e pretensions of states and kingdoms. Thus a anger who should have come to Rome in the abnce of the consuls, would have thought the governent of the republic was entirely aristocratical, that in the hands of the elders and sages,

THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE.

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The power of the people, however was very conerable. They were sole masters and arbiters of reards and punishments, which is the most essential rt of government. They often fixed pecuniary ulets upon such as had been possessed of the highest ployments, and had alone the right of condemng the Roman citizens capitally. And in this last se, there was a very laudable custom at Rome, acrding to Polybius, and worthy of observation, ich was to leave a person who was accused of a pital crime, the power of preventing judgment, and tiring into some neighbouring city, where he past e rest of his life in peace and liberty, in a voluntary nishment. It was the people, who by their suffrages nferred all offices and honours, which in the reblic are the most glorious rewards of probity and erit. They had alone the right of instituting and rogating laws, and what is still more considerable, was the people who deliberated of peace and war, no decided alliances, treaties of peace, and convenons with foreign people and princes. Who would t have thought such a government absolutely polar and democratical? h

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HE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE OF THE CONSUL, SENATE, AND PEOPLE UPON EACH OTHER.

It is this mutual dependence of the different parts.

ALL

terest, renders the body of the state invulnerable, and not to be conquered by any foreign power.

We have already observed, that the power of the consul, in time of war, was almost sovereign, and yet he absolutely depended, in several particulars, both upon the senate and people. For on one side it was only by order from the senate that he could receive the sums that were necessary for the provisions, clothes, and pay of the soldiers; and the denial, or delay of these succours, disabled the general from forming any attempt or pursuing their designs as far as he could wish. The same senate, at the end of the year, could appoint a successor to the consul, or continue him in the command of the army, and thereby had it in their power to leave him the glory of ending the war, or to take it from him. Lastly, it depended upon the senate to cast a blemish upon the achievements of the generals, or advance their glory. For it was the senate which decreed the honour of a triumph, and appointed the expences necessary for that pompous solemnity. On the other side, as it belonged to the people to declare war, to confirm or disannul the treaties made with princes and foreign nations, and to call the generals to an account for their conduct at their return from the army, it is easy to see how attentive it was necessary for them to be in conciliating the favour of the people."

As to the senate, though their power was so great in other respects, yet in several points it was subject to that of the people. In great affairs, and such especially as concerned the lives of the citizens, the intervention of their authority was requisite. When any laws were proposed, even such as tended to diminish the rights, honours, and prerogatives of the

were the judges whether they should be received or rejected. But the greatest instance of their powerwas, that if but one of their tribunes opposed the resolutions and designs of the senate, it sufficed to put a stop to them, so that after this opposition the senate could proceed no farther.

Lastly, the people likewise in their turn, were nearly concerned to keep fair with the senators, both in general and in particular. The receivers of taxes, tributes, and customs, in a word, of all the income and revenue of the state, the contractors, who engaged to furnish the army with provisions, to repair the temples and other public buildings, to keep up the high roads, these persons formed numerous societies, which were all taken out of the people, and subsisted a great number of citizens, some being employed in collecting the revenues, others serving for security to the farmers, others lending their money by way of advance, and putting it out to use in that manner. Now the censors were the persons who adjudged these farms to the companies who offered to accept them, and also allotted to the undertakers the several works to be done; and it was the senate, which either of itself, or by commissioners of their nomination, passed judgment without appeal, concerning the disputes which might arise upon any of these matters, so far as to disannul sometimes such agreements as became impracticable, and to grant a farther time for the payment, or to lower the rate of the leases, upon account of some ill accident intervening. And, what was still more capable of inspiring the people with modesty and respect for the decrees of the senate, [k] the judges of the greatest part of the public and private affairs o any consequence, were taken out of their body. The citizens were likewise obliged to keep fair with the consuls upon whom they all depended, especially in time of war, and when they served under them in the army.

[4] The form of judgment was changed in after-times.

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the times immediately following it, of the almost continual seditions which so long divided the senate and people, and that kind of intestine war between the tribunes and consuls, we justly stand astonished, how a state agitated by such frequent and violent convulsions, should not only be able to subsist, but to conquer, even at that very time, all the neighbouring people, and presently after to extend their victories into countries far more remote. Polybius gives a solid reason for it, which reflects a considerable honour upon the Roman people; and this is, that when the republic was attacked by an enemy from without, the fear of the common danger, and the motive of the public good, suspended their private quarrels, and entirely re-united them. The love of their country was then in a manner the soul which put all the parts and members of the state into motion, every one striving to discharge their duty in their several functions, either by forming resolutions with deliberation and wisdom, or by putting them in execution with promptitude and alacrity; and it was this good understanding and unanimity which constantly rendered the republic invincible, and gave success to all their undertakings.

It was this very constitution of the Roman government which maintained and subsisted the republic for some time, even after the citizens, delivered from the fear of a foreign enemy, grown haughty and insolent by their victories, emasculated by riches and pleasures, and corrupted by praise and flattery, began to abuse their power, and commit violence and wrong in a thousand instances. For in this condition the authority of the senate, and that of the people, being always counter-balanced by each other, when one of the two parties at any time endeavoured to extend its

nower the other presently joined all its forces to null

it down, and keep it in order; and thus, by this mutual equality, thus balancing power and authority, the republic always maintained itself in its liberty and independency.

CAUSES OF THE CHANGE OF A REPUBLIC INTO A MONARCHY.

It is with a state and a republic, says Polybius, as with the human body, which has its progress and increase, its time of strength and maturity, its declension and end; and usually, when a state is arrived at the height of grandeur and power, it afterwards degenerates by more or less sensible declensions, and falls at last to ruin.

Thus, says Polybius, whilst the government of Carthage, like that of Sparta and Rome, was made up of the [] three sorts of power we have been speaking of, it was very potent and flourishing. But in the beginning of the second Punic war, and in the time of Hannibal, it might be said in some measure, to be upon the decline. Its youth, flower, and vigour, were already faded; it had begun to fall from its former height, and tend towards its ruin. Whereas Rome was then, as I may say, in full strength and vigour, and making large advances towards the conquest of the world. The reason which Polybius gives, of the fall of the one, and the increase of the other's power, is drawn from the principles he had laid down concerning the successive revolutions of states. Amongst the Carthaginians, the people had at that time the principal authority in all public affairs; on the other hand, at Rome, the senate had then more credit than ever. From whence he concludes, that a people, guided by the prudence of old men, must necessarily have the advantage over a state governed, or rather hurried on by the rash counsels of the multitude Rome accordingly, which, properly speaking, began then to extend its power, and make trial of it strengt against foreigners, governed by the wise counsels o

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