Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
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Page 238
... fact , rare indeed is the commander who ever admits he has enough matériel . As Hart acknowledged to the congressional committee , “ I think I had the common failing of all commanders in chief . You always want more . " 26 But the ...
... fact , rare indeed is the commander who ever admits he has enough matériel . As Hart acknowledged to the congressional committee , “ I think I had the common failing of all commanders in chief . You always want more . " 26 But the ...
Page 350
... fact there had been no acts of sabotage on December 7 “ or immediately thereafter . ” 13 According to Marine Brigadier General Samuel R. Shaw , a captain at the time , " The Army's intelligence estimate was that a sizeable number of ...
... fact there had been no acts of sabotage on December 7 “ or immediately thereafter . ” 13 According to Marine Brigadier General Samuel R. Shaw , a captain at the time , " The Army's intelligence estimate was that a sizeable number of ...
Page 378
... fact that the Navy was responsible for distant re- connaissance . " But he did not request “ clarification from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean what it had unequivocally said . " This failure the ...
... fact that the Navy was responsible for distant re- connaissance . " But he did not request “ clarification from the War Department in the event he felt the latter did not mean what it had unequivocally said . " This failure the ...
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
To Avoid War with Japan | 66 |
Copyright | |
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Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral Kimmel air attack aircraft alert American Army and Navy Army Board asked August Barnes believed Bloch bomb plot British carriers Chapter Chief of Staff China Congress congressional committee considered Dawn We Slept December defense Diary diplomatic dispatch East enemy fact failure Gerow going Government Hart Hawaii Hawaiian Department hereafter cited Honolulu Husband E Ibid intelligence intercepts Interview Islands January Japan Japanese Japanese attack Kimmel and Short knew Knox Konoye MacArthur Marshall military Morgan Nagumo nation Naval District Navy Court Navy Department Nomura November 27 Oahu officer operation peace Pearl Harbor attack Philippines planes position possible President radar RADM reconnaissance replied responsibility Roberts Commission Roosevelt sabotage Safford Secretary Senator ships situation Stark Stimson strategy submarine surprise task force testified thought Tokyo told Turner U.S. Navy U.S. Pacific Fleet United War Department warning Washington winds execute wrote Yamamoto York