Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
Results 1-3 of 93
Page 240
mediate preliminary to war ” and Marshall “ so considered it . ” 34 So did
everyone else of any importance in the Washington scheme of things . For
example , Welles testified that , to him , the order from Tokyo to the Washington
embassy ...
mediate preliminary to war ” and Marshall “ so considered it . ” 34 So did
everyone else of any importance in the Washington scheme of things . For
example , Welles testified that , to him , the order from Tokyo to the Washington
embassy ...
Page 243
What is more : Complete authority to act in General Marshall ' s absence does not
seem to have been given to any one subordinate . Had there been an officer
either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was in the War
...
What is more : Complete authority to act in General Marshall ' s absence does not
seem to have been given to any one subordinate . Had there been an officer
either with authority or with courage to act on the information that was in the War
...
Page 249
3 When informed of the Board ' s report , Marshall said to Stimson " that he
thought his usefulness to the Army had been destroyed . ” But Stimson “ told him
that was nonsense , to forget it . ” The secretary of war charged up Marshall ' s
reaction ...
3 When informed of the Board ' s report , Marshall said to Stimson " that he
thought his usefulness to the Army had been destroyed . ” But Stimson “ told him
that was nonsense , to forget it . ” The secretary of war charged up Marshall ' s
reaction ...
What people are saying - Write a review
LibraryThing Review
User Review - MasseyLibrary - LibraryThingThe previous book “At Dawn We Slept” was a re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and ... Read full review
Pearl Harbor: the verdict of history
User Review - Not Available - Book VerdictPrange's twin volumes offer everything you always wanted to know about Pearl Harbor but were afraid to ask, plus pictures! Together, these tomes comprise an exhaustive study of the day that will live ... Read full review
Contents
THE BASE AND THE SUMMIT 1 We Were All Out There | 9 |
Slow in Waking Up | 19 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
Copyright | |
46 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral aircraft alert American appeared Army asked attack base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chief cited command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department direct dispatch doubt duty East effect enemy execute expected fact failure force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least letter major Marshall matter means military move Naval Navy Navy Department never November November 27 Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared problem question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Safford seemed sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson strike surprise task testified thing thought told took United wanted warning Washington winds wrote