established, the amount of the defendant's liability does not depend on its degree.

In actions founded on Dispositions, that is on Contract and quasicontract, the liability of the defendant depends on the degree of his negligence. In some relations a man is bound to make good losses occasioned by the slightest negligence: in others he is only compelled to indemnify for the consequences of gross negligence.

The terms, Gross and Slight, like other quantitative terms, have no positive signification until we fix upon some unit of measurement or standard of comparison to which any given instance may be referred and by which it may be measured. Two standards are frequently employed by the Roman jurists: the extraordinary care of a vigilant man of business, and the care which a given individual habitually bestows on his own interests. Although there is no necessary antithesis between these two standards, yet practically in Roman law they serve to fix the meaning of gross and slight negligence. Slight negligence is the absence of the extraordinary diligence of the most careful man of business; gross negligence is the absence of the degree of diligence which a man habitually bestows on his own concerns. The degree of diligence for which a man is held responsible depends on various principles, which may best be indicated by the following statement of the degrees of diligence exacted or of negligence imputed in the principal contracts and quasi-contracts.

Extraordinary care is required of the gratuitous borrower for use. (Is qui utendum accepit exactam diligentiam custodiae rei praestare jubetur, Inst. 3, 14, 2. In rebus commodatis talis diligentia praestanda est qualem quisque diligentissimus paterfamilias suis rebus adhibet, Dig. 13, 6, 8). The reason of this is that the contract of commodatum, being gratuitous, is solely for the advantage of the borrower. (Commodatum autem plerumque solam utilitatem continet ejus cui commodatur, et ideo verior est Quinti Mucii sententia, existimantis, et culpam praestandam et diligentiam, Dig. 13, 6, 5, 2). The same principle may be applied to the depositor and principal (Dig. 47, 2; 63, 5). Extraordinary diligence is also required of the mortgagee, (Placuit sufficere quod ad eam rem custodiendam exactam diligentiam adhiberet, Inst. 3, 14, 4. Ea igitur quae diligens paterfamilias in suis rebus praestare solet a creditore exiguntur, Dig. 13, 7, 14), the vendor, (Custodiam autem venditor talem praestare debet quam

praestant hi quibus res commodata est, ut diligentiam praestet exactiorem quam in suis rebus adhiberet, Dig. 18, 6, 3), the conductor, (Culpa autem abest si omnia facta sunt quae diligentissimus quisque observaturus fuisset, Dig. 19, 2, 257), the locator, (In judicio tam locati quam conducti dolum et custodiam, non etiam casum cui resisti non potest, venire constat, Cod. 4, 6, 28). The principle appears to be that when a contract is for the interest of both parties, although their interests are rather adverse than identical, each is responsible for the least negligence. (In contractibus bonae fidei servatur, ut, si quidem utriusque contrahentis commodum versetur, etiam culpa, sin unius solius, dolus malus tantummodo praestetur, Dig. 30, 108, 12). This principle will require the same amount of diligence from the mortgagor and vendee.

Finally, extraordinary care is required of the agent, (A procuratore dolum et omnem culpam, non etiam improvisum casum, praestandum esse, juris auctoritate manifeste declaratur, Cod. 4, 35, 13. Aliena vero negotia exacto officio geruntur, nec quidquam in eorum administratione neglectum ac declinatum culpa vacuum est, Cod. 4, 35, 21), whether authorized or unauthorized, (Quo casu ad exactissimam quisque diligentiam compellitur reddere rationem, nec sufficit talem diligentiam adhibere qualem suis rebus adhibere soleret, si modo alius diligentior commodius administraturus esset negotia, Inst. 3, 27, 1).

It is not easy to say why more diligence is required of the authorized agent than of the depositary, as both are unremunerated. Perhaps it is because in agency the direct and express purpose and intent of the contract is that an experienced agent should devote more skill and vigilance to the interests of the principal than the principal himself is able to bestow; whereas in other contracts diligence is merely an implied and accessory or incidental obligation.

Moreover, Agency was not really gratuitous: the honorarium of the Agent, as we have seen, though not recoverable in an ordinary action before a judex, being recoverable at the tribunal of the praetor in the exercise of his cognitio extraordinaria.

The amount of diligence a man habitually shows in his own affairs is all that is required of the following persons: the depositary, (Quod Nerva diceret latiorem culpam dolum esse, Proculo displicebat, mihi verissimum videtur. Nam etsi quis non

ad eum modum quem hominum natura desiderat diligens est, nisi tamen ad suum modum curam in deposito praestat, fraude non caret: nec enim salva fide minorem his quam suis rebus diligentiam praestabit, Dig. 16, 3, 32), the lender, (Quin etiam paulo remissius circa interpretationem doli mali debere nos versari, quoniam nulla utilitas commodantis interveniat, Dig. 47, 2; 63, 6). The reason is that the contract on their part is gratuitous, (Quia nulla utilitas ejus versatur apud quem deponitur, merito dolus praestatur solus, nisi forte merces accessit, tunc enim etiam culpa exhibetur, Dig. 13, 6, 5, 2).

The same principle applies to the tutor and curator, whose quasi-contract is moreover involuntary, (De omnibus quae fecit tutor, quum facere non deberet, item de his quae non fecit, rationem reddet hoc judicio, praestando dolum et culpam, et quantam in rebus suis diligentiam, Dig. 27, 3, 1, pr. The English law, it may be observed, appears to exact a greater amount of diligence than this from Trustees, though they are equally unremunerated). The same amount of diligence is required from the partner, (Venit autem in hoc judicium pro socio bona fides. Et Celsus scripsit socios inter se dolum et culpam praestare oportere, Dig. 17, 2; 52, 1. Socius socio etiam culpae nomine tenetur, id est, desidiae atque negligentiae. Culpa autem non ad exactissimam diligentiam dirigenda est: sufficit enim talem diligentiam communibus rebus adhibere qualem suis rebus adhibere solet, quia qui parem diligentem sibi socium acquirit, de se queri debet, Dig. 17, 2, 72), the husband in respect of the dotal estate, (In rebus dotalibus virum praestare oportet tam dolum quam culpam, quia causa sui dotem accipit; sed etiam diligentiam praestabit quam in suis rebus exhibet, Dig. 23, 3, 17), the coheir and colegatee, (Non tantum dolum sed et culpam in re hereditaria praestare debet coheres, quoniam cum coherede non contrahimus sed incidimus. in eum. Non tamen diligentiam praestare debet qualem diligens paterfamilias, quoniam hic propter suam partem causam habuit gerendi . . . . Talem igitur diligentiam praestare debet qualem in suis rebus, Dig. 10, 2; 25, 16). In these latter relations both parties are interested and their interests are identical. It must be observed that Ulpian, Dig. 13, 6, 5, places the husband and partner in the same category with the vendor vendee, hirer letter, mortgagor and mortgagee, whom we have put into the opposite category. This does not harmonize with

the authorities we have quoted, and must be regarded as an inexactitude of Ulpian. Misled by Ulpian, Sir William Jones in his treatise on Bailments lays down the principle that, when a contract is reciprocally beneficial, only ordinary diligence is required, whereas we have shown that if the interests of the parties are not identical, the Roman law, at least, requires extraordinary diligence.

He also, in measuring diligence and negligence, introduces the conception of a mean and two extremes, making three gradations of diligence (and correspondingly of negligence), ordinary diligence, less than ordinary diligence, more than ordinary diligence: but this tripartite division produces an intricacy and complication that is not to be found in the Roman jurists.

Under the head of Obligatio ex delicto should be placed, according to Savigny, the doctrine of POSSESSION (Interdict-possession), or, rather, of Dispossession, with its remedies, the Interdicts Utrubi, Uti possidetis, and Unde vi. This would agree with the Roman arrangement at least the Roman jurists, instead of recognizing in Possession a primary right, imposing a negative obligation on all the world (jus in rem), were content with regarding Dispossession as a wrong imposing a secondary positive obligation on the individual dispossessor, and treated all the possessory Interdicts as actions ex delicto, 4 § 140, commentary.

But the true place of Possession seems indicated by Vangerow who distinguishes between the Interdicta Retinendae and Recuperandae possessionis. The Interdictum Recuperandae possessionis, i. e. the Interdict Unde vi, is really based on obligatio ex maleficio, and belongs to Penal jurisprudence: whereas Possession as contemplated by the Interdicta Retinendae possessionis, i. e. the Interdicts Uti possidetis and Utrubi, is a primary right demanding universal recognition (jus in rem) that has its place in the code regulating Dominion: and the interdicts allotted for its protection, though nominally based on obligatio ex delicto are really coordinate not with Penal actions, but with Real actions or Vindicatio. Gaius only deals with Possession and possessory Interdicts as belonging to the code of Procedure, without indicating their position in the code of Substantive law.

BOOK IV.

DE ACTIONIBUS.