in the substance of the soul, by the Creator; they e isted before all ages, and are of greater antiquity th the world, as they are an emanation of the Divi Wisdom, which cannot think otherwise of virtue a vice. They are the model and original of hum laws, which in a manner cease to be, as soon as th swerve from this primitive type of justice and tru which all lawgivers should propose to follow in their institutions.

These first notions of good and evil may be wea ened and obscured by a bad education, by the torr of example, by the violence of passions, and abo all by the dangerous attractions of pleasure, wh spoils and corrupts our minds by false delights, wh it lays before us, that we do not find in the pract of virtue. But there is constantly left within us an ward sense of these primitive truths, and it is the siness of Philosophy to rekindle these precious spa by its salutary instructions, to remove all errors fr us, by giving us a nearer view of the first princip to cure us of popular opinions and prejudices, to ma us understand [c] that we are born for justice and tue, to convince us by sensible and evident proofs, that there is a Providence which guides and presi over all, and which takes care not only of the wo in general, but of every man in particular; that thing escapes its all-seeing eyes, and that God kn thoroughly all our actions, and sees our most sec thoughts and intentions; for such a conviction is v

àtque princeps, apta ad jubendum & ad vitandum, ratio est recta summi Jovis... Ergo est lex justorum injustorumque distinctio, ad illam antiquissimam & rerum omnium principem expressa naturam, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quæ supplicio improbos afficiunt, & detendunt, & tuentur bonos. Cic. lib. ii. de Leg. n. 8. 13.

[c] Nos ad justitiam esse natos, neque opinione, sed naturâ constitutum esse jus.Lib. i. de Leg. n. 28. [d] Dominos esse omnium rerum

ac moderatores deos, eaque gerantur, eorum geri judicio ad mine. (Neque universo gener minum solùm, sed etiam singu Diis immortalibus consuli & p deri. Lib. ii, de Nat. Deor. n. 1 Eosdem qualis quisque sit, agat, quid in se admittat, mente, quâ pietate religiones c intueri; piorumque & impic habere rationem. His enim imbutæ mentes, haud sanè abh bunt ab utili & à verâ sente Cic. lib. ii. de Leg. n. 15.

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be always bound to observe the two sorts of duties, which I have now spoken of, that is, he ought always to honour the Divinity, and pay a regard to himself, by living in a wise and regular manner; [e] but he is under other obligations with relation to the common society whereof he is a member. God is the common father of a great family, and all men are his children, united by the bond of humanity, formed for one another, and consequently obliged to promote the public good, and mutually assist each other by all good offices. Thus, man should not limit his views or his zeal to the particular place where he was born, [ƒ] but look upon himself as a citizen of the whole world, which in this sense is but a single city.

[g] It is true, this general society, which at first takes in the whole race of mankind, afterwards divides itself by degrees into other less extensive societies, betwixt men of the same city and the same family, and from thence arise the different duties of civil society with regard to friends, allies, relations, parents, and country; but they have all their origin in the first principle we have laid down, which is, that man, according to the views and appointment of God, is born for man.

This is a small abridgment of the maxims of morality, which paganism supplies us with, and these

[e] Quoniam (ut præclarè scriptum est a Platone) non nobis solùm nati sumus, ortûsque nostri partem patria vindicat, partem parentes, partem amici, hominesque hominum causâ generati sunt, ut ipsi inter se alius alii prodesse possint; in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi; & communes utilitates in medium afferre mutatione officiorum. Cic. lib. 1. de Offic. n. 22.

civitas communis hominum existimanda. De Leg. lib. 1. n. 23.

Socrates quidem, cùm rogaretur Cujatem se esse diceret, Mundanum inquit: totius enim mundi se incoJam & civem arbitrabatur. Lib. v. Tusc. Quæst. n. 108.

[g] Gradus plures sunt societatis hominum... Abillâ enim immensâ societate generis humani, in exiguum angustumque concluditur.

principles, it must be owned, are great, solid, an evident; but they do not extend so far as they ough and as perfect as they appear, they leave us on t way, without shewing us either the motive that shou sanctify our actions, or the end we should propose ourselves in them. It is the holy Scripture alon which gives us a clear and certain notion of man, discovering to us the advantages of his first origi his fall into sin, and the fatal consequences of th fall; his restoration by a Redeemer; his different d ties with regard to God, his neighbour and himsel the end he ought to have in view, and the means conducting him to it; and a Christian philosoph will not fail to instruct his scholars in all these trut But in my opinion, it is no small advantage to po out to them in paganism itself, the rules of such r fined morality, and the principles of so sublime a co duct, which invincibly prove, that virtue is not empty name, as the libertines would persuade ther selves, nor the duties of religion and of civil life me human establishments, politically invented to lay restraint upon the multitude; but that all these duti all these obligations, and all these laws, are includ in the very nature of man, and a necessary cons quence of God's designs towards him.

It is for this reason I look upon it as a very usef custom to make the youth, who study Philosoph read from time to time select passages out of the pl losophical books of Tully, and especially from tho

where he treats of offices and laws.

Beside this advantage, they will find 'there wher withal to improve the taste of polite learning, whi they have acquired in the preceding classes; and may also be of great use to masters themselves, teaching them to write Latin in a pure, neat and el gant manner, proper for the treating philosophic subjects, which is a matter of no small consequen to their profession.

[h] OF all the natural gifts which man has received from God, reason is the most excellent; that which distinguishes him from other animals, and which displays in him the brightest lines of his reemblance to God. By reason, he has the idea of what is beautiful, great, just, and true; he decides and judges concerning the properties of every thing; e compares several objects together, deduces consequences from principles, makes use of one truth to come at another; and lastly, by reason he gives orHer and connection to his notions and reasonings, vhich diffuse a light and grace through them, which ender them far more intelligible, and discover more Fully their whole force and truth. The importance of a science, which aids and assists the mind in all hese operations, is easily conceived.

We find excellent reflections upon this subject, in he first discourse prefixed to the art of thinking. I hall make use of them here, as knowing nothing more proper to give youth a just esteem and taste For philosophy, or more capable of explaining to them all the advantages, and even necessities of it.

There is nothing, says the author of this logic, more valuable than good sense, and rectitude of mind n discerning truth and falshood. All the other qualiLies of the mind are limited in their use, but exactness of reason is universally useful, in all parts and in all the employments of life. It is not only difficult in the sciences to distinguish truth from error, but also in most of the subjects that man speak of, and the affairs of which they treat. They are almost universally dif

ferent paths, some true and others false, and it is th business of reason to make the choice. Those wh chuse well have a right understanding, and those wh chuse amiss have a wrong one; and this is the fir and most important difference that we can make be twixt the qualities of the human mind.

Thus our principal application should be to for the judgment, and render it as exact as may be ; and is to this end the greatest part of our study should I directed. We make use of reason as an instrument t acquire the sciences; and on the other hand, w should make use of the sciences as an instrument t bring our reason to perfection; a right mind bein far more considerable than all the branches of spec lative knowledge we are capable of obtaining, b means of the most true and solid sciences.-Men a not born to spend their time in measuring of line in examining the proportion of angles, or considerin the different motions of matter. Their understan ing is too great, their life too short, their time to precious to be employed upon such trivial object But they are obliged to be just, equitable and jud cious in all their discourse, in all their actions, in a the affairs they undertake, and for this they shou principally exercise and form themselves.

This care and study is so much the more necessar as it is surprising how seldom we meet with this exac ness of judgment. We scarce meet with any but wro minds, that have very little discernment of truth, tal all things by a false bias, that pay themselves wi very bad reasons, and would put them off upon othe as current, suffer themselves to be carried away by t slightest appearances, and are always in excess; wh boldly decide concerning matters they are ignorant and do not understand, and who adhere to their ow opinions with such inflexible obstinacy, that they w hearken to nobody that can undeceive them.

This ill turn of the mind is not only the cause errors in the sciences, but also of most part of th faults which are committed in civil life; unjust qua

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