mies make a jest of him; his own officers and soldiers insult him; Rome in general declares against him, by making the general of his horse equal to him, in authority, in an unprecedented manner. Yet all does not move him. He continues firm as fate. Those railleries, insults, and injurious treatment, are no arguments, nor make any alteration in the situation of affairs; and before he changes his plan, he must be convinced by reason; youès isús. The success fully justified his conduct. The justice his citizens, and his very enemies afterwards paid him, was a sufficient recompence for all the reports they had vented against him. And by consenting to pass but a small time for a coward, he has deserved to be considered by all succeeding times, as the wisest and most prudent general that Rome ever produced. Thus be made good the truth of what Livy says upon another occasion, that a seasonable contempt of glory is repaid with usury and advantage; [9] Spreta in tempore gloria etiam cumulatior redit. But what I think most admirable in Fabius, is the noble and generous manner ofhis behaviour towardsa declared enemy, from whom he had received the most sensible affront: an action great indeed, as Plutarch observes, and wherein valour, prudence, and goodness were equally displayed. He might have let Minucius perish on the occasion in which his own rashness had engaged him, and have punished him by the hands of his enemies for the affront he had received from him. These would have been the sentiments of a little genius and a mean soul. Fabius flies to the assistance of his rival, and extricates him from his danger, Let us compare the glory which Fabius acquired by this action, the joy he felt in having saved the re[9] Liv. lib. ii. n. 47. public public, the pleasure of seeing his enemy at his feet, acknowledging his fault, and the whole army saluting him their deliverer and father, with the base and shameful satisfaction of a revengeful person, who sacrifices every thing, and even the public, to his resentment. The conduct of Fabius towards Scipio does not appear so blameless and noble; and it is difficult to acquit his constant opposition to the design thatyoung Roman had formed, of carrying the war into Africa, from all mixture of jealousy. There is reason to believe, says Plutarch, that he first opposed Scipio thro' 'an excess of prudence and precaution, as being alarmed at the danger to which he thought the republic was likely to be exposed; but that afterwards he too obstinately persisted in it, and went farther than he ought, instigated by an immoderate emulation to check the glory and greatness of a young general that gave him umbrage. There are several reasons to believe, that Fabius in this dispute acted more from passion than reason. He had at first used his utmost endeavours to engage Crassus, the colleague of Scipio, in the consulship, to insist upon his right of taking the provinces by lot, according to the custom; not voluntarily to give up to Scipio the command of the army in Sicily, and to be in readiness to pass himself into Africa, if it should be at last judged convenient. Not being able to succeed in his first attempt, he employed all his interest to prevent the funds necessary for the war from being assigned to Scipio; and when afterwards Scipio's enemies, whilst he was, in Sicily laid their complaints against him before the senate, Fabius, without any examination, very injuriously and extravagantly advised to recal him immediately, and deprive him of the command. These complaints however were found to have no foundation. And lastly, when Scipio was passing into Africa, and Rome rung of his glorious actions and victories, the language and conduct of Fabius was still the same, and he was not ashamed to demand that a successor might be sent him, and for no other greatest men that the Roman republic ever produced, but these instances of jealousy and envy against the infant glory of a young warrior of such hopes, are a blot in his reputation, and a sensible proof of what we have elsewhere advanced, that nothing is more rare, nor at the same time more heroic, than to behold unmoved, or even with joy, the glorious actions and good successes of such as are engaged in the same pursuits with ourselves. A much greater degree of virtue was necessary in Fabius to defend himself against being jealous of a merit that might eclipse his own, than was necessary in the case of Minucius, for behaving with moderation towards his rival, over whom he found he had every advantage in point of merit. HANNIBAL AND SCIPIO. I have thought proper to join these two great men, and once more engage them in a war with each other, because both o them had virtues which were very much alike, by thus viewing them in the same light, it will be more easy to come at the knowledge of their characters, and to judge which of the two deserves the preference. I do not attempt however to make an exact comparison between them, but only to set down the principal circumstances relating to both. In this parallel I shall examine their military, moral, and political virtues; that which forms the great general, and that which makes the honest man. I begin with this quality, because, properly speak the e measures, and preparing all the means necessary make it succeed; in knowing when to seize favourole occasions, which are always on the wing, and ever return; introducing into this scheme even suden and unforeseen accidents; in a word, in foreseeg all that may happen, and in watching every thing, ithout being embarrassed or disconcerted by any vent. For, as the same [s] Polybius observes, the oncurrence of all the wisest measures that can be oncerted and executed, is scarce sufficient to make design succeed; whereas the omission of one single rcumstance, how slight soever it may appear, is Eten enough to prevent its success. Such was the character of Hannibal and Scipio. oth formed great projects, bold and singular, of ast extent, long duration, capable of perplexing the rongest head, but alone salutary and decisive. Hannibal discerned from the beginning of the war, at the only means of conquering the Romans was by tacking them in their own country. He disposed of Fery thing that was necessary at a distance, for the rrying on this great design. He foresaw every difculty, and every obstacle. The passage of the Alps as no stop to his progress. So wise a commander, [t]Polybius observes, would have been careful not have engaged himself so far, if he had not been be-re assured that those mountains were not impractiable. The success answered his views; and we know ith what rapidity he carried on his conquests, and ow near Rome was brought to her destruction. Scipio formed a design, which seemed no less bold, ut met with better success; and this was to fall upon e Africans in Africa itself. How many obstacles emed to oppose the pursuit of this project? Was it there then be time to recal the consul to their assistance? What would become of Scipio and his army, if he lost the battle? And what might not be apprehended from the Carthaginians and their allies, united together, and fighting for their liberties, in the sight of their wives, their children, and their country ? These were the reflections of Fabius, which appeared very plausible, but did not stop Scipio; and the success of the enterprise shewed sufficiently with what wisdom it had been formed, and with what ability conducted; and it was visible, that in all the actions of this great man, there was nothing which arose from chance, but all was the effect of that solid reasoning and consummate prudence, which distinguish the conduct of the great captain from the casual successes of the mere soldier. 2. Profound Secrecy. One of the most certain means to make an enter prise succeed, is secrecy; and [u] Polybius requires that a general should be so impenetrable upon this article, that not only friendship and the most intimate familiarity should never be able to draw an indiscreet word from him, but that it should not be even possible for the most subtle curiosity to discover any thing of what he has in his mind, either in his countenance or his manner of behaviour. The siege of Carthagena was the first enterprise of Scipio in Spain, and in a manner the first step to all his other conquests. He spoke of it only to Lælius, and intrusted him with it only, because it was absolutely necessary. It could be likewise only by silence and a profound secrecy, that another enterprise sueceeded of still greater importance, as it drew along |