain, immoralities may be the safe and constant habit of men, as too generally and too truly it is, under one palliating disguise or another, the habit of those who are not decidedly religious; then the argument of moral rewards and punishments must be abandoned." P. 100.... "And thus, whilst moral nature would lead us to provide for the security of the body, it entirely abandons the care of the soul." P. 102.

The design of the events of life, nevertheless, shews much of deep and heavenly wisdom;" though ultimately proving, that "man, by his natural or moral powers only cannot please God, and therefore cannot accord with his will, and come to repentance unto salvation." P. 110. In support of this argument it is urged, that the whole tendency of the Gospel religion" is opposed to that of moral rewards and punishments;" that it is "paramount to all claims of kindred, and bonds of affection; and that there can be no "analogy between natural and revealed religion."

Now we conceive, that under this specious veil and semblance of truth, our author has weakened and curtailed his powers of vision, and paused at a moment when another step might have brought him to the threshold of what, in our opinion, bears more resemblance to genuine truth, because it is founded on reason and experience. The fallacy appears to us to lie in his supposing that the religion of Christ, or indeed any religion, does or can in fact exclude the selfish principle. On the contrary, we would ask, whether the end and object of every religion be not interwoven with, and inseparable from, the principle of selfishness. Warburton held a fallacy approximating to this, maintaining that the idea of moral obligation was altogether incomplete and imperfect, unless made to rest also on the will of a superior. It is, we admit, unquestionably true, that the command of a superior will, more or less, constitute an obligation. The fallacy lies in supposing that this is a separate and additional ground of obligation. It is true that morality, in the

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genuine sense of the word, must be founded on the will of a superior, on the command of God. But why are we bound by that? why do we acknowledge its power? but because we feel a confidence in its affecting our happiness; in other words, in its administering to the selfish principle. What is an obligation, but something inducing us to act? but there neither is, nor can be, any other universal motive for human action, than human happiness. It is this desire of happiness, this accordance with the selfish principle, well or ill understood, seen widely or narrowly, that necessarily dictates all our actions, and is at the bottom of all our conceptions of morality and duty. A rational being cannot be supposed to act voluntarily, except with a view to its own good; to gain something agreeable, or avoid something disagreeable; in other words, to promote his own happiness. Such are the observations of close reasoners and attentive observers of human nature; for which, too, we find great authority in the Gospel itself. What was the inducement held forth to those who were called upon to forsake houses, and brethren and sisters, and father and mother, and wife and children, and lands, for the name of Christ? What, but that they should "receive an hundred fold," and "inherit everlasting life?" Even that most excellent gift of charity is allowed to partake of a mixed nature; love to man, for God's sake, and our own spiritual or temporal advantage. "He that hath pity upon the poor lendeth unto the Lord; and that which he hath given will he pay him again." It is to be observed too, how far the principle extends. "Whosoever shall give to drink unto one of these little ones a cup of cold water only in the name of a disciple, verily, I say unto you, he shall in no wise lose his reward." It was for this, apostles and holy martyrs became as "the offscouring of the world." It was to win Christ that St. Paul submitted not only with patience but joy to buffetings, scourgings, and imprisonments, in hope of that eternal life "which God had promised before the world began." And such reasons, viz. our own good, our own happiness, our own gain, in time or in futurity-such-vary, evade, deny it, if we will,-have, and ever will be, the forcible springs by which individuals are impelled.

Upon these deep subjects, we are aware, the most contradictory opinions have been delivered; nay more, the most derogatory to every conception we can form of the goodness or justice of the Deity. Theological writers seem to have delighted to perplex themselves and their readers. Our author evidently feels this occasionally, and is induced to confess it. He admits, indeed, that the assertion that "the Almighty has

given a commandment which he knew man could not keep," must appear" paradoxical at the first view;" but he reconciles the impropriety of a doubt on this point by an insinuation that every opinion impugning his, proceeds from the vain wisdom of men, who 66 are not called upon to criticise the will and teaching of God, but to prostrate the heart before him, and receive instruction in righteousness." P. 138. The theological reader will see, in this happy way of denying all access to reason, the foundation stone of every absurdity, and perhaps heresy, foisted on the Scriptures by the prejudice or the obstinacy or the folly of man, from the first century downwards to the present day.

With the exception, however, of the argument in favour of a belief in a state of perfectibility, as attainable in this life, which our author defends upon the principle, that if we deny it we must in fact deny the "power of the Holy Ghost," p. 274, wę shall find much more to praise than to blame in the remainder of the volume. The views taken of the doctrine of the Trinity appear to be peculiarly sound and happy; and what perhaps is not less desirable, on many accounts, they are intelligible and rational.

"To us," says he, "who believe that Christ is one with God, whilst we are assured of his distinct personality, the belief also of the personality of the Holy Ghost is but the exercise of the same faith. To argue against it by saying that we cannot comprehend this spiritual personality, and this mystical union, is to bound the omnipotency of God by our finite comprehension. Much more ingenious and philosophical would it be to reason from what we know of the power and wisdom of the works of God: e. g. that, as we cannot comprehend, yet still acknowledge, that pencils of light may possess some of the secondary, without all their primary qualities of matter being objects of sensation, so may the Holy Ghost exist in some glorious state of individuality, far too pure and spiritualized for our gross conception. And also as we cannot comprehend how certain properties and accidents are united in the same substance, e. g. the figure, colour, and odour of the rose, we may readily conceive the possibility, and implicitly believe in the 'connection' of those divine persons of the Holy Trinity, constituting the mystical union of the Godhead." P. 209.

This opinion will be found in strict conformity with that of the generality of the ancient Fathers, particularly of St. Athanasius, which we quote the more readily, as it may be satisfactory to many who chuse to object to the creed which is called by his name. He compares God the Father to the λos or to the pws, the sun or the original light; and God the Son to the anavyаoμа, the splendour or brightness of it.. σε δε γαρ τρεις

αρχας εισαγομεν, επει μηδε τριων ήλιων υπεισθεμεθα την εικόνα, αλλα ηλιον και απαυγασμα και εν το εξ ηλιο εν τω απαυγασματι φως. εσω μιαν apny odaμer. For it appears from the similitude used by us that we do not introduce three principles (as the Marcionists and Manicheans did) we not comparing the Trinity to three suns, but only to the sun and its splendour. So that we acknowledge only one principle." Again, he affirms the Son to have been begotten of the essence or substance of the Father: ως το φωτος aτavyаσμa, ws vdaros arpus, as the splendour of the light, and as the vapour of the water;" adding στε γαρ το απαυγασμα ετε η από μις αυτο το ύδωρ εςιν η αυτος ο ηλιος, στε αλλοτριον αλλα απορροια της το πατρος ουσίας. For neither the splendour nor the vapour is the very sun nor the very water; nor is it yet alien from it or a stranger to its nature; but they are both effluxes from the essence or substance of them; as the Son is an efflux from the substance of the Father, yet so as he is no way diminished or lessened thereby."

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The doctrine of Regeneration is treated in a manner which shews that the author's opinions on this vital question are clear and strong, and in accordance with the principles of our Church, as they are declared in her articles and liturgy.

"We must," says he, "consider regeneration as the first step which the Holy Spirit takes in our salvation; the last is that high and excellent degree of Christian perfection by which we partake of the divine emanation of love, which flows from the throne of God. The intermediate steps are various, according to the state of that heart upon which the spirit of grace is shedding its sacred influence." P. 23.

It is defined to be "that change of the state of the heart in which its capabilities are altered, or its organic disease removed, and its primordial powers restored, that as before this change man is necessarily disobedient to God; so after this change he has the power both of religious perception and religious obedience. It may be the more proper," it is added, "to confine the meaning of Regeneration to this inceptive state of a religious life; as the secondary or metonymical sense leads both to illogical reasoning, and erroneous conception." P. 231.

The author then proceeds more largely to shew that baptism is the "medium" of regeneration.

"If it be not so," he concludes, "alas! for human nature; you must sin in spite of all discipline and teaching, until it please God to draw you to Christ; if, indeed, it please him ever so to do it: whilst the pious mother would lose her sense of the mercy and love of God whom she adores, could she believe that the lessons of faith, of obedience, of charity, of worship, and of love, which she sought and delighted to in