RULE 86. If an officer to whom a warrant is directed be killed in attempting to make an arrest, it is murder, though it appear in evidence that the warrant was illegal.

RULE 87. When the time proved differs from that laid in the indictment, the jury may find the prisoner guilty either generally, or specially on the day on which the fact was proved.

RULE 88. Where a place certain is made part of the description of the fact charged in the indictment, the least variance as to such place between the evidence and the indictment is fatal to the indictment.

RULE 89. A place named only for a venue in the indictment is not material in evidence. Proof of the same crime at any other place in the same county sustains the indictment.

RULE 90. A variance between the indictment and the evidence, in a capital case, as to the instrument used is not material, if the deceased be proved to have died the same kind of death as that charged in the indictment.

RULE 91. The evidence of poisoning, or any other kind of killing, where no weapon is used, will not maintain an indictment for killing with a weapon. These are different kinds of death.

RULE 92. All who are present, aiding and assisting, or ready to afford assistance if necessary, are equally princi pals with him who gave the fatal blow of which the deceased died.

son was in a public office? If an officer to whom a warrant is directed be killed in attempting to make an arrest? If the time proved differs from that laid in the indictment? If a place certain is made part of the description of the fact? If the place be named only for a venue? What is the effect of a variance between the instrument described in the indictment and the one proved on the trial? If the indictment is for killing with a weapon, and the evidence shows that the death was caused by

RULE 93. The fact of killing being first proved, all the circumstances of accident, necessity, etc., are to be proved by the prisoner, which tend to justify, excuse, or alleviate the killing.

RULE 94. When a blow aimed at one person falls upon another, and kills him, this constitutes murder.

RULE 95. In all cases of homicide caused by persons following their lawful occupation, it is incumbent on the defendant to show by evidence that he has used all due and necessary caution.

RULE 96. If an officer who is to execute the sentence of death on a criminal varies from the judgment, he is guilty of murder.

RULE 97. When a person having authority to arrest, using proper means for that purpose, is resisted in so doing, and the party making resistance is killed in the struggle, evidence of such resistance justifies the homicide.

RULE 98. But if the officer be killed, it will be murder in all against whom there is evidence of having taken part in such resistance.

RULE 99. When a felony has been committed, and the felon flies from justice, if in the pursuit the party flying is killed when he cannot be otherwise overtaken, evidence of the felony and the flight will justify the homicide.

poisoning? Who are equally principals with him who gives the fatal blow of which the injured party dies? After the fact of killing is proved, what is to be proved by the prisoner? When a blow aimed at one per son falls upon another and kills him? In case of homicide caused by a person following his lawful occupation, what is incumbent on the person causing the homicide? If an officer who is to execute the sentence of death on a criminal varies from the judgment? When a person having authority to make an arrest is resisted, and the party making the resistance is killed in the struggle? If the officer be killed? When a felony has been committed and the felon flies from justice, and is killed when

RULE 100. In a case of justifiable self-defence, the injured party may repel force by force, in defence of his person, habitation, or property, against a person attempting to commit a felony upon either. In this case, he is not obliged to retreat, but may pursue his adversary until he finds himself out of danger; and if in a conflict he happens to kill the assailant, such killing is justifiable.

RULE 101. In case of mutual conflict, if a party would excuse himself upon the ground of self-defence, he must show that before he gave the fatal blow he had declined any further conflict, and retreated as far as he could with safety, and that he killed his adversary through necessity, and to avoid being killed.

RULE 102. Duelling, if death ensues, is murder.

RULE 103. Ministers of justice, while in the execution of their office, are under the peculiar protection of the law; and every man who renders assistance to an officer, is under the same protection as the officer himself.

RULE 104. In the execution of civil process, the officer cannot justify the breaking open of an outside door or window; for a man's house is his castle, for safety and repose to himself and family, and such breaking would be a trespass.

RULE 105. If the officer, in the execution of civil process, finds the door open or gains admission from a person within, he does not commit a trespass in entering the house; and he may break open inside doors, if he finds it necessary to execute his process.

he could not be otherwise overtaken? In case of justifiable self-defence, what may the injured party do? Is he obliged to retreat? If in the conflict he kills the assailant? In case of a mutual conflict, what must the party, who wishes to excuse himself on the ground of self-defence, show? If death is caused by duelling? Are the ministers of the law under any special protection while in the execution of their office? If others are rendering them assistance? Can the officer in executing a

RULE 106. Where a stranger takes refuge in the house. of another, the house is not his castle; neither has a lodger the privilege of the occupant of the house.

RULE 107. When a felony has been committed, or when an officer holds a process, founded on a breach of the peace, the party's own house is no longer a castle for him. After the officer has given notice that he holds such process, and demanded entrance, and the same has been refused, the doors or windows may be forced open, and the accused arrested.

RULE 108. If a man be found murdered, and another be found running from the place in haste, with the weapon which caused the death of the deceased, a strong presumption, next to the sight of the act itself, would be raised, that such person was the murderer.

RULE 109. The jury are in all cases to weigh the evidence, and to decide according to the weight of evidence. If, upon weighing the evidence, the guilt and innocence of the prisoner are equally sustained, so as to raise a doubt in the minds of the jury, the prisoner is entitled to the benefit of that doubt.

RULE 110. It is not a sufficient ground to acquit, that there is a possibility that the accused may be innocent of the charge; for there is no case where a jury can procure absolute certainty from circumstantial evidence.

civil process break the outside door or window of defendant's dwellinghouse? For what purpose is a man's house his castle? If the outside door be open, or if the officer gain admission from within? What may he then do? If a stranger take refuge in the house of another? If he be only a lodger in the house? If a felony or breach of the peace has been committed by the occupant of the house? What may the officer do? If a man be found murdered and another be found running from the place in haste, with the weapon which caused the death of the deceased? What are the jury in all cases to do? How are they to decide? If upon weighing the evidence, the guilt and innocence of the prisoner are equally sustained, so as to leave a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury? If there is a possibility that the accused may be in

RULE 111. The introduction of false evidence on the part of the defence raises a presumption against the prisoner.

RULE 112. To support an indictment for larceny, there must be evidence to show a felonious and fraudulent taking and carrying away of the goods.

RULE 113. If it appear that a horse was hired in good faith, or that goods were sold and credit given, the fraudulent conversion of the property afterwards cannot constitute larceny; for a felonious design must exist at the time the property is obtained.

RULE 114. When it is shown, by evidence, that the possession of the property was obtained with a fraudulent design to steal it, whatever may have been the pretence, the act constitutes the crime of larceny.

RULE 115. Whenever one person assaults another with such circumstances of terror as to put him in fear, and cause him, by reason of such fear, to part with his money or other property, the taking thereof is robbery.

RULE 116. To constitute a burglary, there must be a felonious breaking and entering of a building of another, with intent to commit some crime therein.

RULE 117. The fact of breaking is sufficiently established by proving the lifting of a latch, taking out a pane of glass, descent down the chimney, turning a key when the door is locked on the inside, obtaining entrance by fraud, strategem, or threats.

nocent of the charge? If defendant introduces false evidence? What evidence is required to support an indictment for larceny? If it appear that a horse was hired in good faith, or goods purchased and credit given, and there was afterwards a fraudulent conversion? When must a felonious design have existed? When it is shown by evidence that the possession of the property was obtained with a fraudulent design to steal it? What will constitute robbery? What will constitute bur