Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
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Page 251
... November 27 " pictured the Japanese - United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information avail- able to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December . " He wrote with remorseless logic : Short as a ...
... November 27 " pictured the Japanese - United States situation accurately as it appeared from the information avail- able to the War Department at that time and up until 7 December . " He wrote with remorseless logic : Short as a ...
Page 298
... November 27 , he assumed that it answered " the G - 2 message sent out by General Miles . " 2 Actually , G - 2 originated no less than three sabotage messages in connection with the Army's prime alert of November 27. The first was brief ...
... November 27 , he assumed that it answered " the G - 2 message sent out by General Miles . " 2 Actually , G - 2 originated no less than three sabotage messages in connection with the Army's prime alert of November 27. The first was brief ...
Page 651
... November 27 , 1941 PRIORITY MESSAGE NO . 472 TO COMMANDING GENERAL , HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT : Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese ... November 27, 1941.
... November 27 , 1941 PRIORITY MESSAGE NO . 472 TO COMMANDING GENERAL , HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT : Negotiations with Japan appear to be terminated to all practical purposes with only the barest possibilities that the Japanese ... November 27, 1941.
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Congress congressional committee considered Dawn We Slept December defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Husband E Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Court Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation peace Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto York