who witnessed it did not live to see checked in its onward progress. Now, however, it is quite otherwise, and hence the source of difficulty felt in the present day. Doubtless we believe there is wisdom, it may be even mercy, in this. God will deal justly with all, and not seek to reap where he has not sown; and considering the guilt incurred by so many in the rejection of the Gospel and the unprofitable reception of it to so great an extent, it may have been in mercy withheld from races unfitted for its reception, as the Roman world was fitted for it when it was first made known. The ground may be allowed to lie fallow till it is fit for the seed, and the seed matured for being profitably cast into it. The conversion of the heathen may be awaiting the fuller realization of the Christian ideal with us than has ever yet been manifested. At present we commend to the heathen a remedy that has evidently failed with many to whom it has been applied in vain. Irresistible grace, as it has been called, might no doubt have made it effectual to all who have received it, and compel the rest of the world to receive it in like manner. But where then would there have been room for free will or the production of anything that could be regarded as real righteousness? Perhaps if we could see the vast extent of the future success of the Gospel which is promised, its failure hitherto would dwindle into smaller proportions and might seem as nothing. But this leaves untouched the case of those with whom it has already actually failed, or may fail in time to come, to whom the terrible warnings of Holy Scripture appear to leave no hope beyond the grave. Dr. Newman seeks to relieve himself from the terrible thought of the endless sufferings of the lost by saying, "If punishment be at tended by continuity, or by a sense of succession, this must be because it is endless and something more; such inflictions are an addition to its endlessness, and do not necessarily belong to it because it is endless."* But however we might see in the absence of a sense of continuity and succession in the existence of the lost some mitigation of our horror at the thought of eternal sufferings, this would leave untouched the final triumph of evil in the case of these unhappy beings, which I apprehend is a main part of the difficulty felt in the present day. I suppose, however, that if those to whom this is a difficulty were assured that after this life, which is but a moment in comparison with the indefinite duration of the state hereafter, those who have failed here to attain the moral and spiritual renovation that could alone insure the favour of God would have renewed opportunities of reformation, a new probation, and a new dispensation of repentance and grace, their difficulty in this respect would cease. It is the apparent triumph of evil, the supposed final triumph in so large a proportion of cases, that seems so much now to stagger the sceptical mind, and to awaken doubts that a good God can be the author of the world, or that the religion which is so partial in its effects, so apparently unsuccessful, can have proceeded from Him. But let us reflect that we know nothing, according to the teaching of the Christian * Grammar of Assent, p. 417. Dr. Newman subjoins in a note a passage from Petavius, "De Angelis," sub fine: "De hâc damnatorum saltem hominum respiratione, nihil adhuc certi decretum est ab Ecclesiâ Catholicâ ; ut propterea non temere tanquam absurda sit explodenda sanctissimorum Patrum hæc opinio; quamvis à communi sensu Catholicorum hoc tempore sit aliena." The respiratio or relief that Petavius here speaks of is a supposed mitigation of suffering obtained by the prayers of the faithful, though an entire remission of them is not to be expected. religion, of the future purposes and dealings of God respecting those who die in sin, beyond the sentence of indefinitely prolonged punishment pronounced against sin unrepented of. I use the word indefinite in regard to the duration of future punishment advisedly. For, in the language of Scripture the words generally used to denote what we call eternity are only expressive of indefinitely prolonged duration, and were commonly used to express an indefinite duration, known, however, to be limited.* It is only from the nature of the case in which they occur that we can tell whether they mean a real infinity of duration or not. When applied to God, of course they have the sense of infinity, but not from their own proper vigour, but because infinity enters into our idea of God as a necessary attribute. When they are applied to the future state of man, it is argued that, if they mean eternal life for the righteous, they must mean eternal punishment for the wicked. And so they do, but only on the supposition of eternal perseverance in righteousness by the one, and eternal perseverance in sin by the other. If we might suppose a defection on the part of the saints in Heaven, we should at once perceive that such words could not be taken to mean an eternal continuance in blessedness notwithstand *This is now so well understood, that in recent discussions the word æonian, from the Greek diúvios, has been adopted to express the indefiniteness of the duration as distinguished from infiniteness. There is another word, atdios, more properly expressive of infinite duration. This was used in the Arian controversy. For some who acknowledged the generation of the Son to have been è aiwvwv scrupled to apply the word åtdios to that. This word is found only twice in the New Testament. S. Paul, Rom. i. 20, uses it to express God's "eternal power and godhead." The other instance is in S. Jude, 6, where it is used of the "everlasting chains" in which the angels that kept not their first estate are reserved. There, however, it is plainly used in a limited sense, namely, "unto the judgment of the great day." ing. We may feel justly persuaded that such a defection will not take place; but on the supposition of it, plainly the words would indicate only a continuance in happiness co-extensive in its duration with continuance in goodness.* And similarly, if we had any reason to suppose that repentance and renovation should take place hereafter, the like words would not hinder us from seeing that the punishment might terminate on the restoration to righteousness. There are indeed some of the ill consequences of sin, penal no doubt, that can never cease, if there be any continuity of consciousness between our present and our future state. But this applies in its measure to those who are saved as well as to the lost. The sense of past guilt should never be forgotten, and perhaps they that have sinned could never be as though they had not. But certainly the terms of God's sentence against sin are not so absolute as to render it impossible that He should grant a future pardon. The promise of a reward implies a contract with those who fulfil the conditions of it. Not so the threat of punishment, especially when the good, who, in the hope set before them, denied themselves the pleasure of sin here, would themselves rejoice if their unhappy brethren might be restored again. For it might be alleged * The supposition made above is apt to wound the sensitiveness of pious people, who having struggled with evil here, and felt the burden of sin, shrink from the thought of a like conflict hereafter. But it should be remembered that what may be possible in the nature of things may by moral means become a practical impossibility. Defectibility in the abstract seems essential to a moral state, and if transgression should be rendered impossible by anything but the moral character of the saints in heaven, I cannot see how their state could be a state of holiness at all; the moral dignity of the redeemed would be wholly lost. It is enough to be assured that our future perseverance will be morally secure. All that the argument I have used above requires is, that our continuance in happiness hereafter is conditional on our continuance in holiness, and that our defection is a thing in itself that such a threatening of punishment implies a contract with those who, in fear of it, laboured and practised selfdenial to escape it, and might say, if they saw the wicked as well off in the end as themselves, that they had been unfairly dealt with, like the labourers in the vineyard. Such an allegation is met by the fact that no truly good man could do anything but rejoice in the final reformation and restoration of the wicked. The only failure of justice that could be reasonably complained of would be the escape of the wicked without reformation. And, as the terms expressive of duration are capable of a limited sense, I can see nothing to render it impossible that God may have in His gracious purpose a renewed dispensation of repentance and grace. But I see much to preclude its being told us now that God has such a scheme in His Divine purposes. For if this life is our term of probation for the life next possible, however certain we may feel that it will not take place. Indeed the very knowledge of its possibility may be a most effectual means, when coupled with the remembrance of our past experience, of hindering such an event. If it were to be hindered by any extrinsic force, and not by the operation of moral considerations, including our earthly experience, I do not think any reflecting person could desire such a state. I may here quote with advantage some passages from the famous fifth chapter of the first part of Butler's Analogy:— 66 Nothing which we at present see would lead us to the thought of a solitary inactive state hereafter; but if we judge at all from the analogy of nature, we must suppose, according to the Scripture account of it, that it will be a community. Nor is our ignorance what will be the employments of this happy community, nor our consequent ignorance what particular scope or occasion there will be for the exercise of veracity, justice, and charity, amongst the members of it with regard to each other, any proof that there will be no sphere of exercise for these virtues. Much less, if that were possible, is our ignorance any proof that there will be no occasion for that frame of mind, or character, which is formed by the daily practice of those particular virtues here, and which is a result from it. This at least must be owned in general, that as the government established in the universe is moral, the character of virtue and piety must in some way or |