mediate gratifications of sense, but they are not less conducive to our well-being and comfort in life. In like manner, many enjoyments which Providence has placed within our grasp every hour, although less exquisite than others we expect to meet with, ought not to be despised on that account. The former are the pence, which we should endeavour to take care of; the latter are the pounds, which may be safely left to take care of themselves.

Admitting, therefore, that all the individuals characterized above, had formed a just estimate of the great importance of those objects to which they are exclusively attached, I would only beg them, for the reasons now advanced, to pay a little more regard to things which they appear to consider as comparatively trifling. The pleasures I would recommend to their notice are within their reach, and may be obtained with as little trouble, and far more certainty, than those which have hitherto engrossed their attention. I would remind them that every situation in life has peculiar duties attached to it, sufficient to exercise our diligence, and occupy our leisure; and that the conscientious fulfilment of those duties is attended with a degree of satisfaction, which renders them deserving of cultivation. If the epicure and drunkard cannot enjoy the gra

tifications of sense so often as they could wish, they may yet, by a slight sacrifice, be able to satisfy the cravings of hunger or thirst in the wretch who is sinking under sickness or poverty, and thus enjoy that "nobler luxury of doing good." The covetous or ambitious, although disappointed in the ultimate object of their aims, may, by directing their efforts into other channels, easily and effectually promote the cause of virtue by their influence and example, and greatly meliorate the condition of their fellow creatures. If the unhappy in wedlock are compelled to discard the hope of a new and more fortunate connexion, they may have it in their power, by mutual concessions, to render their present situation far more desirable; and though the coquette cannot secure a lover, she may yet be enabled to make many friends. The unfashionable dress of a beau may, in some measure, be compensated by increased complaisance, and a more diligent cultivation of the understanding;—and even on the part of the ladies, the ornament of " a meek and quiet spirit" will leave little reason to regret the temporary want of a modish costume. Persons in every station may find full scope for their exertions, in the exercise of benevolence, in acts of kindness, in the cultivation of the social affections, in relieving the wants of the afflicted,

soothing their anguish, and alleviating their distress, and in fulfilling the claims of society upon them as children, parents, wives, husbands, neighbours, and friends. These are the trifles which I would earnestly recommend to the notice of my readers. The attainment of them is easy; opportunities for exercising them occur every moment; and, however paradoxical it may appear to many persons, they will in practice afford a degree of delight, less vehement, perhaps, but equally gratifying, more lasting, and far oftener to be enjoyed, than that arising from the most successful pursuit of the objects of sensual pleasure, vanity, or ambition.

NUMBER 28.

The lights and shades of manners, wrong and right.

THOMSON.

THE nature of virtue is an inquiry which has often occupied the attention of philosophers and moralists; and various definitions have been given of it by those authors who have undertaken to elucidate this important subject. Some make it to consist in following nature; some in a regard to truth, considered with respect both to words and actions; others in acting up to the moral

fitness of things; some place it in the agreeable and useful, as they relate to mankind in general,and have even gone so far as to include bodily graces and accomplishments in their definition; one class has made it to consist in the imitation of God; and another in doing good to mankind, in obedience to his will. An examination of these different opinions, and the reasons upon which they are grounded, would occupy more time and space than the limits of an INSPECTOR will allow; but if the sentiments of mankind in general, as displayed in their conduct, are allowed to form a tolerably correct test of truth, it will not, perhaps, be difficult to point out the futility of most of these definitions; since a small portion of observation will suffice to shew, that though most men profess to act in conformity to the standard of virtue, the number is very small of those who attempt to reduce any of them into practice. How few, for instance, at present, consider themselves as under any obligation to follow nature, at least in the sense in which moralists have used that term. How few act with a perfect regard to what is denominated the fitness of things. Many persons openly or tacitly deny the being of a God; and, of course, the imitation of him, or an endeavour to promote the happiness of mankind in obedience to his will, cannot

enter into their conceptions of virtue. Among those who profess a regard to truth, as it relates to words, many are exceedingly inattentive to it in what belongs to actions. The agreeable and useful, so far as individuals are concerned in them, meet with their warm approbation; but in what concerns others, are often found to possess little influence on the mind and character. That bodily graces or accomplishments constitute the whole of virtue, may indeed seem to derive confirmation from the behaviour of many persons among us, who either are, or fancy themselves to be, in possession of them, and who apparently despise every other qualification; but the old, the envious, the ugly, and the awkward, will oppose such a claim, and are in sufficient numbers to prevent the doctrine from obtaining universal acceptation.

This evident inconsistency in the conduct of the generality of mankind, when referred to any of the above definitions of that virtue by which they profess to regulate their lives, leads to a supposition that they have adopted some opinion of its nature, different from any of those before enumerated, but what that opinion is, remains to be deduced from a view of all the circumstances. According to Aristotle, virtue consists in mediocrity. The authority of this ancient