Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of HistoryTHE CONTROVERSIAL SEQUEL TO AT DAWN WE SLEPT -- A PROBING ANALYSIS OF THE ROOT CAUSES OF PEARL HARBOR, AMERICA'S MOST CATASTROPHIC MILITARY DEFEATThe monumental bestseller At Dawn We Slept was a landmark re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and the revisionist theories that Roosevelt and other high officials knew about the attack.With the same imposing scholarship and narrative drive that distinguished its predecessor, Pearl Harbor uncovers the secret roles played by the president, his cabinet secretaries, admirals, and generals in the weeks before the attack. Based on more than forty years of research, extensive interviews, and an insider's knowledge of the military, this book poses an explosive and highly convincing new theory of America's entry into the Pacific War. Like the very best works of history, it not only expands but dramatically deepens our understanding of the events that were once the province of myth and rumor. |
From inside the book
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Page 51
The President “ apparently developed intense interest in certain things and then
his mind fitted on to others and he never got back to his original interest . ”
Ingersoll also told Greaves that “ FDR often concentrated on details , particularly
when ...
The President “ apparently developed intense interest in certain things and then
his mind fitted on to others and he never got back to his original interest . ”
Ingersoll also told Greaves that “ FDR often concentrated on details , particularly
when ...
Page 238
He told the Roberts Commission : The thing that would have affected me more
than the other matter was the fact that they ... items — the “ bomb plot ” and the
Marshall message — were “ the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor
.
He told the Roberts Commission : The thing that would have affected me more
than the other matter was the fact that they ... items — the “ bomb plot ” and the
Marshall message — were “ the really definite things that pointed to Pearl Harbor
.
Page 267
It only plans and watches and supervises the doing of things by others . . . . They
are there to keep the commander from blundering , to inform his action , and to
enable him to do that which , without such service , no human being could hope
to ...
It only plans and watches and supervises the doing of things by others . . . . They
are there to keep the commander from blundering , to inform his action , and to
enable him to do that which , without such service , no human being could hope
to ...
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LibraryThing Review
User Review - MasseyLibrary - LibraryThingThe previous book “At Dawn We Slept” was a re-creation of the apocalyptic events of December 7, 1941. This provocative sequel delves even further to examine the underlying causes of Pearl Harbor and ... Read full review
Pearl Harbor: the verdict of history
User Review - Not Available - Book VerdictPrange's twin volumes offer everything you always wanted to know about Pearl Harbor but were afraid to ask, plus pictures! Together, these tomes comprise an exhaustive study of the day that will live ... Read full review
Contents
We Were All Out There | 3 |
Slow in Waking Up | 15 |
Too Deeply to Bury Their Hate | 34 |
Copyright | |
49 other sections not shown
Other editions - View all
Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History Gordon W. Prange,Donald M. Goldstein,Katherine V. Dillon Limited preview - 2014 |
Common terms and phrases
action Admiral aircraft alert American appeared armed Army asked attack base believed Bloch Board British called carriers Chapter Chief cited command concerning congressional committee considered course danger December defense Department direct dispatch doubt duty East effect enemy execute expected fact failure force going Government Hawaii Hawaiian Hull Ibid important intelligence interest Interview Islands Japan Japanese Kimmel knew later least letter major Marshall matter means military mind move Naval Navy Navy Department never November November 27 Oahu officer operation opinion Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor Philippines planes position possible prepared question ready reason received reconnaissance Record relations replied responsibility Roosevelt Safford seemed sent ships Short situation staff Stark Stimson strike surprise task thing thought told took understand United wanted warning Washington winds wrote