void of friendship, gratitude, natural affection, love to their more than this must be intended: though these regards themcountry, common justice, or more equally and uniformly selves are most just and reasonable, and absolutely necessary hardhearted, than the abandoned in, what is called, the way to be often recollected in such a world as this. of pleasure-hardhearted and totally without feeling in It may be proper just to advertise the reader, that he is not behalf of others; except when they cannot escape the sight to look for any particular reason for the choice of the greatest of distress, and so are interrupted by it in their pleasures. part of these Discourses; their being taken from amongst And yet it is ridiculous to call such an abandoned course of many others, preached in the same place, through a course of pleasure interested, when the person engaged in it knows eight years, being in great measure accidental. Neither is beforehand, and goes on under the feeling and apprehension, he to expect to find any other connexion between them, than that it will be as ruinous to himself, as to those who depend that uniformity of thought and design, which will always be upon him. found in the writings of the same person, when he writes with simplicity and in earnest.

Stanhope, Sept. 16, 1729.

Upon the whole, if the generality of mankind were to cultivate within themselves the principle of self-love; if they were to accustom themselves often to set down and consider, what was the greatest happiness they were capable of attaining for themselves in this life, and if self-love were so strong and prevalent, as that they would uniformly pursue this their supposed chief temporal good, without being diverted from it by any particular passion; it would manifestly prevent numberless follies and vices. This was in a great measure the Epicurean system of philosophy. It is indeed by no means the religious or even moral institution of life. Yet, For as we have many members in one body, and all members have

SERMON I.

UPON HUMAN NATURE.

not the same office: so we being many are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.-Rom, xii. 4, 5.

with all the mistakes men would fall into about interest, it would be less mischievous than the extravagances of mere appetite, will, and pleasure: for certainly self-love, though The Epistles in the New Testament have all of them a parconfined to the interest of this life, is, of the two, a much ticular reference to the condition and usages of the Christian better guide than passion, which has absolutely no bound world at the time they were written. Therefore as they cannor measure, but what is set to it by this self-love, or moral not be thoroughly understood, unless that condition and those usages are known and attended to: so further, though they considerations. be known, yet if they be discontinued or changed; exhortaFrom the distinction above made between self-love, and tions, precepts, and illustrations of things, which refer to the several particular principles or affections in our nature, such circumstances now ceased or altered, cannot at this time we may see how good ground there was for that assertion, be urged in that manner, and with that force which they were to the primitive Christians. Thus the text now before us, in maintained by the several ancient schools of philosophy its first intent and design, relates to the decent management against the Epicureans, namely, that virtue is to be pursued of those extraordinary gifts which were then in the church, as an end, eligible in and for itself. For, if there be any prin- but which are now totally ceased. And even as to the alluciples or affections in the mind of man distinct from self-love, sion that we are one body in Christ; though what the Apostle that the things those principles tend towards, or that the ob- here intends is, equally true of Christians in all circumstanjects of those affections, are, each of them, in themselves eli-ces; and the consideration of it is plainly still an additional motive, over and above moral considerations, to the discharge gible, to be pursued upon its own account, and to be rested of the several duties and offices of a Christian: yet it is manin as an end, is implied in the very idea of such principle or ifest this allusion must have appeared with much greater affection. They indeed asserted much higher things of vir-force to those, who, by the many difficulties they went through tue, and with very good reason; but to say thus much of it, for the sake of their religion, were led to keep always in view the relation they stood in to their Saviour, who had underthat it is to be pursued for itself, is to say no more of it, than gone the same; to those, who, from the idolatries of all around may truly be said of the object of every natural affection what-them, and their ill-treatment, were taught to consider themselves as not of the world in which they lived, but as a disThe question, which was a few years ago disputed in tinct society of themselves; with laws and ends, and princiFrance, concerning the love of God, which was there called ples of life and action, quite contrary to those which the world professed themselves at that time influenced by. Hence the enthusiasm, as it will every where by the generality of the relation of a Christian was by them considered as nearer than world; this question, I say, answers in religion to that old that of affinity and blood; and they almost literally esteemed one in morals now mentioned. And both of them are, I themselves as members one of another. think, fully determined by the same observation, namely, that It cannot indeed possibly be denied, that our being God's the very nature of affection, the idea itself, necessarily im-creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted plies resting in its object as an end.

ever.

to it, are prior obligations to piety and virtue, than the con

These observations show the original particular reference of the text; and the peculiar force with which the thing intended by the allusion in it, must have been felt by the primitive Christian world. They likewise afford a reason for treating it at this time in a more general way.

I shall not here add any thing further to what I have said sideration that God sent his son into the world to save it, and in the two Discourses upon that most important subject, but the motives which arise from the peculiar relation of Chrisonly this; that if we are constituted such sort of creatures, as tians, as members one of another under Christ our head.— from our very nature to feel certain affections or movements However, though all this be allowed, as it expressly is by the inspired writers; yet it is manifest that Christians at the of mind, upon the sight or contemplation of the meanest in-time of the revelation, and immediately after, could not but animate part of the creation, for the flowers of the field have insist mostly upon considerations of this latter kind. their beauty; certainly there must be somewhat due to him himself, who is the Author and Cause of all things; who is more intimately present to us than any thing else can be, and with whom we have a nearer and more constant intercourse, than we can have with any creature: there must be some The relation which the several parts or members of the movements of mind and heart which correspond to his per- natural body have to each other and to the whole body, is fectious, or of which those perfections are the natural object: here compared to the relation which each particular person and that when we are commanded to love the Lord our God in society has to other particular persons and to the whole with all our heart, and with all our mind, and with all our soul; society; and the latter is intended to be illustrated by the former. And if there be a likeness between these two relasomewhat more must be meant than merely that we live in tions, the consequence is obvious: that the latter shows us hope of rewards or fear of punishments from him; somewhat we were intended to do good to others, as the former shows

us that the several members of the natural body were intend-individual. And if there be in mankind any disposition to ed to be instruments of good to each other and to the whole friendship; if there be any such thing as compassion, for combody. But as there is scarce any ground for a comparison passion is a momentary love; if there be any such thing as between society and the mere material body, this without the the paternal or filial affections; if there be any affection in mind being a dead unactive thing; much less can the com- human nature, the object and end of which is the good of parison be carried to any length. And since the apostle another; this is itself benevolence, or the love of another. speaks of the several members as having distinct offices, Be it ever so short, be it in ever so low a degree, or ever so which implies the mind; it cannot be thought an unallowable unhappily confined, it proves the assertion, and points out liberty, instead of the body and its members, to substitute the what we were designed for, as really as though it were in a whole nature of man, and all the variety of internal principles higher degree and more extensive. I must however remind which belong to it. And then the comparison will be between you that though benevolence and self-love are different; though the nature of man as respecting self, and tending to private the former tends most directly to public good, and the latter good, his own preservation and happiness; and the nature of to private: yet they are so perfectly coincident, that the greatman as having respect to society, and tending to promote est satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having benevopublic good, the happiness of that society. These ends do lence in a due degree; and that self-love is one chief security indeed perfectly coincide; and to aim at public and private of our right behaviour towards society. It may be added, good are so far from being inconsistent, that they mutually that their mutual coinciding, so that we can scarce promote promote each other: yet in the following discourse they must one without the other, is equally a proof that we were made be considered as entirely distinct; otherwise the nature of for both.

man as tending to one, or as tending to the other, cannot be Secondly, This will further appear from observing that the compared. There can no comparison be made, without con- several passions and affections, which are distinct* both from sidering the things compared as distinct and different. benevolence and self-love, do in general contribute and lead From this review and comparison of the nature of man as us to public good as really as to private. It might be thought respecting self, and as respecting society, it will plainly ap- too minute and particular, and would carry us too great a pear, that there are as real and the same kind of indications length to distinguish between and compare together the sevein human nature, that we were made for society and to do ral passions or appetites distinct from benevolence, whose good to our fellow-creatures, as that we were intended to take primary use and intention is the security and good of society; care of our own life and health and private good; and that the and the passions distinct from self-love, whose primary insame objections lie against one of these assertions as against tention and design is the security and good of the individual.† the other. For,

First, There is a natural principle of benevolence in man; which is in some degree to society what self-love is to the

different objects, will prove to a certainty, what principles they do not, and, to the greatest probability, what principles they do proceed from: and lastly, by the testimony of mankind. Now that there is some degree of benevolence amongst men, may be as strongly and Suppose a man of learning to be writing a grave book upon plainly proved in all these ways, as it could possibly be proved, human nature, and to show in several parts of it that he had an in- supposing there was this affection in our nature. And should any sight into the subject he was considering; amongst other things the one think fit to assert, that resentment in the mind of man was following one would require to be accounted for; the appearance of absolutely nothing but reasonable concern for our own safety, the benevolence or good-will in men towards each other in the instances falsity of this, and what is the real nature of that passion, could be of natural relation, and in others. Cautious of being deceived with out-shown in no other way than those in which it may be shown, that ward show, he retires within himself to see exactly what that is in the there is such a thing in some degree as real good-will in man towards mind of man from whence this appearance proceeds; and, upon deep man. It is sufficient that the seeds of it be implanted in our nature reflection, asserts the principle in the mind to be only the love of by God. There is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own power, and delight in the exercise of it. Would not every body think heart and temper; to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exerhere was a mistake of one word for another? that the philosopher cise it in a steady, uniform manner. This is our work; this is virtue was contemplating and accounting for some other human actions, and religion.

some other behaviour of man to man? And could any one be tho- * Every body makes a distinction between self-love, and the sevroughly satisfied, that what is commonly called benevolence or good-eral particular passions, appetites and affections; and yet they are will was really the affection meant, but only by being made to un-often confounded again. That they are totally different, will be derstand that this learned person had a general hypothesis, to which seen by any one who will distinguish between the passions and appethe appearance of good-will could no otherwise be reconciled? That tites themselves, and endeavouring after the means of their gratificawhat has this appearance is often nothing but ambition; that delight tion. Consider the appetite of hunger, and the desire of esteem; in superiority often (suppose always) mixes itself with benevolence, these being the occasion both of pleasure and pain, the coolest selfonly makes it more specious to call it ambition than hunger, of the love, as well as the appetites and passions themselves, may put us two: but in reality that passion does no more account for the whole upon making use of the proper methods of obtaining that pleasure, appearances of good-will than this appetite does. Is there not often and avoiding that pain; but the feelings themselves, the pain of the appearance of one man's wishing that good to another which he hunger and shame, and the delight from esteem, are no more selfknows himself unable to procure him; and rejoicing in it, though love than they are any thing in the world. Though a man hated bestowed by a third person? And can love of power any way possi-himself, he would as much feel the pain of hunger as he would that bly come into account for this desire or delight? Is there not often of the gout; and it is plainly supposable there may be creatures with the appearance of men's distinguishing between two or more per-self-love in them to the highest degree, who may be quite insensible sons, preferring one before another, to do good to, in cases where and indifferent (as men in some cases are), to the contempt and love of power cannot in the least account for the distinction and esteem of those upon whom their happiness does not in some further preference? For this principle can no otherwise distinguish between respects depend. And as self-love and the several particular pasobjects, than as it is a greater instance and exertion of power to do sions and appetites are in themselves totally different, so that some good to one rather than to another. Again, suppose good-will in actions proceed from one, and some from the other, will be manifest the mind of man to be nothing but delight in the exercise of power: to any who will observe the two following very supposable cases. men might indeed be restrained by distant and accidental considera- One man rushes upon certain ruin for the gratification of a present tion; but these restraints being removed, they would have a disposi- desire: nobody will call the principle of this action self-love. Suption to, and delight in mischief as an exercise and proof of power: pose another man to go through some laborious work upon promise and this disposition and delight would arise from, or be the same of a great reward, without any distinct knowledge what the reward principle in the mind, as a disposition to, and delight in charity, will be; this course of action cannot be ascribed to any particular Thus cruelty, as distinct from envy and resentment, would be ex-passion. The former of these actions is plainly to be imputed to actly the same in the mind of man as good-will: that one tends to some particular passion or affection, the latter as plainly to the genthe happiness, the other to the misery of our fellow-creatures, is, it eral affection or principle of self-love. That there are some parseems, merely an accidental circumstance, which the mind has not ticular pursuits or actions coucerning which we cannot determine the least regard to. These are the absurdities which even men of how far they are owing to one, and how far to the other, proceeds capacity run into, when they have occasion to belie their nature, and from this, that the two principles are frequently mixed together, and will perversely disclaim that image of God which was originally run up into each other. This distinction is further explained in the stamped upon it, the traces of which, however faint, are plainly dis-eleventh sermon. cernible upon the mind of man. If any desire to see this distinction and comparison made in a

If any person can in earnest doubt whether there be such a thing particular instance, the appetite and passion now mentioned may as good-will in one man towards another, (for the question is not serve for one. Hunger is to be considered as a private appetite; concerning either the degree or extensiveness of it, but concerning because the end for which it was given us is the preservation of the the affection itself), let it be observed, that whether man be thus, or individual. Desire of esteem is a public passion; because the end otherwise constituted, what is the inward frame in this particular, is for which it was given us is to regulate our behaviour towards soa mere question of fact or natural history, not provable immediately |ciety. The respect which this has to private good is as remote as the by reason. It is therefore to be judged of and determined in the respect that has to public good; and the appetite is no more self-love same way other facts or matters of natural history are, by appealing than the passion is benevolence. The object and end of the former to the external senses, or inward perceptions, respectively, as the is merely food; the object and end of the latter is merely esteem; matter under consideration is cognizable by one or the other; by but the latter can no more be gratified, without contributing to the arguing from acknowledged facts and actions; for a great number of good of society, than the former can be gratified, without contributactions in the same kind, in different circumstances, and respecting ing to the preservation of the individual.

It is enough to the present argument, that desire of esteem some influence. The particular place assigned to it by nature, from others, contempt and esteem of them, love of society as what authority it has, and how great influence it ought have, distinct from affection to the good of it, indignation against shall be hereafter considered.

successful vice, that these are public affections or passions; From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of our have an immediate respect to others, naturally lead us to public and private affections, of the courses of life they lead regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of service to, and of the principle of reflection or conscience as respectto our fellow-creatures. If any or all of these may be con- ing each of them, it is as manifest, that we were made for sidered likewise as private affections, as tending to private society, and to promote the happiness of it, as that we were good, this does not hinder them from being public affections intended to take care of our own life, and health, and private too, or destroy the good influence of them upon society, and good.

their tendency to public good. It may be added, that as per

And from this whole review must be given a different sons without any conviction from reason of the desirableness draught of human nature from what we are often presented of life, would yet of course preserve it merely from the appe- with. Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is tite of hunger; so by acting merely from regard (suppose) to such a correspondence between the inward sensations of one reputation, without any consideration of the good of others, man and those of another, that disgrace is as much avoided men often contribute to public good. In both these instances as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem and love as they are plainly instruments in the hands of another, in the much desired as any external goods: and in many particular hands of Providence, to carry on ends, the preservation of the cases, persons are carried on to do good to others, as the end individual and good of society, which they themselves have their affection tends to and rests in; and manifest that they not in their view or intention. The sum is, men have various find real satisfaction and enjoyment in this course of bebaappetites, passions, and particular affections, quite distinct viour. There is such a natural principle of attraction in man both from self-love and from benevolence; all of these have a towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, having tendency to promote both public and private good, and inay breathed in the same climate, barely having been in the same be considered as respecting others and ourselves equally and artificial district or division, becomes the occasion of conin common; but some of them seem most immediately to tracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after: respect others, or tend to public good; others of them most im- for any thing may serve the purpose. Thus relations merely mediately to respect self, or tend to private good; as the former nominal are sought and invented, not by governors, but by are not benevolence, so the latter are not self-love; neither the lowest of the people; which are found sufficient to hold sort are instances of our love either to ourselves or others, mankind together in little fraternities and copartnerships: but only instances of our Maker's care and love both of the weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough for ridiindividual and the species, and proofs that he intended we cule, if they are absurdly considered as the real principles of should be instruments of good to each other, as well as that that union but they are in truth merely the occasions, as we should be so to ourselves. any thing may be of any thing, upon which our nature carries Thirdly, There is a principle of reflection in men, by which us on according to its own previous bent and bias; which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove their own occasions therefore would be nothing at all, were there not actions. We are plainly constituted such sort of creatures this prior disposition and bias of nature. Men are so much as to reflect upon our own nature. The mind can take a one body, that in a peculiar manuer they feel for each other, view of what passes within itself, its propensions, aversions, shame, sudden danger, resentment, honour, prosperity, dispassions, affections, as respecting such objects, and in such tress; one or another, or all of these, from the social nature degrees; and of the several actions consequent thereupon. in general, from benevolence, upon the occasion of natural In this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another, relation, acquaintance, protection, dependence; each of these and towards a third is affected in neither of these ways, but being distinct cements of society. And therefore to have no is quite indifferent. This principle in man, by which he restraint from, no regard to others in our behaviour, is the approves or disapproves his heart, temper, and actions, is speculative absurdity of considering ourselves as single and conscience; for this is the strict sense of the word, though independent, as having nothing in our nature which has ressometimes it is used so as to take in more. And that this pect to our fellow-creatures, reduced to action and practice. faculty tends to restrain men from doing mischief to each And this is the same absurdity, as to suppose a hand, or any other, and leads them to do good, is too manifest to need part, to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole being insisted upon. Thus a parent has the affection of love body.

to his children: this leads him to take care of, to educate, But allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man to make due provision for them; the natural affection leads dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do evil to this but the reflection that it is his proper business, what to others, as well as to do good? Whence come the many belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to do; miseries else, which men are the authors and instruments of this added to the affection becomes a much more settled to each other?" These questions, so far as they relate to the principle, and carries him on through more labour and diffi- foregoing discourse, may be answered by asking, Has not culties for the sake of his children, than he would undergo man also dispositions and principles within, which lead him from that affection alone, if he thought it, and the course of to do evil to himself, as well as good? Whence come the action it led to, either indifferent or criminal. This indeed many miseries else, sickness, pain, and death, which men is impossible, to do that which is good and not to approve of are instruments and authors of to themselves? it; for which reason they are frequently not considered as It may be thought more easy to answer one of these quesdistinct, though they really are: for men often approve of tions than the other, but the answer to both is really the same; the actions of others, which they will not imitate, and like- that mankind have ungoverned passions which they will wise do that which they approve not. It cannot possibly be gratify at any rate, as well to the injury of others, as in condenied, that there is this principle of reflection or conscience tradiction to known private interest: but that as there is no in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an innocent such thing as self-hatred, so neither is there any such thing person in great distress; suppose the same man afterwards, as ill-will in one man towards another, emulation and resentin the fury of anger, to do the greatest mischief to a person ment being away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or who had given no just cause of offence; to aggravate the good-will: there is no such thing as love of injustice, opinjury, add the circumstances of former friendship, and obli-pression, treachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after gation from the injured person; let the man who is supposed such and such external good; which, according to a very to have done these two different actions, coolly reflect upon ancient observation, the most abandoned would choose to them afterwards, without regard to their consequences to obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy, and as effechimself: to assert that any common man would be affected tual to their end; that even emulation and resentment, by in the same way towards these different actions, that he would any one who will consider what these passions really are in make no distinction between them, but approve or disapprove nature,* will be found nothing to the purpose of this objecthem equally, is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted.

There is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience in * Emulation is merely the desire and hope of equality with, or mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has to superiority over others, with whom we compare ourselves. There private good, with the respect it has to public; since it does not appear to be any other grief in the natural passion, but only plainly tends as much to the latter as to the former, and is that want which is implied in desire. However, this may be so commonly thought to tend chiefly to the latter. This faculty strong as to be the occasion of great grief. To desire the attainis now mentioned merely as another part in the inward frame ment of this equality or superiority by the particular means of others of man, pointing out to us in some degree what we are in-distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that the real being brought down to our own level, or below it, is, I think, the tended for, and as what will naturally and of course have end, which the natural passion emulation, and which the unlawful

tion; and that the principles and passions in the mind off or respects, and they often violate their nature in both, i. e. man, which are distinct both from self-love and benevolence, as they neglect the duties they owe to their fellow-creatures, primarily and most directly lead to right behaviour with to which their nature leads them; and are injurious, to which regard to others as well as himself, and only secondarily and their nature is abhorrent; so there is a manifest negligence accidentally to what is evil. Thus, though men, to avoid in men of their real happiness or interest in the present world, the shame of one villany, are sometimes guilty of a greater, when that interest is inconsistent with a present gratificayet it is easy to see, that the original tendency of shame is to tion; for the sake of which they negligently, nay, even knowprevent the doing of shameful actions; and its leading men ingly, are the authors and instruments of their own misery to conceal such actions when done, is only in consequence of and ruin. Thus they are as often unjust to themselves as to their being done; i. e. of the passions not having answered others, and for the most part are equally so to both by the its first end. same actions.

If it be said, that there are persons in the world, who are in great measure without the natural affections towards their fellow-creatures; there are likewise instances of persons without the common natural affections to themselves: but the nature of man is not to be judged of by either of these, but by what appears in the common world, in the bulk of mankind.

I am afraid it would be thought very strange, if to confirm the truth of this account of human nature, and make out the

SERMON II. III.

UPON HUMAN NATURE.

things contained in the law, these, having not the law, are a law unto themselves.-Rom. ii. 14.

justness of the foregoing comparison, it should be added, For when the Gentiles, which have not the law, do by nature the that, from what appears, men in fact as much and as often contradict that part of their nature which respects self, and which leads them to their own private good and happiness; as they contradict that part of it which respects society, and As speculative truth admits of different kinds of proof, so tends to public good; that there are as few persons, who likewise moral obligations may be shown by different methods. attain the greatest satisfaction and enjoyment which they If the real nature of any creature leads him and is adapted might attain in the present world; as who do the greatest to such and such purposes only, or more than to any other; good to others which they might do; nay, that there are as this is a reason to believe the author of that nature intended few who can be said really and in earnest to aim at one, as at it for those purposes. Thus there is no doubt the eye was the other. Take a survey of mankind: the world in general, intended for us to see with. And the more complex any conthe good and bad, almost without exception, equally are stitution is, and the greater variety of parts there are which agreed, that were religion out of the case, the happiness of thus tend to some one end, the stronger is the proof that the present life would consist in a manner wholly in riches, such end was designed. However, when the inward frame honours, sensual gratifications; insomuch that one scarce of man is considered as any guide in morals, the utmost cauhears a reflection made upon prudence, life, conduct, but upon tion must be used that none make peculiarities in their own this supposition. Yet on the contrary, that persons in the temper, or any thing which is the effect of particular customs, greatest affluence of fortune are no happier than such as have though observable in several, the standard of what is comonly a competency; that the cares and disappointments of am- mon to the species; and above all, that the highest principle bition for the most part far exceed the satisfactions of it; as be not forgot or excluded, that to which belongs the adjustalso the miserable intervals of intemperance and excess, ment and correction of all other inward movements and affecand the many untimely deaths occasioned by a dissolute tions, which principle will of course have some influence, but course of life; these things are all seen, acknowledged, by which being in nature supreme, as shall now be shown, every one acknowledged; but are thought no objections ought to preside over and govern all the rest. The difficulty against, though they expressly contradict this universal prin- of rightly observing the two former cautions; the appearciple, that the happiness of the present life consists in one or ance there is of some small diversity amongst mankind with other of them. Whence is all this absurdity and contradic-respect to this faculty, with respect to their natural sense of tion? Is not the middle way obvious? Can any thing be moral good and evil; and the attention necessary to survey more manifest, than that the happiness of life consists in with any exactness what passes within, have occasioned that these possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree; that to it is not so much agreed what is the standard of the internal pursue them beyond this degree, is always attended with nature of man, as of his external form. Neither is this last more inconvenience than advantage to a man's self, and often exactly settled. Yet we understand one another when we with extreme misery and unhappiness. Whence then, I say, speak of the shape of a human body: so likewise we do when is all this absurdity and contradiction? Is it really the we speak of the heart and inward principles, how far soever result of consideration in mankind, how they may become the standard is from being exact or precisely fixed. There is most easy to themselves, most free from care, and enjoy the therefore ground for an attempt of showing men to themchief happiness attainable in this world? Or is it not mani- selves, of showing them what course of life and behaviour festly owing either to this, that they have not cool and rea- their real nature points out and would lead them to. Now sonable concern enough for themselves to consider wherein obligations of virtue shown, and motives to the practice of it their chief happiness in the present life consists; or else, if enforced, from a review of the nature of man, are to be conthey do consider it, that they will not act conformably to sidered as an appeal to each particular person's heart and what is the result of that consideration, i. e. reasonable con-natural conscience: as the external senses are appealed to for cern for themselves, or cool self-love is prevailed over by the proof of things cognizable by them. Since then our inpassion and appetite. So that from what appears, there is ward feelings, and the perceptions we receive from our externo ground to assert that those principles in the nature of man, nal senses, are equally real; to argue from the former to life and which most directly lead to promote the good of our fellow-conduct is as little liable to exception, as to argue from the creatures, are more generally or in a greater degree violated, latter to absolute speculative truth. A man can as little doubt than those, which most directly lead us to promote our own whether his eyes were given him to see with, as he can doubt private good and happiness. of the truth of the science of optics, deduced from ocular ex

The sum of the whole is plainly this. The nature of man periments. And allowing the inward feeling, shame; a man considered in his single capacity, and with respect only to can as little doubt whether it was given him to prevent his the present world, is adapted and leads him to attain the doing shameful actions, as he can doubt whether his eyes greatest happiness he can for himself in the present world. were given him to guide his steps. And as to these inward The nature of man considered in his public or social capacity feelings themselves; that they are real, that man has in his leads him to a right behaviour in society to that course of life nature passions and affections, can no more be questioned, which we call virtue. Men follow or obey their nature in than that he has external senses. Neither can the former be both these capacities and respects to a certain degree, but wholly mistaken; though to a certain degree liable to greater not entirely their actions do not come up to the whole of mistakes than the latter. what their nature leads them to in either of these capacities

There can be no doubt but that several propensions or instincts, several principles in the heart of man, carry him to and a manner in which no inward principle leads him to evil. society, and to contribute to the happiness of it, in a sense These principles, propensions, or instincts which lead him to do good, are approved of by a certain faculty within, quite

distinct from these propensions themselves. All this hath man, without regard either to the kind or degree of it. Thus been fully made out in the foregoing discourse. the passion of anger, and the affection of parents to their chil

But it may be said, "What is all this, though true, to the dren, would be called equally natural. And as the same perpurpose of virtue and religion? these require, not only that son hath often contrary principles, which at the same time we do good to others when we are led this way, by benevo- draw contrary ways, he may by the same action both follow lence or reflection, happening to be stronger than other prin- and contradict his nature in this sense of the word; he may ciples, passions, or appetites; but likewise that the whole follow one passion and contradict another. character be formed upon thought and reflection; that every II. Nature is frequently spoken of as consisting in those action be directed by some determinate rule, some other rule passions which are strongest, and most influence the actions; than the strength and prevalency of any principle or passion. which being vicious ones, mankind is in this sense naturally What sign is there in our nature (for the inquiry is only vicious, or vicious by nature. Thus St. Paul says of the about what is to be collected from thence) that this was in- Gentiles, who were dead in trespasses and sins, and walked actended by its Author? Or how does so various and fickle cording to the spirit of disobedience, that they were by nature a temper as that of man appear adapted thereto? It may the children of wrath. They could be no otherwise children indeed be absurd and unnatural for men to act without any of wrath by nature, than they were vicious by nature. reflection; nay, without regard to that particular kind of re- Here then are two different senses of the word nature, in flection which you call conscience; because this does belong neither of which men can at all be said to be a law to themto our nature. For as there never was a man but who ap- selves. They are mentioned only to be excluded; to prevent proved one place, prospect, building, before another, so it their being confounded, as the latter is in the objection, with does not appear that there ever was a man who would not another sense of it, which is now to be inquired after and have approved an action of humanity rather than of cruelty; explained.

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interest and passion being quite out of the case. But interest III. The apostle asserts, that the Gentiles "do by Nature and passion do come in, and are often too strong for and the things contained in the law." Nature is indeed here put prevail over reflection and conscience. Now as brutes have by way of distinction from revelation, but yet it is not a mere various instincts, by which they are carried on to the end the negative. He intends to express more than that by which Author of their nature intended them for is not man in the they did not, that by which they did the works of the law; same condition; with this difference only, that his instincts namely, by nature. It is plain the meaning of the word is (i. e. appetites and passions) is added the principle of reflec- not the same in this passage as in the former, where it is tion or conscience? And yet brutes act agreeably to their spoken of as evil; for in this latter it is spoken of as good; nature, in following that principle or particular instinct which as that by which they acted, or might have acted virtuously. for the present is strongest in them: does not man likewise What that is in man by which he is naturally a law to himself, act agreeably to his nature, or obey the law of his creation, is explained in the following words: "Which show the work by following that principle, be it passion or conscience, which of the law written in their hearts, their consciences also bearfor the present happens to be strongest in him? Thus dif-ing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or ferent men are by their particular nature hurried on to pursue else excusing one another." If there be a distinction to be honour, or riches, or pleasure: there are also persons whose made between the works written in their hearts, and the wittemper leads them in an uncommon degree to kindness, com-ness of conscience; by the former must be meant the natural passion, doing good to their fellow-creatures: as there are disposition to kindness and compassion, to do what is of good others who are given to suspend their judgment, to weigh report, to which this apostle often refers: that part of the naand consider things, and to act upon thought and reflection. ture of man, treated of in the foregoing discourse, which with Let every one then quietly follow his nature; as passion, re- very little reflection and of course leads him to society, and by flection, appetite, the several parts of it, happen to be strong-means of which he naturally acts a just and good part in it, est: but let not the man of virtue take upon him to blame the unless other passions or interests lead him astray. Yet since ambitious, the covetous, the dissolute; since these equally other passions, and regards to private interest, which lead us with him obey and follow their nature. Thus, as in some (though indirectly, yet they lead us) astray, are themselves cases we follow our nature in doing the works contained in in a degree equally natural, and often most prevalent; and the law, so in other cases we follow nature in doing contrary." since we have no method of seeing the particular degrees in Now all this licentious talk entirely goes upon a supposi- which one or the other is placed in us by nature; it is plain tion, that men follow their nature in the same sense, in vio- the former, considered merely as natural, good and right as lating the known rules of justice and honesty for the sake of they are, can no more be a law to us than the latter. But a present gratification, as they do in following those rules there is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in when they have no temptation to the contrary. And if this every man, which distinguishes between the internal princiwere true, that could not be so which St. Paul asserts, that ples of his heart, as well as his external actions: which passes men are by nature a law to themselves. If by following nature judgment upon himself and them; pronounces determinately were meant only acting as we please, it would indeed be some actions to be in themselves just, right, good; others to be ridiculous to speak of nature as any guide in morals: nay the in themselves evil, wrong, unjust; which, without being convery mention of deviating from nature would be absurd; and sulted, without being advised with, magisterially exerts itself, the mention of following it, when spoken by way of distinc- and approves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly: tion, would absolutely have no meaning. For did ever any and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of one act otherwise than as he pleased? And yet the ancients course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual senspeak of deviating from nature as vice; and of following na- tence, which shall hereafter second and affirm its own. But ture so much as a distinction, that according to them the per- this part of the office of conscience is beyond my present defection of virtue consists therein. So that language itself sign explicitly to consider. It is by this faculty, natural to should teach people another sense to the words following na- man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to himself: but ture, than barely acting as we please. Let it however be ob- this faculty, I say, not to be considered merely as a principle served, that though the words human nature are to be explain- in his heart, which is to have some influence as well as ed, yet the real question of this discourse is not concerning others; but considered as a faculty in kind and in nature the meaning of words, any other than as the explanation of supreme over all others, and which bears its own authority of them may be needful to make out and explain the assertion, being so.

that every man is naturally a law to himself, that every one may This prerogative, this natural supremacy, of the faculty find within himself the rule of right, and obligations to follow it. which surveys, approves or disapproves the several affections This St. Paul affirms in the words of the text, and this the of our mind and actions of our lives, being that by which men foregoing objection really denies by seeming to allow it. And are a law to themselves, their conformity or disobedience to the objection will be fully answered, and the text before us which law of our nature renders their actions, in the highest explained, by observing that nature is considered in different and most proper sense, natural or unnatural; it is fit it be views, and the words used in different senses: and by show- further explained to you: and I hope it will be so, if you will ing in what view it is considered, and in what sense the word attend to the following reflections.

is used, when intended to express and signify that which is Man may act according to that principle or inclination which the guide of life, that by which men are a law to themselves. for the present happens to be strongest, and yet act in a way I say, the explanation of the term will be sufficient, because disproportionate to, and violate his real proper nature. Supfrom thence it will appear, that in some senses of the word pose a brute creature by any bait to be allured into a snare, nature cannot be, but that in another sense it manifestly is, a by which he is destroyed. He plainly followed the bent of his nature, leading him to gratify his appetite: there is an

law to us.

I. By nature is often meant no more than some principle in entire correspondence between his whole nature and such an