" which numbers of People ought to be fent. Prudence, Industry, and Benevolence, pub"lick Spirit, and Diligence, Oeconomy, Neat"nefs, and Temperance, are not only practifed "by them in the most exemplary manner, but ftrongly recommended to us by their Ex ample. Look on a Swarm of Bees, and ob"ferve the Difpofition that influences every In"dividual; they all labour for the general Ad"vantage; they are all fubmiffive to the Laws " and Regulations of the Community; there " is no particular Intereft, and confequently no Emulations nor Competitions for Gain or cr ર Glory; no Diftinctions, but those which Na"ture and the Neceffities of the Family have "introduced among them. We never see them "diffatisfied with their Condition, or inclinable "to abandon the Hive, in Disgust to find them"felves Slaves or Neceffitous. On the contrary, they think themselves in perfect Freedom, " and perfect Affluence, as indeed they are: they are free, because they depend only upon "the Laws; they are happy, because the Con"course of their several Labours inevitably pro"duce an Abundance, that conftitutes the Riches "of each Individual. Let us compare Human "Societies with this, and they will appear altogether monstrous. Neceffity, Reason, and Philofophy, have eftablished them under the " commendable Pretence of mutual Aids and "Benefits; but a Spirit of Selfishness destroys all; and one half of Mankind, to load them"felves with Superfluities, leave the other half "deftitute 3 "deftitute of the common Neceffaries of Life." In short, upon the ftricteft and closest Enquiry we can make into the feveral Tribes of Families of the Brute-Creation, it will appear, that they are all directed and act by fome Principle analogous at least, and equivalent to what we call Understanding in ourselves; and why we should call it by any other Name in them, I confess I am at a lofs to determine. If then the feveral Species of Brutes do by the Strength of their own Understandings, think, reafon, project, contrive, and perform every Office within their proper Sphere of Life and Action in ajust and due proportion to what we do in ours, they must be allowed to have fome immaterial Principle within them, in which thefe Faculties are inherent, and by which they are directed. Now, to my poor Apprehenfion, Understanding without a Soul, and a Soul that is not a Spirit, appears quite as abfurd as Light without Flame, or Flame without Fire; the one I think naturally supposes and includes the other. The Great Mr. Locke, in his Effay on Human Underftanding, lib. 2. cap. 11. allows that Brutes have Ideas, and that they reason, tho' they are not capable of comparing and comprehending these Ideas, and reasoning abftractedly, as we do. Yet (fays he) if they have any Ideas at all, and are not mere Machines, as fome would have them, we can't deny them to have fome Reafon. It feems to me as evident, that they do in fome inftances reajon, as that they have Senfe; but it is only in par ticular ticular Ideas, just as they received them from their Senfes. Juft as they received them from their Senfes!Why, how fhould it be else? What is the Foundation of our Reafon, but those particular Ideas we receive from our Senfes? Ideas are Images, excited or impreffed upon the Soul by external Objects, thro' the Mediation of the Senfes; and the enlarging, comparing, and combining these Ideas, and forming practical Conclufions from them, is the whole Province of Human Reason. This philofophical Limitation of the Understanding of Brutes, founds a little aukwardly from this great Man, because he has allowed the most exalted Human Understanding no better Materials to work upon. He has very juftly exploded the Notion of innate Ideas, and has by confequence left us nothing but those which we receive by Senfation, to be the Ground-work of our most refined Speculations. Why then will he not allow the fame uniform Effect to be produced by the fame uniform Cause in both? Why does he take fo much pains to perfuade himself and us, that Rationality in Brutes must proceed from a quite different Cause, from what it does in ourselves? What is he afraid of? What would be the terrible Confequences of fuch a Conceffion? For my own part, I think I fee none, but what your own excellent Underftanding will, with a little Recollection, eafily evade, without the leaft violence either to Reafon or Revelation. He concedes, indeed, to the main Point, and allows the Rationality of Brutes; Brutes; but, for fear of allowing them immaterial, and confequently immortal Souls, he frequently infinuates, that Thought, Rationality, or Reflection, is not the abfolute Privilege of immaterial Beings, but may be communicated by the Power of God to certain Portions of Matter, differently modified, and confequently that Matter exalted to a certain degree of Purity, may be as capable of Reason and Reflection, as an immaterial Spirit. And in his Difpute with the Bishop of Worcester, who juftly charged him with this unphilofophical Notion, he was reduced to a neceffity of afferting it in plain and express Terms, and of putting all his Philosophy to the utmost stretch, to reconcile it to Reafon and common Sense; which, I humbly conceive, is abfolutely impoffible. Yet he frequently and directly afferts the Poffibility of Thinking Matter, allowing to his material Animal Senfe, Perception, Reason, fpontaneous Motion or Volition, which, one would imagine, that nothing but Vanity, an Itch of Singularity, or a Defire of Victory, could ever have extorted from fo great and excellent a Perfon and I cannot pafs it by without fome little Examination, for which I fhall offer at no Apology to a Lady of your inquifitive Genius, and fuperior Understanding, directed folely by Reafon and the Nature of Things, without the Prejudices of vulgar Errors, or the Subtilties of Philofophy, falfely fo called. : The most obvious Idea we have of Matter, is of an extended impenetrable, folid Subftance, uncapable of moving itself, or of being moved, but by by the Agency and Impreffion of fome fuperior, external, active Caufe; from whence it will unavoidably follow, that mere Matter, however modified, exalted, or purified, will be as uncapable of Self-motion, as it was in its lowest ftate of Density, or Depreffion; and confequently cannot, by any Power, be tranfmuted, or fublimated into a living, felf-moving Subftance; from whence it follows, that all Gravity, Attraction, Elafticity, Repulfion, and whatever Tendencies to Motion are obferved in Matter, and commonly called natural Powers of Matter, are not Powers implanted in Matter, or poffible to be made inherent in it; but are intirely owing to fome Impulfe, or Force impreffed upon it from external Causes. And the most that can be faid, is, that Matter is indeed fufceptible of Motion, or capable of being moved, but that the Motion itfelf muft proceed from fome external Cause, totally distinct from, and fuperior to Matter. Mr. Locke, therefore, had very little Reason to be fo peremptory in his Difpute with the Bishop of Worcester, about the Poflibility of Thinking Matter; where, to prove it poffible, he fays, Vol. 2. p. 144. Edit. 1715. for example, God creates an extended folid Subftance, without fuperadding any thing else to it, and fo we may confider it at reft; to fome parts of it he fuperadds Motion, but it has ftill the Effence of Matter. Other parts of it he forms into Plants, with all the Excellencies of Vegetation, Life, and Beauty, which is to be found in a Rofe or a Peach-tree, above the Effence of Matter in general, but it is D Still 1 |