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made on my own mind, by the perusal of many expositors of prophecy; and I would merely make the appeal to every intelligent reader, whether my representation is not substantially correct.

Is it lawful and safe, now, to call in question a mode of interpretation so generally admitted, and which has so long been current among us? Lawful, I think, it may be; for the Scriptures have prescribed to us none of the rules which lead to such interpretations as those to be examined, nor have any of the Creeds of Protestants dictated any thing which binds us to admit them. Safe it may be, provided truth admits of our questioning such rules; and surely it must be safe, if truth demands that we should reject them, for it is always safe and proper to follow truth.

The true and legitimate principles of interpretation depend on no individual man, no sect, no party. They are independent of all parties, else they would be of little or no value. They depend on no niceties of philosophical theories, on no far fetched and recondite deductions, on no caprice of fancy or imagination. Were they so dependent, they would be of little value even to the learned, and of none at all to the great mass of men who read the Scrip

tures.

The origin and basis of all true hermeneutical science is the reason and common sense of men, at all times and in all ages, applied to the interpretation of language either spoken or written. The faculty of interpreting is as natural as the faculty of speaking; and the rules or principles of interpretation are formed merely by observing how the faculty of exegesis develops itself. All science of interpretation so called, all modes of expounding language proposed by whomsoever they may have been, (unless indeed they may truly be the result of inspiration), which are not founded on the simple basis described above, can put in no

just claim to our confidence, and have no right to exact our homage.

A scientific digest of the principles of interpretation, if rightly prepared, would be made in the like way as a grammatical treatise. In the latter case, the usages of language as to the forms of nouns, verbs, pronouns, etc., are first observed; then the manner in which sentences are constructed. A simple and true account of these constitutes what we call the Grammar of any language. So is it, also, in respect to Hermeneutics or the science of interpretation. The general usage of intelligent men, in respect to interpreting the language which they hear or read, is first observed, and then a record of this is made and reduced to a scientific form. The result is, a book of Hermeneutics.

Nothing can be more certain, than that language was not constructed by the aid of grammar as a science; for this science is only a regular digest of facts observed in respect to language already spoken, with some obvious deductions of general principles from these. These principles the rational nature of man, when employed in speaking or writing, instinctively follows. They are not matters of calculation and of consciously designed effort. So also in Hermeneutics; the principles of interpreting what we hear or read are instinctive, they belong to our rational nature. Science only collects and arranges them, and then draws deductions from them.

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If this account be correct as to the origin of the science of interpretation, it would seem to follow, that any principle inconsistent with the general laws which our nature and reason have prescribed, or any principle beyond the circle of that prescription, cannot be safely trusted. Should any one ask: Why do the proper principles of Hermeneutics address themselves to all intelligent men with an imperative force? The answer is, that they are imperative,

because they are the laws of our communicative nature and faculties-because we find the basis of them within ourselves, and are conscious therefore of their binding force. But suppose that we are called upon to give our assent to a rule of interpretation which is not founded in the usages of men, nay which is even contrary to these or inconsistent with them, are we obliged to yield assent? Just as much, I answer, as we should be to yield our assent to a proposition in grammar, which would convert into a rule of the English language the patois of some little district or village. For example; not far from the place where I am writing, is a small collection of people, who have, no one knows how long, been accustomed to say: I does; I reads this; I goes to-morrow, etc. Shall this be inserted, now, as an

additional rule for the declension and use of verbs in the next edition of Murray's English Grammar? If you answer in the negative, then why should a rule of interpretation foreign to general usage, or inconsistent with it, be incorporated into a system of Hermeneutics?

§ 2. OCCULT OR DOUBLE SENSE OF PROPHECY.

The bearing of what has been said, the reader will speedily perceive. Our first question, as above proposed, is, whether we are to regard the position, that “there are many occult passages in the prophecies, which are pregnant with a double meaning,” as a position founded in the common-sense principles and usages of mankind as to the interpretation of language?

On this question I shall now proceed to make a few remarks; keeping in view, however, the title of this Essay, and remembering that I am pledged only to give HINTS, and not to write a Thesaurus of hermeneutical science.

I must first of all define the meaning of double sense, so that the subject of discussion may be distinctly understood.

If we ascribe to any passage of Scripture a literal, obvious, historical sense, and interpret it as conveying the meaning which its words naturally and obviously seem to convey, and yet at the same time ascribe to these same words another meaning which is occult or obscure, but still is designed to be conveyed by those same words, we then make out a double sense. For example; if the second Psalm is construed as a description of the coronation of David or Solomon on the hill of Zion, and all that is there said be literally and historically applied, and still we go on to find in this same Psalm, that is, in the words of it, a secondary or spiritual sense (as it is often named), then we give to it a double sense. We first ascribe to it an obvious and historical meaning, endeavoring to make this out in the best manner that we can; and then we suppose that there is a vлóvoa, i. e. an occult or secondary and spiritual meaning, by virtue of which the Psalm becomes applicable to Christ, the true and spiritual Messiah. So, to produce another example, if we interpret the 45th Psalm as an epithalamium or nuptial song, on the occasion of Solomon's marriage with a foreign princess, and endeavor to adapt every thing in it to the historical sense consequent upon such a method of exegesis, and yet after we have executed this task, we proceed to show, or at least endeavor to show, that a vлóvoa runs through the whole, by virtue of which we may find in the words a description of the King Messiah and of his union with the Church, then we give to this Psalm a double sense.

The question now before us is: Whether this is a reasonable, practicable, well-grounded method of interpreting the Scriptures?

I shall not stop here to argue with those, who, finding

difficulty in such a direct and palpably occult sense throughout the whole of those two Psalms, expound one part of the second Psalm, for example, as historically descriptive of the literal David, and the other part as belonging to the King Messiah, because it seems incapable of a literal application to David, except by doing violence to the meaning of the words. In like manner do they expound many other portions of the Old Testament Scriptures. I do not stop to argue with such expositors, because the violence which is done to sound rules of interpretation, by arbitrarily introducing two subjects of the writer's discourse, when he plainly and obviously presents but one, is so great, that but little danger to the churches can ever arise from such an error. It is so plainly a trespass against the laws of our nature as to the interpretation of language; it is so arbitrary in its proceedings, when it appropriates one part of the text to one subject, and another part, which is indissolubly connected, to another and totally different subject; that nothing like a general persuasion of propriety in practising such a method of interpretation can ever be brought about. There are indeed those who so interpret many passages of the Old Testament; there have been such in days that are past; but, as I have already said, it is doing such violence against the first principles of our reason as to the interpretation of language, that little or no serious evil can well be supposed to flow from it. The imagination of some readers may be excited and pleased by the ingenuity of such devices, but the sober understanding and judgment of none can be satisfied. That must always be a wavering and uncertain state of mind, which follows the adoption of such views; and the faith, which is connected with them, must be feeble, tottering, doubtful, and mostly inoperative. Nature abused and driven away will sooner or later return and claim and vindicate her rights. The

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