tive policy be pursued to the end," and "one is driven to the conclusion that a general rearrangement of these roads segregating them into two competing systems in order to conform to the requirements of the act, is the proper course to pursue."

Another characteristic mentioned is the very large amount of mileage which still remains in independent hands, there being a number of local properties varying in length from 100 to 300 miles. Another general feature of this region is that there are "too many railroads to be supported by the available traffic." This is said to be due in part to the railway promoter who has found in the Southwest the last and most inviting field for the practice of his art. That the field should be inviting would indicate that the resources of the country are such that the investment might ultimately prove profitable but the inference from the report is that the promoters were mistaken and that in the Southwest is a peculiar situation requiring special treatment at the hands of the commission. Yet some of the very roads complained of in this report, published in 1921, have out of earnings expended millions of dollars for betterments and improvements within the past three years. No such capacity for self-help is recognized in the report and from a reading of this chapter one would never have prophesied the splendid performance of such roads as the International-Great Northern and the Texas and Pacific, to mention but two instances.

Another peculiarity of the Southwestern-Gulf situation and one which accordingly introduces an element of confusion into all statistical comparisons, is a separate incorporation and accounting of the railway lines located in Texas. One infers from the discussion of this so-called peculiarity that the commission is being encouraged to further Federal incorporation.

It is considered that the Southwestern carriers have some part in transcontinental business, though it is said they are "not naturally large factors." But "they are properly called upon to perform an important function for the nation as a whole through engaging in long haul business to

and from the Gulf ports to the Missouri River gateways. They are the necessary outlets for the entire country west of the Mississippi River; and construction of the Panama Canal, and our recently developed national marine interests are bound to emphasize still further the import and export feature of the Southwestern-Gulf traffic." It is thought that the systems should not be deprived of their air lines which might serve the transcontinental carriers, because the withdrawing of such air lines would further weaken carriers that are on the whole now in financial difficulties, most of them have been through several bankruptcies and reorganizations. It is not suggested that the weak gathering lines too might be merged with these stems into the powerful transcontinental systems and thus comply with the terms of the statute. Instead, we have the proposal that roads considered so weak by the author of the report as to constitute a peculiar problem and to require special treatment are to be grouped together to form weak systems in the same territory as such giants as the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific-Rock Island. The geography of the country is cited as a reason for not merging the Southwestern lines with the Santa Fe and the Rock Island-Southern Pacific. Not much attention is given to the possibility of calling upon the Burlington and the Union Pacific to share with the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific the burden of the weak lines of the Southwest. The statement is made that neither the Frisco nor the Missouri Pacific could be incorporated in transcontinental systems, but no sufficient reason is given in support of that assertion. It is concluded in the report that two systems should be built in the Southwest, one around the Frisco and the other around the Missouri Pacific. Then it is decided to extend each system into Chicago. This would have the effect of modifying conditions arising out of these roads having been based upon Kansas City and St. Louis. There is an interesting comparison between Southwestern and Southeastern roads in order to show that the Southwestern roads should be given access to Chicago, whereas those of the Southeast should be denied such an entrance, the principal reason being that

in the Southwest there are already two systems, the Santa Fe and Rock Island which reach Chicago. The fact that St. Louis and Kansas City are primary markets and that the Southwestern roads need the long haul that extension to Chicago would furnish are given in support of the proposition. There is an apparent reluctance in the report to recognize that the Rock Island, the Southern Pacific, and the Santa Fe are Southwestern properties in the sense that they as truly serve the Southwest as do any other lines operating in that region. Then follows a description of the two systems as Professor Ripley recommends them: first, the St. Louis San Francisco railway system with 5,252 miles is taken as the nucleus for one of the two proposed purely Southwestern systems. Then it is proposed to include the Missouri, Kansas and Texas with its 3,863 miles of first main track. There is a curious inaccuracy in describing the Katy and the Frisco lines from Denison to Dallas, Texas.10 These two systems, the Frisco and the Katy, are competitive all the way from St. Louis into Texas. Then, it is proposed to place a competitor of both the Katy and Frisco, the St. Louis Southwestern Railway, or such part of it as is not needed by the Rock Island-Southern Pacific group, in this combination. This group is to be put into Louisiana over the Louisiana Railway and Navigation Company and to somewhat compete with the Kansas City Southern. In the Missouri Pacific it is suggested that trackage be provided for the Frisco, first over the Texas and Pacific from Shreveport to Texarkana and from that point on over the Kansas City Southern to Hartford Junction, where the main line of the Frisco would again be reached. It is said "this would bring utilization of the Kansas City Southern as the country develops and through traffic increases may conceivably in time lead to the bringing of a parallel bridge line across this district." This is a rather large concession in view of the emphasis laid upon the Southwest being so much over-railroaded. For a more direct line to Galveston than the Katy affords, it is suggested that the Trinity and

10Ibid., p. 623.

Brazos Valley be tied into the system, or as a possible alternative, the Houston, East and West Texas, which connecting with the Cotton Belt at Lufkin, would furnish a rather direct line to Houston and Galveston. The Kansas City, Mexico and Orient is a necessitous road from Wichita, Kansas, southwest into Texas as far as Alpine on the Southern Pacific. It is proposed to divide it at Altus, Oklahoma, and give part of the line across Texas to the Frisco and the remainder to the Missouri Pacific. The Frisco in order to strengthen itself in North Louisiana, it is suggested, should have the Vicksburg, Shreveport, and Pacific running east and west between Shreveport and Vicksburg, the part of this line east of the river having already been allocated in the discussion of Southeastern roads to the Southern Railway. Though these Southwestern lines are regarded as financially weak, it is proposed to merge the Chicago and Alton with the Frisco system for the purpose of letting the system into Chicago.

Turning now to the proposed Missouri Pacific system which is recommended to balance the suggested Frisco system, we find the statement that the Missouri Pacific in 1918 operated 7,008 miles of line of which it owned in fee about 6,800 miles. A weakness of the Missouri Pacific is considered the sharp separation on the two flanks of the Ozarks between western and southern halves. These are at present united by two long bridge lines running northwest and southeast across the Ozarks along the valley of the Arkansas River. It is suggested that the Missouri Pacific should have the Kansas City Southern to furnish it the shortest possible route to the Gulf. The Kansas City Southern also would, it is also thought, lend financial strength to the Missouri Pacific. It is further proposed that the Kansas, Oklahoma, and Gulf road be included in this system and the Louisiana and Arkansas from Alexandria to Hope, Arkansas. It is definitely recommended that the Missouri Pacific be forbidden access to the Pacific Coast and confined to the Southwest and based upon the Gulf of Mexico. Since the Missouri Pacific has a line to Denver, it is proposed that the Colorado Southern and Fort Worth and Denver City

should be included in the Missouri Pacific system. These roads too would further add financial strength to the Missouri Pacific. Having made recommendations that thwart the long-time ambition of the Missouri Pacific, to reach the Pacific coast, recommendations are made to strengthen the system on the Gulf. Among these is that the southern half of the Gulf Coast lines from Beaumont be assigned to the Missouri Pacific, the Santa Fe getting the Gulf Coast lines east of DeQuincy. In connection with access to Houston, it is suggested, though not urged, that the Missouri Pacific have traffic rights over the Houston, East and West Texas. In order to give this system access to Chicago, it is recommended that the Western, Chicago and Eastern Illinois be incorporated with it. This recommendation is made, even though at the time the report was written there was heavy interchange by the Missouri Pacific and the Chicago and Alton. The chapter ends by citing statistical studies that indicate that the two systems as proposed might be very well balanced as to financial returns, though the returns predicted are discouragingly so low as compared with those of the competitors, the Santa Fe and the Southern Pacific, as to suggest that such systems might perpetuate rather than solve the problem of the weak roads, for rates that would be necessary to sustain these two Southwestern systems would likely be more than sufficient for the stronger competitors, while rates that would yield a fair return to the strong roads in the Southwest would perhaps result in bankruptcy for these two local systems.

VIII

The last chapter of the report is a recapitulation, it being both an argument for the plans above outlined and for consolidation. The object sought in the discussion above is stated to be as follows: "An inherently natural geographic scope for each system; a sound operating adaptation of each unit to its surroundings, due consideration being given to the nature of its traffic; administrative practicability, that is to say, a size under each particular set of circumstances, commensurate with capacity in manage