Page images
PDF
EPUB

at various periods exercised their functions in | standard of wisdom and right, it ought to the Eternal City without let or hinderance guide, restrain, and even suppress. The asfrom the government of his holiness."

As to the expelled gentleman himself, the pope has conferred upon him the highest compliment that could have been paid to his writings; and if he has been personally inconvenienced, he will be amply revenged by the additional disgrace which the government of his holiness has brought upon itself by its spiteful conduct. "The papacy," says the Times, in noticing this occurrence, has a long account to settle with civilization. A reckoning is at hand, and then the expulsion of this gentleman will be remembered as one of the most foolish acts of which Cardinal Antonelli and his satellites have been guilty."

Two semi-official_pamphlets, both in reply to the famous "Le Pape et le Congrès," have simultaneously appeared in Paris. The first, entitled "La Maison de Lorraine et l'Opinion Publique," is generally believed to emanate directly from the Grand Duke of Tuscany; and the second a larger work, accompanied by numerous documents, entitled "La Duchesse de Parme devant l'Europe," is said to come from the princess named in the title. Its ostensible author, however, is M. Henry de Riancey, editor of the Union.-Spectator.

sumption that public conviction ought to precede distinctly governmental action is denied. On the contrary, government undertakes, to some extent, to form public conviction by its acts, to warn it of its errors,-to resist its misdirected impulses.

Hence all the enlightenment of the French government is apt to take a despotic and didactic shape. The emperor does not even consult his council about free trade in France, but gives effect to Mr. Cobden's views, in his treaty with England, with the imperative fiat of a Russian czar, instead of after such a prolonged agitation as that of the Anti-Corn Law League. He does not ask any one's advice in his conflict with the pope, but warns and suppresses the Univers with far less appearance of irritation than England showed on occasion of the famous papal aggression. He is content, if he has just enough opinion on his own side to hold in check the opinion that is hostile to him;-he decides for the country he rules, and often in a manner not in accordance with its principles. England cannot and ought not to be expected to approve of this. We cannot be expected to approve such peremptory acts as the prohibition of the publication of Ultramontane opinions, and the repeal of a system of monopoly without the country's initiative. But thus From The Economist, 4 Feb. much we may say, that if a despotic governTHE BREACH BETWEEN THE EMPEROR ment is to throw its weight into one scale or AND THE POPE, AND ITS RESULTS. the other, it is probably better that it should THE suppression of the Univers will ever throw it into the right scale than into the mark a critical era in the second Bonapartist wrong. If the imperial government were to empire; and we must avow our conviction give its unqualified support to a system of that if the anti-papal policy which has dictated monopoly, not only would the material interthis measure be boldly persisted in, it will be a better guarantee of a good understanding with England than even common action in favor of the principles of commercial freedom. Both the blow to protection, and the blow to papal interference in France, have indeed been struck without any appeal to the nation, or any indisputable evidence of popular approval. Neither the one nor the other is the yield of public opinion legitimately consulted. In both cases alike, the emperor has arrogated to himself the task of acting as the organ of France, and though in both cases alike he has decided the question rightly on its merits, he may very likely have decided both questions in a manner which would find no triumphant support from the present state of national opinion. But in the present form of the French constitution, the principle that even a misjudging self-government is superior to a right-judging system of dictation has oeen deliberately rejected. It is assumed, once for all, that when government sees the popular mind deviating widely from its own

ests of the country be injured, but every year the wholesome influences of other nations upon it would be diminished. If it were to give its unqualified support to a sacerdotal rule, not only would the political government of the country be injured, but there is danger that the germs of political wisdom might be destroyed altogether. And it is a mistake to suppose that France could, on her present system of government, adopt a neutral course. The monopolistic system now to be superseded was as arbitrary, as little the fair'decision of the national will, as the free-trade system which follows it. While the Univers was petted by the government, the Ultramontane party had as much the advantage as the Gallican party will now obtain. Under such a system, no government can be impartial, because it has no test by which to be guided but its own bias and will. It is probably better, therefore, it should be peremptorily right than peremptorily wrong.

With these qualifications,-while always maintaining that it were far better for the

dial adherence to liberal tendencies will give.

And though, therefore, we would much rather have seen an assimilation of French and English political convictions begin with an enlargement of the scope of free discussion, than in an arbitrary check even to papal interference, we have some hope that if this policy be fairly persevered in, it may end where it might better, perhaps, have begun. If the government of France appeals to the liberal spirit of French science and economy, and to the hearty support of Sardinia and England, then it cannot be entirely proof against the influence of the practical example of these countries on the constitutional forms of France.

The emperor, who, after ten years' rule, has found himself strong enough to dispense with the support of the French hierarchy, may find out before ten years more have elapsed that he needs the only support which can effectually neutralize the influence of a united hierarchy, some organic expression of the independent thought and feeling of the country. In this way, we think it is not unreasonable to expect that the breach between the papacy and the emperor may end in the concession of something more like constitu tionalism than would have been likely so long as the Roman power and the French government were at one.

people of France to be supporting all sorts of evils, economical, ecclesiastical, and political, in the mere ignorance and inexperience of self-government, than to be led thus passively by even so astute a statesman as Louis Napoleon, we may be allowed to rejoice that his government has taken a definitive part against the papal party in the Church instead of with it. It is, we believe, the great crisis in the history of the second empire. For the emperor, choosing as he does to be entirely independent of the views of his own subjects, cannot yet work effectually without a certain share of external approval to support him. His uncle, indeed, never depended much on any thing but force of arms. He seldom had any important allies who were not his allies only because they feared to be his enemies. But the present emperor cannot work mainly by the aid of armies and military power. He has always shown himself very sensitive to the drift of European opinion, and when he cuts himself off from the good-will of one great power, it always turns out that he has secured the good-will of another even more important. Without the understanding with Russia, he would never have gone into the Italian campaign; without the encouragement of England, he would never have modified the stipulations of Villafranca. If, then, he is now willing to brave the anger of the pope, we may be sure that he intends to work to the utmost the advantage of a cordial understanding with those powers who most abhor ultramontane politics. The emperor of the French never wastes a step of this kind. In his resistance to the priesthood, he knows that he encounters a formidable power, as well as in his resistance to the protectionists. The natural counterweight to such a loss of strength is cordial unity with England and North Italy, and all powers which adhere to the same principles. And, insomuch as the papal power is greater, more subtle, more lasting, more unscrupulous, and more fertile in its resources than the protectionist power, so far will that policy of opposition to Rome which the government of France is now entering upon, be more likely to render an English support permanently important and even nec essary for France, than even the opposition to a policy of monopoly. The latter is comparatively insignificant, though a noisy and furious, interest. Its influence cannot outlast the first shock of the change to free trade. But the pope, once turned into an enemy, the forty thousand clergy who are more or less under his influence, and the vast numbers of With regard to the European point of the French population who are more or less view, we do not believe that the possession of under their influence, will be a permanent the Savoy mountains would greatly increase anxiety to the French government, and a the power of France over Italy. Whether permanent reason for seeking all the aid in for friendly or hostile purposes, the Gulf of French and European opinion which a cor-Genoa is probably now the most eligible

From The Economist, 4 Feb. PIEDMONT, FRANCE, AND SAVOY. No one, we suppose, is surprised to find that France did not make war merely “ for an idea," but with a substantial gain in view, which, if not very rich in apparent value, has an ideal value of its own, inasmuch as it is the gain of a step towards having a "natural boundary" for France, an aspiration which has always haunted the house of Bonaparte,

and the legitimate consequences of which would involve an extension to the Rhine. No one is surprised, and, of course, no one is much pleased. But we think the true proportions of the Savoy question are somewhat misunderstood by the English press in general. We are inclined to doubt the very large importance of the question from the European point of view, the balance of power point of view. We do not think it can be much overrated from the Savoyard point of view,-the point of view of the inhabitants whose transfer to another rule is contemplated.

And we have

little doubt that, if an eager desire for Savoy is felt by the government of France, the means are preparing for doing all that is possible to attain a favorable verdict from the masses of the people.

pathway to Italy for a power so great on the polling populations en masse. sea as France. She has been near enough for a long time to domineer a good deal over Sardinia, had she been so disposed. But she has found a better opportunity in Rome, which is far off, than in Turin, which is close at hand. The truth is, distance makes little But it is extremely important that England difference to such a power as France, it is should use her utmost efforts to see not only broad opportunity, not highways, which give that such a question is fairly submitted to the her an advantage. And opportunities will in people of Savoy, but that it is submitted to a thousand ways be lessened, instead of in- them without any influences likely to bias their creased, by the union of all the lesser states judgment. The Chambery meeting seems to of North Italy under one strong central gov- have been, in spite of the misrepresentations ernment. The counterpoise against French of the French papers, really important and influence will be far more powerfully increased unanimously loyal to the Piedmontese Govby the union under Sardinia, than it can pos- ernment. The address there adopted says: sibly be diminished by the addition of Savoy, -"We declare our respect, our love, and naor even of Savoy and Nice,-to France. tional fidelity to the loyal and chivalrous It is in weak and divided states that foreign Victor Emmanuel II. We are resolved to powers obtain an undue power of interfer- remain free under the constitutional charter ence. Sardinia, after her accessions,-espe- which the magnanimous Charles Albert gave cially if Venetia be added to Lombardy, which is hinted at, ought to be, and we trust will be, a powerful and united kingdom. We may well hope that Savoy is but as a grain in the French balance, as compared with Central Italy in the Sardinian.

to the nation;" and we are told that the reply read by the governor from a Turin despatch, that "the government never entertained the idea of ceding Savoy to France," was received with a real burst of popular enthusiasm. If this be a true report of what The objection, that to concede any thing to occurred at Chambery, there seems good reathe "natural boundary" aspirations of the son to admit a deep vein of conservative loyBonapartes is to excite the fears of number-alty in Savoy. Whether that feeling exist or ess Germans and to whet the appetite of not, it would ill become England, after a France, is more important. And even if long and faithful defence of the principle of Savoy were to be annexed to France, this non-interference with the will of the popula ground ought to be formally repudiated by tions of Central Italy, to permit any tamperall the great powers as untenable, dangerous, ing with the will of the people of Savoy, and in every way inadmissible. But this ob- merely because the country is so poor and Section touches only the "consideration" al- small. It is worse to wrench away a coneged for the act of concession, not the results tented country from its natural government, of that act itself. than to impede the formation of a natural government in a disturbed and discontented country. In the one case you are destroying a rightful and existing social order,-in the other, you are only impeding an experiment, very hopeful possibility, but still an experiment for the future. If it is a political crime to veto Tuscany's desire to try annexation to Sardinia,-it is a worse political crime to sever violently the attachment of Savoy to its constitution and monarch. There are not too many well-satisfied nations on the continent of Europe. If Savoy be one of them, let us do all in our power to enable her to hold her place. And in any case let our ministry insist on fair play; let us have every guarantee that the population are consulted fairly, and not bribed or menaced into the arms of France. If Savoy wishes to belong to France, we see no European reason against it. If she does not, we see in any attempt to force her inclination a political crime of the deepest dye.

But when we turn from the exterior view of the matter to the interior view of it, there seems to us to be a much graver question involved. Transfer should imply property, or a power to transfer; and it is scarcely necessary to observe that neither had France, at the time of the treaty of Villafranca, any property in the millions of Lombardy, nor has Sardinia any such property in the sparse population of Savoy. It would be an anomaly not unlike the act of a member of parliament who should attempt arbitrarily to transfer his constituency to the care of another, and of one, moreover, who had already paraded his contempt for any conscientious discharge of the duties of a representative,-if Sardinia were to transfer her Savoy subjects to the care of France without consent of theirs. Nor do we apprehend that any thing of the kind will be attempted. The emperor of the French has always shown an exceptional respect for the constitutional form of

766

PROPOSITIONS OF ENGLAND ON THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.

From The Economist, 11 Feb. THE PROPOSITIONS OF ENGLAND ON THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.

We know that it has been a matter of reproach against the present government that it has renewed the attempt to settle the affairs of Italy by making propositions to the other powers. It is said, and this argument is calculated to bear with great effect on those who only see the external view of Italian polities, that England had nothing to do but to protest against any forcible interference in the affairs of Italy, and so prolong the time during which the Italians might deal unmolested with their own affairs. This answer would be complete if it were true that the Italians are now at liberty to deal unmolested with their own affairs, or even that they could rely with certainty on French forbearance, were they to do so. The truth is, that Italy has not, as is generally supposed, at the present moment a free breathing space for political organization. The states of Central Italy are in a condition of the most exciting political suspense. Sardinia on the one hand Tuscany and Parma and Modena on the other, dare take no step forward towards the aim which they are keeping before them. Sardinia dares not send troops into Central Italy, -Central Italy can get no nearer to identification with Sardinia,-until all parties are as sured that such a step will not be followed by the public disavowal of France, and an intimation to Austria that the field will be left open for her interference if she choose to take steps with that view.

one has described better than M. Peyrat, the eminent writer in the French Presse, who has only just returned from a tour in the disturbed states. Let him be our witness to the truth of the assertion, that it is no spirit of diplo matic meddling which has induced England to make her recent propositions to the other great European powers. M. Peyrat thus describes his impressions of the public feeling in Italy: "We return to Paris, with this deep conviction, that Italy has never been, morally, in a more violent condition. Everywhere we have met with the same patriotism, the same devotion to the common cause, but everywhere also we have met with the same uneasiness and anxiety. At Turin, Parma, Modena, and Bologna, there is in the attitude of the populations, in the goings and comings of the party leaders, and in the language of political men, an ardor and an impatience with which it is impossible not to be struck. In the life of nations, as well as in that of individuals, nothing is more insupportable than uncertainty, and to put an end to it there are frequent examples of a decisive move being made, no matter at what risks. That is evidently what the Italians are about to do. The long existence of a provisional state of affairs, the weakness of the govern ments, the inaction of the troops, the intrigues of Austria, are so many dissolving elements that enervate the army and demoralize the people. The public mind is anxious; enthusiasm on the wane; passions are arising which have been long kept down. Old soldiers, accustomed to the yoke of discipline, grow imThat England, in attempting to obtain patient while daily expecting an enemy that from France and the other European powers never appears, and gradually lose their mora. an express admission of the right of Italy to courage. The volunteers, who had taken up take the decision of things now into her own arms to fight, not to dawdle away their lives hands, has not been guilty of a work of med-in a barrack-room, have become a regular ding supererogation, no one who knows what difficulty for the government, and may one is really going on in Italy will believe. Be-day become a formidable element of pertur cause no foreign intervention has yet taken bation." In this state of the affairs of Italy, place, or is even immediately anticipated, peo- it becomes of the first importance that the ple are apt to infer that the interior of Italy is practically left at liberty to cement the union with Sardinia. The truth is, however, that Austria and the grand dukes are watching Italy from the Venetian side with an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men, eager for some ostensible act of "intervention" on the part of Sardinia in Central Italy, that a Neapolitan army, guided by papal sympathies, is watching the Romagna for the same event, -while France, whose protection, if certain, would render both Austrian and Neapolitan armies empty threats, is on very uncomfortable terms with Sardinia, and apparently trying to wrest Savoy and Nice from her as the condition of any further assistance. What the present state of Central Italy now is, no

Sardinian statesmen should know exactly what they may safely do without being abandoned by France and England. As Lord John Russell observed on Wednesday night, so soon as the congress was known to be postponed sine die "her majesty's govern ment felt it to be a very serious thing that the Italians, who had hitherto been waiting in expectation that Italian affairs should be solved by the congress, should have no regular gorernment and no apparent means of terminating the condition of uncertainty in which they were placed." We cannot doubt that this suspended animation of political will in Italy, at a time when the political life there is so unusually vivid, has been and is an unnatural and dangerous state, the longer protraction of

PROPOSITIONS OF ENGLAND ON THE AFFAIRS OF ITALY.

which might issue in new troubles. We think, therefore, that it is a wise step to use all the influence of the English government to liberate Italy from this undefined and painful suspense. And we think also, that the propositions originated by the English government were well adapted to this end.

1. It was proposed that both France and Austria should agree not to intervene again in the affairs of Italy without the consent of the five great powers. To this France at once assented, and Austria, while objecting that it is derogatory to her dignity to give any pledge on the subject, intimated that she has not the east intention at present of intervening in any Italian concerns beyond the Venetian frontier.

2. It was proposed that France should withdraw as soon as possible her armies from Rome and Lombardy: to which (under some modified form, we are told,) France has assented.

3. It was proposed to concede to Austria that there should be no European interference in the administration of the government of Venetia in case

4. It should be agreed that the king of Piedmont might assume power in Central Italy whenever, and not sooner than, a new popular vote of the Central Italian States should re-assert the wish of the populations to include their countries within the Sardinian dominions. Then, and not till then, it would, according to this resolution, be competent to the king of Sardinia to send his troops into Central Italy. On this last proposition France has asked time to deliberate, intending, as it is supposed, to make the cession of Savoy and Nice, one or both, a condition of her acquiescence in the aggrandizement of Sardinia. Now, the most obvious of hostile criticisms on these proposals of England would be, that they are like Lord Malmesbury's fidgety propositions last year-helpless propositions, carrying no weight and backed by no practical resolve. 66 The sympathies of England," says M. Peyrat, in the article on Italy to which we have before referred, "are not doubtful. But obliged to keep up a force of one hundred thousand men in India, she has no troops disposable for a war on the continent, and she will not send a single regiment into Italy. As regards the part she will take, it will be entirely limited to a diplomatic co-operation.

767

(Tout se bornera de sa part à un concours diplomatique.)" And this argument will be held by the Tory party to be so far valid as to prove, not perhaps that any new suggestion on the part of England must be ineffectual, but that it can only be effectual so far as it hampers us with risks or engagements which no gain of freedom for Italy could justify us in incurring.

In this view we cannot at all concur, and we will briefly state our reasons. First, England is not at all in the same position in which she stood last year. She is herself stronger, and the case before her is far clearer. Italian constitutionalism and French aggrandizement seemed inextricably mingled last year in the same cause. Now they are assuming more and more clearly distinguished forms. Moreover, England has more hold upon France than she had last year, has far more means of making her friendship important and her hostility annoying to France. The emperor of the French has broken with the pope, he has roused the hornet's nest of Protectionists, he has made all Germany jealous and vigilant, he has no longer, it is supposed, as much influence with Russia as he had last year. He is comparatively isolated and thrown on the Liberal party in Europe. Let him offend that party also, and his position would become even dangerous. He cannot just now afford to ignore the strong convictions of England.

Next, it is not at all true that England, if her advice were slighted, and new complications in Italy arose, could do nothing materia. to assist the Constitutional party. She could, perhaps, spare no soldiers. But if Naples supported Austrian intervention in the north by an attack on the Romagna from the south England could probably crush Naples, and so gain an influence in Italian affairs which France would not willingly see.

In short, our strength is greater than last year; our position is clearer, our influence is larger; and should our present administration continue to guide our foreign affairs on the same firm and clear principles as heretofore, we have little doubt that we may modify the influence of France to the great advantage of Italy;-nay, probably soon succeed in that most difficult of feats, getting the French armies out of Italy which are now settled in it.

« PreviousContinue »