THE PRINCE. SECRETARY OF NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, CITIZEN AND THOSE Who Court the favour of princes generally present them with whatever they possess that is most rare, curious, or valuable; as horses, armour, embroidered cloths, precious stones, &c., according to the dignity of the personage they seek to propitiate. For my part, my anxiety to present myself to the notice of your highness, with the best proof of my devotion, has not enabled me to discover, amongst all I possess, anything that I esteem more, or account so valuable, as a knowledge of the actions of celebrated men; a knowledge acquired by a long experience of modern times, and a diligent perusal of the ancients. The observations which I have made with all the accuracy, reflection, and care of which I am capable, are contained in the small volume now addressed to you. And although I have not the vanity to deem it worthy of your acceptance, yet I am persuaded that your goodness will not refuse the offering, since it is impossible to present you with anything more valuable than a work which will place before you, in a small compass, all the experience I have acquired during many years of continual meditation and suffering in the school of adversity. You will find in this fragment neither a glowing and lofty style, nor any of those meretricious ornaments with which authors seek to embellish their works. Its interest must depend upon the importance of the subject, the solidity of the reflections, and the truth of the facts recorded. It will, perhaps, appear presumptuous in me, a man of humble birth, to propose rules of conduct to those who govern; but as the painter when about to sketch a mountainous country places himself in the plain, and in order to draw the scenery of a vale, ascends an eminence, even so, I conceive, that a person must be a prince to discover the nature and character of a people, and one of the people to judge properly of a prince. I am therefore bold enough to hope that you will accept this feeble tribute in reference to the intention with which it is offered; and if you condescend to read it with attention, you will have evidence of my ardent desire to see you fill with glory those high destinies, to which fortune and your splendid talents have called you. If from your elevated position you should condescend to look down on a person in my lowly station, you will see how long and how unworthily I have been persecuted by the extreme and unrelenting malevolence of fortune. NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI. THE PRINCE. CHAPTER I. Of the different kinds of principalities, and the means by which they are acquired. ALL states and governments which have ever possessed, or at the present day exercise, dominion over mankind, have been in their origin, or continue to subsist, either as republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary in the family by whose descendants they have long been ruled, or they are, on the other hand, but newly acquired. The latter are either wholly and absolutely new, as the government of Milan was to Francisco Sforza, or else they become annexed as appendages to the hereditary states of the prince by whom they are acquired, as the territory of Naples now is to the kingdom of Spain. States so acquired either become subject to the dominion of a prince, or they enjoy their liberty. The conqueror subdues them either by his own prowess or through the intervention of foreign arms, from some fortunate event, or by means of his own personal courage and talents. CHAPTER II. Of hereditary principalities. I SHALL not here speak of republican governments, having already discussed that subject amply in my Essay on Livy. I shall confine myself solely to the subject of principalities; and in following the divisions which I have already laid down, I shall consider how such states ought to be governed and maintained. I must first premise that hereditary states, accustomed to be governed by a line of princes, are more easily maintained than such as are new. In fact, it is only necessary for an hereditary prince to conform strictly with the measures established by his predecessors, and comply with the exigencies which particular occasions may require. Thus, by the rational exercise of ordinary faculties, he may always maintain himself with credit in his states, or at least he can only be dispossessed by some force far greater than his own; and even then he may re-establish himself with ease on the first check which the fortune of his adversary may sustain. Of this Italy affords us an example in the duke of Ferrara, who was enabled to resist the Venetians in 1484, and Pope Julius II. in 1510, merely by having been so long established in the duchy. For the natural prince having no motive or necessity for irritating his subjects, it follows of course that he will be more beloved by them than another; hence, if some extraordinary vices do not render him odious, it is natural that he should engross their inclination and regard. In the antiquity and long duration of a government both the cause and the remembrance of innovation become confounded, for one change ever produces an increasing inclination for another. CHAPTER III. Of mixed principalities. IN the government of principalities newly acquired, many difficulties occur; for, in the first place, if they are not entirely new, but merely annexed as appendages to another sovereignty (in which case the state may be called a mixed one), a degree of instability is created by the difficulties ever incident to new principalities. For as most men are willing enough to change their masters, in expectation of improving their condition, such a persuasion induces them to take up arms against the existing government. But in this respect they are often deceived, and find by experience that they have only rendered their condition worse. This mischievous result seems to be both natural and inevitable; for every new prince is compelled, in some degree, to displease his new subjects, either by the presence of the soldiers he is obliged to retain, or by numerous other grievances which are always attendant on recent acquisitions. And thus he is sure to render all those persons inimical to him whom he has injured by seizing the principality, and is unable to preserve the friendship of others who assisted him in his enterprise, because he can neither reward them as they expect, nor coerce them with rigour, as they have laid him under such weighty obligations. For, however great the military resources of a prince may be, he will find that to obtain firm footing in a province he must engage the favour and interest of the inhabitants. From these circumstances it happened that Lewis XII. king of France, so quickly gained possession of Milan, and as speedily lost it. The troops of Lodovico Sforza were sufficient to retake it at the first attack. For the very people who had opened the gates of the city to the French, deceived in the hopes they had conceived of future favours, soon became disgusted with the conduct of their new master. It is doubtless true, that when a prince has reconquered a country which has once rebelled, he can retain it afterwards more easily in subjection. He avails himself of the rebellion as a reason for using less reserve in securing his conquest, by punishing the guilty, watching the suspected, and strengthening himself in all the vulnerable points of his province. Thus when the French were first driven from the duchy of Milan, this was effected by a mere movement on the confines on the part of Louis Sforza; but on the second occasion it became necessary to form a league with other states against the French, to destroy their armies and expel them from Italy; and all this was owing to the causes before assigned. The duchy of Milan was, nevertheless, twice wrested from its new master. We have mentioned the general reasons which occasioned his losing it the first time; it remains for us to examine the causes of the second, and to speak of the measures which the king of France, or any other prince in a similar situation, ought to have adopted, in order to maintain his ground better than Lewis did. We must first premise, that a state which a sovereign acquires and unites with his ancient territories is either con |