SERMONS

BY

THE RIGHT REV. JOSEPH BUTLER, D. C. L.

LATE

LORD BISHOP OF DURHAM.

PREFACE.

Thus by use they become satisfied merely with seeing what is said, without going any further. Review and attention, Though it is scarce possible to avoid judging, in some way and even forming a judgment, becomes fatigue; and to lay or other, of almost every thing which offers itself to one's any thing before them that requires it, is putting them quite thoughts; yet it is certain, that many persons, from different out of their way.

causes, never exercise their judgment, upon what comes be- There are also persons, and there are at least more of them fore them, in the way of determining whether it be conclu- than have a right to claim such superiority, who take for sive, and holds. They are perhaps entertained with some granted, that they are acquainted with every thing; and that things, not so with others; they like, and they dislike: but no subject, if treated in the manner it should be, can be treatwhether that which is proposed to be made out be really made ed in any manner but what is familiar and easy to them. out or not; whether a matter be stated according to the real It is true indeed, that few persons have a right to demand truth of the case, seems to the generality of people merely a attention; but it is also true, that nothing can be understood circumstance of no consideration at all. Arguments are often without that degree of it, which the very nature of the thing wanted for some accidental purpose: but proof as such is requires. Now morals, considered as a science, concerning what they never want for themselves; for their own satisfac- which speculative difficulties are daily raised, and treated tion of mind, or conduct in life. Not to mention the multi- with regard to those difficulties, plainly require a very pecutudes who read merely for the sake of talking, or to qualify liar attention. For here ideas never are in themselves dethemselves for the world, or some such kind of reasons; there terminate, but become so by the train of reasoning and the are, even of the few who read for their own entertainment, place they stand in; since it is impossible that words can aland have a real curiosity to see what is said, several, which ways stand for the same ideas, even in the same author, much is prodigious, who have no sort of curiosity to see what is less in different ones. Hence an argument may not readily true: I say, curiosity; because it is too obvious to be men- be apprehended, which is different from its being mistaken; tioned, how much that religious and sacred attention, which and even caution to avoid being mistaken may, in some cases, is due to truth, and to the important question, What is the render it less readily apprehended. It is very unallowable rule of life? is lost out of the world. for a work of imagination or entertainment not to be of easy

For the sake of this whole class of readers, for they are of comprehension, but may be unavoidable in a work of another different capacities, different kinds, and get into this way from kind, where a man is not to form or accommodate, but to different occasions, I have often wished, that it had been the state things as he finds them.

custom to lay before people nothing in matters of argument It must be acknowledged, that some of the following Disbut premises, and leave them to draw conclusions themselves; courses are very abstruse and difficult; or, if you please, obwhich, though it could not be done in all cases, might in scure; but I must take leave to add, that those alone are many. judges, whether or no and how far this is a fault, who are The great number of books and papers of amusement, judges, whether or no and how far it might have been avoidwhich, of one kind or another, daily come in one's way, have ed-those only who will be at the trouble to understand what in part occasioned, and most perfectly fall in with and hu- is here said, and to see how far the things here insisted upon, mour, this idle way of reading and considering things. By and not other things, might have been put in a plainer manner; this means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of, with- which yet I am very far from asserting that they could not. out the pain of attention: neither is any part of it more put to Thus much however will be allowed, that general criticisms the account of idleness, one can scarce forbear saying, is spent concerning obscurity considered as a distinct thing from conwith less thought, than great part of that which is spent in fusion and perplexity of thought, as in some cases there may reading. be ground for them; so in others, they may be nothing more Thus people habituate themselves to let things pass through at the bottom than complaints, that every thing is not to be their minds, as one may speak, rather than to think of them. understood with the same ease that some things are. Con

VOL. II.-3 N

fusion and perplexity in writing, is indeed without excuse, tinguish from all others, and ascertain exactly what the idea because any one may, if he pleases, know whether he under- or perception is. The many treatises upon the passions are stands and sees through what he is about: and it is unpar- a proof of this; since so many would never have undertaken donable for a man to lay his thoughts before others, when he to unfold their several complications, and trace and resolve is conscious that he himself does not know whereabouts he them into their principles, if they had thought, what they is, or how the matter before him stands. It is coming abroad were endeavouring to show was obvious to every one, who in disorder, which he ought to be dissatisfied to find himself felt and talked of those passions. Thus, though there seems in at home. no ground to doubt, but that the generality of mankind have

But even obscurities arising from other causes than the ab- the inward perception expressed so commonly in that manstruseness of the argument may not be always inexcusable. ner by the ancient moralists, more than to doubt whether they Thus a subject may be treated in a manner, which all along have those passions; yet it appeared of use to unfold that insupposes the reader acquainted with what has been said upon ward conviction, and lay it open in a more explicit manner, it, both by ancient and modern writers; and with what is the than I had seen done; especially when there were not wanting present state of opinion in the world concerning such subject. persons, who manifestly mistook the whole thing, and so had This will create a difficulty of a very peculiar kind, and even great reason to express themselves dissatisfied with it. A throw an obscurity over the whole before those who are not late author of great and deserved reputation says, that to thus informed; but those who are will be disposed to excuse place virtue in following nature, is at best a loose way of such a manner, and other things of the like kind, as a saving talk. And he has reason to say this, if what I think he inof their patience. tends to express, though with great decency, be true, that However, upon the whole, as the title of Sermons gives scarce any other sense can be put upon those words, but actsome right to expect what is plain and of easy comprehen- ing as any of the several parts, without distinction, of a man's sion, and as the best auditories are mixed, I shall not set nature happened most to incline him. about to justify the propriety of preaching, or under that title Whoever thinks it worth while to consider this matter publishing, Discourses so abstruse as some of these are: nei- thoroughly, should begin with stating to himself exactly the ther is it worth while to trouble the reader with the account idea of a system, economy, or constitution of any particular of my doing either. He must not however impute to me, as nature, or particular any thing; and he will, I suppose, find, a repetition of the impropriety, this second edition, but to that it is a one or a whole, made up of several parts; but yet, the demand for it. that the several parts, even considered as a whole, do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other. Every work, both of nature and of art, is a system: and as There are two ways in which the subject of morals may be every particular thing, both natural and artificial, is for some treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract rela- use or purpose out of and beyond itself, one may add, to what tions of things: the other from a matter of fact, namely, what has been already brought into the idea of a system, its conthe particular nature of man is, its several parts, their econo- duciveness to this one or more ends. Let us instance in a my or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine watch-suppose the several parts of it taken to pieces, and what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole placed apart from each other: let a man have ever so exact a nature. In the former method the conclusion is expressed notion of these several parts, unless he considers the respects thus, that vice is contrary to the nature and reason of things: and relations which they have to each other, he will not have in the latter, that it is a violation or breaking in upon our own any thing like the idea of a watch. Suppose these several nature. Thus they both lead us to the same thing, our obli- parts brought together and any how united : neither will he gations to the practice of virtue; and thus they exceedingly yet, be the union ever so close, have an idea which will bear strengthen and enforce each other. The first seems the most any resemblance to that of a watch. But let him view those direct formal proof, and in some respects the least liable to several parts put together, or consider them as to be put tocavil and dispute: the latter is in a peculiar manner adapted gether in the manner of a watch; let him form a notion of the to satisfy a fair mind; and is more easily applicab'e to the relations which those several parts have to each other-all several particular relations and circumstances in life. conducive in their respective ways to this purpose, showing

Whether he will think he has any amends made him by the following illustrations of what seemed most to require them, I myself am by no means a proper judge.

The following Discourses proceed chiefly in this latter the hour of the day; and then he has the idea of a watch. method. The three first wholly. They were intended to ex-Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appeplain what is meant by the nature of man, when it is said tites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, conthat virtue consists in following, and vice in deviating from sidered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do it; and by explaining to show that the assertion is true. That not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this the ancient moralists had some inward feeling or other, which nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not they chose to express in this manner, that man is born to vir- yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which tue, that it consists in following nature, and that vice is more these several parts have to each other; the chief of which contrary to this nature than tortures of death, their works in is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from conour hands are instances. Now a person who found no mys-sidering the relations which the several appetites and passions tery in this way of speaking of the ancients; who, without in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the being very explicit with himself, kept to his natural feeling, supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of went along with them, and found within himself a full con- the system or constitution of human nature. And from the viction, that what they laid down was just and true; such a idea itself as it will fully appear, that this our nature, i. e. conone would probably wonder to see a point, in which he never stitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it perceived any difficulty, so laboured as this is, in the second appears, that its nature, i. e. constitution or system, is adapted and third Sermons; insomuch perhaps as to be at a loss for to measure time. What in fact or event commonly happens the occasion, scope, and drift of them. But it need not be is nothing to this question. Every work of art is apt to be thought strange that this manner of expression, though famil- out of order: but this is so far from being according to its iar with them, and, if not usually carried so far, yet not un- system, that let the disorder increase, and it will totally descommon amongst ourselves, should want explaining; since troy it. This is merely by way of explanation, what an there are several perceptions daily felt and spoken of, which economy, system, or constitution is. And thus far the cases yet it may not be very easy at first view to explicate, to dis- are perfectly parallel. If we go further, there is indeed a

difference, nothing to the present purpose, but too important rence of what is base, and liking of what is. fair and just, a one ever to be omitted. A machine is inanimate and pass- takes its turn amongst the other motives of action. This is ive; but we are agents. Our constitution is put in our own the partial inadequate notion of human nature treated of in the power. We are charged with it; and therefore are accountable first Discourse; and it is by this nature, if one may speak so, for any disorder or violation of it. that the world is in fact influenced, and kept in that tolerable order in which it is.]

Thus nothing can possibly be more contrary to nature than vice; meaning by nature not only the several parts of our Brutes, in acting according to the rules before mentioned, internal frame, but also the constitution of it. Poverty and their bodily constitution and circumstances, act suitably to disgrace, tortures and death, are not so contrary to it. Misery their whole nature. [It is however to be distinctly noted, and injustice are indeed equally contrary to some different that the reason why we affirm this is not merely that brutes parts of our nature taken singly; but injustice is moreover in fact act so; for this alone, however universal, does not at contrary to the whole constitution of the nature. all determine whether such course of action be correspondent

If it be asked, whether this constitution be really what those to their whole nature: but the reason of the assertion is, that philosophers meant, and whether they would have explained as in acting thus, they plainly act conformably to somewhat themselves in this manner; the answer is the same, as if it in their nature, so, from all observations we are able to make should be asked, whether a person, who had often used the upon them, there does not appear the least ground to imagine word resentment, and felt the thing, would have explained them to have any thing else in their nature which requires a this passion exactly in the same manner in which it is done different rule or course of action.] in one of these Discourses. As I have no doubt, but that

Mankind also in acting thus would act suitably to their this is a true account of that passion, which he referred to whole nature, if no more were to be said of man's nature than and intended to express by the word resentment; so I have what has been now said; if that, as it is a true, were also a no doubt, but that this is the true account of the ground of complete, adequate account of our nature.

that conviction which they referred to, when they said, vice But that is not a complete account of man's nature. Somewas contrary to nature. And though it should be thought that what further must be brought in to give us an adequate notion they meant no more than that vice was contrary to the higher of it; namely, that one of those principles of action, conscience and better part of our nature; even this implies such a con- or reflection, compared with the rest as they all stand together stitution as I have endeavoured to explain. For the very in the nature of man, plainly bears upon it marks of authority terms, higher and better, imply a relation or respect of parts over all the rest, and claims the absolute direction of them to each other; and these relative parts, being in one and the all, to allow or forbid their gratification; a disapprobation of same nature, form a constitution, and are the very idea of it. reflection being in itself a principle manifestly superior to a They had a perception that injustice was contrary to their mere propension. And the conclusion is, that to allow no nature, and that pain was so also. They observed these two more to this superior principle or part of our nature, than to perceptions totally different, not in degree, but in kind; and other parts; to let it govern and guide only occasionally in the reflecting upon each of them, as they thus stood in their common with the rest, as its turn happens to come, from the nature, wrought a full intuitive conviction, that more was temper and circumstances one happens to be in; this is not due and of right belonged to one of these inward perceptions, to act conformably to the constitution of man: neither can any than to the other; that it demanded in all cases to govern human creature be said to act conformably to his constitution such a creature as man. So that, upon the whole, this is a of nature, unless he allows to that superior principle the abfair and true account of what was the ground of their convic-solute authority which is due to it. And this conclusion is tion; of what they intended to refer to, when they said, virtue abundantly confirmed from hence, that one may determine consisted in following nature: a manner of speaking not what course of action the economy of man's nature requires, loose and undeterminate, but clear and distinct, strictly just without so much as knowing in what degrees of strength the and true. several principles prevail, or which of them have actually the greatest influence.

Though I am persuaded the force of this conviction is felt by almost every one; yet since, considered as an argument, The practical reason of insisting so much upon this natuand put in words, it appears somewhat abstruse, and since ral authority of the principle of reflection or conscience is, the connexion of it is broken in the three first Sermons, it that it seems in great measure overlooked by many, who are may not be amiss to give the reader the whole argument here by no means the worse sort of men. It is thought sufficient in one view. to abstain from gross wickedness, and to be humane and kind Mankind has various instincts and principles of action, as to such as happen to come in their way. Whereas in reality brute creatures have; some leading most directly and imme- the very constitution of our nature requires, that we bring our diately to the good of the community, and some most directly whole conduct before this superior faculty; wait its deterto private good. mination; enforce upon ourselves its authority, and make it Man has several which brutes have not; particularly re- the business of our lives, as it is absolutely the whole busiflection or conscience, an approbation of some principles or ness of a moral agent, to conform ourselves to it. This is actions, and disapprobation of others. the true meaning of that ancient precept, Reverence thyself. Brutes obey their instincts or principles of action, accord- The not taking into consideration this authority, which is ing to certain rules; suppose the constitution of their body, implied in the idea of reflex approbation or disapprobation, and the objects around them. seems a material deficiency or omission in lord Shaftsbury's The generality of mankind also obey their instincts and Inquiry concerning Virtue. He has shown beyond all conprinciples, all of them; those propensions we call good, as tradiction, that virtue is naturally the interest or happiness, well as the bad, according to the same rules; namely, the con- and vice the misery, of such a creature as man, placed in the stitution of their body, and the external circumstances which circumstances which we are in this world. But suppose there they are in. [Therefore it is not a true representation of are particular exceptions: a case which this author was unwilmankind to affirm, that they are wholly governed by self-love, ling to put, and yet surely it is to be put: or suppose a case the love of power and sensual appetites: since, as on the one which he has put and determined, that of a sceptic not conhand they are often actuated by these, without any regard to vinced of this happy tendency of virtue, or being of a contrary right or wrong; so on the other it is a manifest fact, that the opinion. His determination is, that it would be without remsame persons, the generality, are frequently influenced by edy. One may say more explicitly, that leaving out the aufriendship, compassion, gratitude; and even a general abhor-thority or reflex approbation of disapprobation, such a one

would be under an obligation to act viciously; since interest, lice may be appeased or satiated; humour may change, but one's own happiness, is a manifest obligation, and there is goodness is a fixed, steady, immovable principle of action. not supposed to be any other obligation in the case. "But If either of the former holds the sword of justice, there is does it much mend the matter, to take in that natural authori- plainly ground for the greatest of crimes to hope for impunity of reflection? There indeed would be an obligation to ty: but if it be goodness, there can be no possible hope, virtue; but would not the obligation from supposed interest whilst the reasons of things, or the ends of government, call on the side of vice remain?" If it should, yet to be under for punishment. Thus every one sees how much greater two contrary obligations, i. e. under none at all, would not be chance of impunity an ill man has in a partial administration, exactly the same, as to be under a formal obligation to be vi- than in a just and upright one. It is said, that the interest or cious, or to be in circumstances in which the constitution of good of the whole must be the interest of the universal Being, and man's nature plainly required that vice should be preferred. that he can have no other. Be it so. This author has proved, But the obligation on the side of interest really does not re- that vice is naturally the misery of mankind in this world. main. For the natural authority of the principle of reflection Consequently it was for the good of the whole that it should is an obligation the most near and intimate, the most certain be so. What shadow of reason then is there to assert, that this and known: whereas the contrary obligation can at the utmost may not be the case hereafter? Danger of future punishappear no more than probable; since no man can be certain ment (and if there be danger, there is ground of fear) no in any circumstances that vice is his interest in the present more supposes malice, than the present feeling of punishment world, much less can he be certain against another: and thus does.

the certain obligation would entirely supersede and destroy

The Sermon upon the character of Balaam, and that upon the uncertain one; which yet would have been of real force Self-Deceit, both relate to one subject. I am persuaded, that without the former. a very great part of the wickedness of the world is, one way

In truth, the taking in this consideration totally changes or other, owing to the self-partiality, self-flattery, and selfthe whole state of the case; and shows, what this author deceit, endeavoured there to be laid open and explained. It does not seem to have been aware of, that the greatest degree is to be observed amongst persons of the lowest rank, in proof scepticism which he thought possible will still leave men portion to their compass of thought, as much as amongst under the strictest moral obligations, whatever their opinion men of education and improvement. It seems, that people be concerning the happiness of virtue. For that mankind are capable of being thus artful with themselves, in proporupon reflection felt an approbation of what was good, and tion as they are capable of being so with others. Those who disapprobation of the contrary, he thought a plain matter of have taken notice that there is really such a thing, namely, fact, as it undoubtedly is, which none could deny, but from plain falseness and insincerity in men with regard to themmere affectation. Take in then that authority and obligation, selves, will readily see the drift and design of these Diswhich is a constituent part of this reflex approbation, and it courses, and nothing that I can add will explain the design will undeniably follow, though a man should doubt of every of them to him, who has not beforehand remarked, at least, thing else, yet, that he would still remain under the nearest somewhat of the character. And yet the admonitions they and most certain obligation to the practice of virtue; an ob- contain may be as much wanted by such a person, as by ligation implied in the very idea of virtue, in the very idea of others; for it is to be noted, that a man may be entirely posreflex approbation. sessed by this unfairness of mind, without having the least speculative notion what the thing is.

And how little influence soever this obligation alone can be expected to have in fact upon mankind, yet one may The account given of Resentment in the eighth Sermon is appeal even to interest and self-love, and ask, since from introductory to the following one apon Forgiveness of Injuman's nature, condition, and the shortness of life, so little, ries. It may possibly have appeared to some, at first sight, so very little indeed, can possibly in any case be gained by a strange assertion, that injury is the only natural object of vice; whether it be so prodigious a thing to sacrifice that settled resentment, or that men do not in fact resent deliberlittle to the most intimate of all obligations; and which a ately any thing but under this appearance of injury. But I man cannot transgress without being self-condemned, and, must desire the reader not to take any assertion alone by unless he has corrupted his nature, without real self-dislike: itself, but to consider the whole of what is said upon it: this question, I say, may be asked, even upon supposition because this is necessary, not only in order to judge of the that the prospect of a future life were ever so uncertain. truth of it, but often, such is the nature of language, to see

The observation, that man is thus by his very nature a law the very meaning of the assertion. Particularly as to this, to himself, purused to its just consequences, is of the utmost injury and injustice is, in the Sermon itself, explained to importance; because from it it will follow, that though men mean, not only the more gross and shocking instances of should, through stupidity or speculative scepticism, be igno- wickedness, but also contempt, scorn, neglect, any sort of rant of, or disbelieve, any authority in the universe to punish disagreeable behaviour towards a person, which he thinks the violation of this law; yet, if there should be such authori- other than what is due to him. And the general notion of ty, they would be as really liable to punishment, as though injury or wrong plainly comprehends this, though the words they had been beforehand convinced, that such punishment are mostly confined to the higher degrees of it. would follow. For in whatever sense we understand justice, Forgiveness of injuries is one of the very few moral oblieven supposing, what I think would be very presumptuous to gations which has been disputed. But the proof, that it assert, that the end of divine punishment is no other than that is really an obligation, what our nature and condition reof civil punishment, namely, to prevent future mischief; upon quire, seems very obvious, were it only from the considerathis bold supposition, ignorance or disbelief of the sanction tion, that revenge is doing harm merely for harm's sake. would by no means exempt even from this justice: because And as to the love of our enemies: resentment cannot superit is foreknowledge of the punishment which renders us ob- sede the obligation to universal benevolence, unless they are noxious to it; but merely violating a known obligation. in the nature of the thing inconsistent, which they plainly are

And here it comes in one's way to take notice of a mani- not. fest error or mistake in the author now cited, unless perhaps This divine precept, to forgive injuries and love our enehe has incautiously expressed himself so as to be misunder-mies, though to be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a stood; namely, that it is malice only, and not goodness, which peculiar sense a precept of Christianity; as our Saviour has can make us afraid. Whereas in reality, goodness is the na- insisted more upon it than upon any other single virtue. tural and just object of the greatest fear to an ill man. Ma-One reason of this doubtless is, that it so peculiarly becomes

an imperfect, faulty creature. But it may be observed also, Besides, the very idea of an interested pursuit necessarily that a virtuous temper of mind, consciousness of innocence, presupposes particular passions or appetites; since the very and good meaning towards every body, and a strong feeling idea of interest or happiness consists in this, that an appetite of injustice and injury, may itself, such is the imperfection of or affection enjoys its object. It is not because we love ourour virtue, lead a person to violate this obligation, if he be selves that we find delight in such and such objects, but not upon his guard. And it may well be supposed, that this because we have particular affections towards them. Take is another reason why it is so much insisted upon by him, away these affections, and you leave self-love absolutely who knew what was in man. nothing at all to employ itself about; no end or object for The chief design of the eleventh Discourse is to state the it to pursue, excepting only that of avoiding pain. Indeed notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order to show that the Epicureans, who maintained that absence of pain was benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love, than any the highest happiness, might, consistently with themselves, other particular affection whatever. There is a strange affec-deny all affection, and, if they had so pleased, every sensual tation in many people of explaining away all particular affec- appetite too: but the very idea of interest or happiness other tions, and representing the whole of life as nothing but one than absence of pain implies particular appetites or passions; continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that surprising these being necessary to constitute that interest or happiness. confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans* of old, Hobbes, The observation, that benevolence is no more disinterested the author of Reflections, Sentences, et Maximes Morales, and than any of the common particular passions, seems in itself this whole set of writers; the confusion of calling actions worth being taken notice of; but is insisted upon to obviate interested which are done in contradiction to the most mani- that scorn, which one sees rising upon the faces of people fest known interest, merely for the gratification of a present who are said to know the world, when mention is made of a passion. Now all this confusion might easily be avoided, disinterested, generous, or public-spirited action. The truth by stating to ourselves wherein the idea of self-love in gen- of that observation might be made appear in a more formal eral consists, as distinguished from all particular movements manner of proof: for whoever will consider all the possible towards particular external objects; the appetites of sense, respects and relations which any particular affection can resentment, compassion, curiosity, ambition, and the rest. have to self-love and private interest, will, I think, see deWhen this is done, if the words selfish and interested cannot monstrably, that benevolence is not in any respect more at be parted with, but must be applied to every thing; yet, to variance with self-love, than any other particular affection avoid such total confusion of all language, let the distinction whatever, but that it is in every respect, at least, as friendly be made by epithets: and the first may be called cool or to it.

settled selfishness, and the other passionate or sensual self- If the observation be true, it follows, that self-love and ishness. But the most natural way of speaking plainly is, to benevolence, virtue and interest, are not to be opposed, but call the first only, self-love, and the actions proceeding from only to be distinguished from each other; in the same way it, interested and to say of the latter, that they are not love as virtue and any other particular affection, love of arts, supto ourselves, but movements towards somewhat external: pose, are to be distinguished. Every thing is what it is, and honour, power, the harm or good of another: and that the not another thing. The goodness or badness of actions does pursuit of these external objects, so far as it proceeds from these movements (for it may proceed from self-love), is no otherwise interested, than as every action of every creature must, from the nature of the thing, be; for no one can act but from a desire, or choice, or preference of his own.

not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them, any more than that any other indifferent epithet, suppose inquisitive or jealous, may or may not be applied to them; not from their being attended with present or future pleasure or pain; but from their being Self-love and any particular passion may be joined together; what they are; namely, what becomes such creatures as we and from this complication, it becomes impossible in number- are, what the state of the case requires, or the contrary. Or less instances to determine precisely, how far an action, per- in other words, we may judge and determine, that an action haps even of one's own, has for its principle general self-love, is morally good or evil, before we so much as consider, or some particular passion. But this need create no con- whether it be interested or disinterested. This consideration fusion in the ideas themselves of self-love and particular no more comes in to determine whether an action be virtupassions. We distinctly discern what one is, and what the ous, than to determine whether it be resentful. Self-love in other are though we may be uncertain how far one or the its due degree is as just and morally good, as any affection other influences us. And though, from this uncertainty, it whatever. Benevolence towards particular persons may be cannot but be that there will be different opinions concerning to a degree of weakness, and so be blameable: and disinmankind, as more or less governed by interest; and some terestedness is so far from being in itself commendable, that will ascribe actions to self-love, which others will ascribe to the utmost possible depravity which we can in imagination particular passions: yet it is absurd to say that mankind are conceive, is that of disinterested cruelty. wholly actuated by either; since it is manifest that both have Neither does there appear any reason to wish self-love their influence. For as, on the one hand, men form a gen- were weaker in the generality of the world than it is. The eral notion of interest, some placing it in one thing, and influence which it has, seems plainly owing to its being consome in another, and have a considerable regard to it through-stant and habitual, which it cannot but be, and not to the out the course of their life, which is owing to self-love; so, degree or strength of it. Every caprice of the imagination, on the other hand, they are often set on work by the particu- every curiosity of the understanding, every affection of the lar passions themselves, and a considerable part of life is heart, is perpetually showing its weakness, by prevailing over spent in the actual gratification of them, i. e. is employed, not by self-love, but by the passions.

it.

Men daily, hourly sacrifice the greatest known interest to fancy, inquisitiveness, love or hatred, any vagrant incli* One need only look into Torquatus's account of the Epicurean nation. The thing to be lamented is, not that men have so system, in Cicero's first book De Finibus, to see in what a surprising manner this was done by them. Thus the desire of praise, and of great regard to their own good or interest in the present being beloved, he explains to be no other than desire of safety: regard world, for they have not enough; but that they have so little to our country, even in the most virtuous character, to be nothing but to the good of others. And this seems plainly owing to their regard to ourselves. The author of Reflections, &c. Morales, says,

Curiosity proceeds from interest or pride; which pride also would being so much engaged in the gratification of particular pasdoubtless have been explained to be self-love. Page 85, ed. 1725. sions unfriendly to benevolence, and which happen to be As if there were no such passions in mankind as desire of esteem, or most prevalent in them, much more than to self-love. As a of being beloved, or of knowledge. Hobbes's account of the affections of good-will and pity are instances of the same kind. proof of this may be observed, that there is no character more