Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
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Page 143
... doubt in the minds of all who are ranged against the Axis . Our own face , as well as our own welfare , is vitally involved . " 7 But if Hull was ever an appeaser , he had passed that stage in 1941. He knew that there are many points of ...
... doubt in the minds of all who are ranged against the Axis . Our own face , as well as our own welfare , is vitally involved . " 7 But if Hull was ever an appeaser , he had passed that stage in 1941. He knew that there are many points of ...
Page 277
... doubt as to the purpose to be served . Any Intelligence Officer , then and now , who could not figure this out should be taken out and hung higher than Haman . ” 35 A bit drastic , yet Hiles was essentially correct . In his interesting ...
... doubt as to the purpose to be served . Any Intelligence Officer , then and now , who could not figure this out should be taken out and hung higher than Haman . ” 35 A bit drastic , yet Hiles was essentially correct . In his interesting ...
Page 558
... doubt ... that he could have given the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions had he been disposed to do so . " 29 The problem went considerably beyond Turner . It harks back to Morgan's principle No. 3 ...
... doubt ... that he could have given the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet the benefit of his conclusions had he been disposed to do so . " 29 The problem went considerably beyond Turner . It harks back to Morgan's principle No. 3 ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Congress congressional committee considered Dawn We Slept December defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Husband E Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Court Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation peace Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto York