touch, resembles the painting of a miniature on ivory. It is for reasons of the same kind, that the skilful variation of an image or thought already familiar, is often, if supported by adequate skill of expression, an effort that rewards the lyrical poet as richly as the presentation of a thought or image entirely new. Mr Glassford has invited attention very earnestly, especially in his notes on Della Casa, to the wonderful effect which is sometimes produced by this skilfully imaginative elaboration of a few simple materials. But for the similarity of subject with a poem already given, we would have quoted in illustration Della Casa's sonnet to Sleep. An example, almost as good in point of diction and arrangement, and superior in force of thought, as well as in elevation of feeling, is the following Sonnet of his, with which we quit this pleasing volume. It is addressed to the poet's friend Marmitta, with whose anticipated fame he modestly contrasts his own supposed obscurity. t • Would that my soul were as alive, and heart Alas! how quickly this our earthly part, Wasted by time, from hour to hour shall fail; And cherish'd names how soon, swept down the vale, Even as a leaf is driven before the gust, Shall fall and fade! Oh, human sight! how slow 'Not raised to heaven, where fruits immortal grow! Thy wings for flight, yet still to drop so low!' ART. V. 1. Papers relative to the Drawing of Acts of Parliament, and to the means of insuring the Uniformity thereof, in Language, in Form, in Arrangement, and in Matter. Prepared by ARTHUR SYMONDS. Presented to Parliament, by command of Her Majesty, in 1838. 2. A Practical Treatise on the Analogy between Legal and General Composition, intended as an Introduction to the Drawing of Legal Instruments, public and private. By SAMUEL HIGGS GAEL, Esq., of Lincoln's Inn. 8vo. London: 1840. 3. On Legislative Expression, or the Language of the Written Law. By GEORGE COODE of the Inner Temple. London: 1845. 8vo. THIS is a large and important inquiry, and it would be presumptuous to undertake the double duty of examining the existing defects in the structure of our statutes, and setting forth the details of the proper remedy, within the space that we can at present allot to it. In truth, we greatly doubt, whether, were we able to accomplish such a systematic exposition, we should be favoured with the continued attention of our readers. But, in a matter like this, the exposure of flagrant defects, arising not from abortive efforts to create a competent system, but springing up as the natural fruits of utter neglect, is half the victory of improvement gained. Showing, as we shall be able to do, that no uniform system has ever been adopted in this branch of the Public Service-but that it has been left to the uncontrolled management of unknown and irresponsible private persons, differing in profession, in opinion, and in notions of the proper manner in which their duties ought to be performed we shall prepare the reader to find, that the work so executed is unscientific, incongruous, and imperfect; and when he follows us through our general remarks, he will probably be more disposed than heretofore to attend to the vast practical importance of the subject, and the necessity of improvements. There are three different parties to whose intelligence the Legislative Draftsman must address his labours-the Legislator, whose will he expresses; the People, who are to derive from this expression the rule of their conduct; and the Judge, who is to decide, when it becomes a question, whether or not the law has been obeyed. It is not the intention of the legislator that constitutes the law, but the words in which he has permitted that intention to be expressed. His views and designs cannot be 6 man; for every one, instead of making a peculiar reading, and claiming a vested interest in it, will be anxious to discover and abide by that intention of the legislature, according to which he knows that his conduct will be interpreted. Whoever would understand how much more simple it would be to legislate for a public, anxious merely to understand the lawgiver's meaning, than for a set of people each struggling to get his own view of it adopted, may compare the bill of fares at a railway station with. a tariff act. Table of fares' announces to the willing mind as much as several sections of a statute are required to put beyond the cavils of an impugner. First class,' second class,'third class,'-need no elaborate interpretation of their meaning. 'Passengers' luggage must be at the terminus ten minutes before starting,' is easily understood; for it is the passengers' interest to comprehend it, not to discover and support any peculiar interpretation of it. Even where there are acts of Parliament fortified by the usual accumulation of phrases, it is sometimes found expedient to provide of that which has been made long and elaborate to obviate sinister perversion of its meaning-a short abridgement, for the aid of those who honestly seek to know the intention of the framer. Thus, at a Turnpike gate, we see a board announcing a series of rules, and a table of tolls. It contains all that it would have been necessary to give in place of many pages of the turnpike act, had those who read it done so only for information; but the very persons who read and obey these abbreviated rules and tabular rates, would not consent to be bound by a law so briefly set forth; but, acquiring their knowledge in the abbreviated form, are only prevented from disputing the meaning of that which is simple and intelligible, because they know that it is fortified by the elaborate and well weighed clauses of an act of Parliament; which they have never seen, and which they would be utterly unable to comprehend if it were before them. The circumstance that the delicate and difficult duty of drawing acts of Parliament was left to the unregulated practice of individuals, early attracted the attention of the Sages of the Law. Sir Edward Coke laments that the quantity of unscientific irregular draftsmanship, for which both private documents and the public laws were in his day conspicuous, gave birth to much litigation. The greatest questions,' says he, arise, not upon any of the rules of the common law, but upon conveyances and instruments made by men unlearned, many times made upon wills intricately, absurdly, and repugnantly set down by parsons, scriveners, and such other imperiti; and oftentimes upon acts of Parliament overladen with premises and additions, and many times on a sudden penned and corrected by men of none or very little judgment in law. If men would take sound advice and counsel in making of their conveyances, assurances, instruments, and wills; and counsellors would take pains to be rightly and truly informed of the true state of their clients' case, so as their advice and counsel might be apt and agreeable to their clients' estate; and if acts of Parliament were after the old fashion penned, and by such as perfectly knew what the common law was, before the making of any act of Parliament concerning that matter; as also how far forth former statutes had provided remedy for former mischiefs and defects discovered by experience, therefore should very few questions in law arise; and the learned should not so often and so much perplex their heads to make atonement and peace by construction of law between insensible and disagreeing words, sentences and provisoes, as they now do.' * It may be inferred from this passage, that the great oracle of the Common Law would have desired to see the statutes drawn and revised by the Judges, according to old practice; but though we are anxious to see legal skill and uniformity of system applied to the manufacture of our laws, we do not think that those who are afterwards to have the duty of interpreting them, should also be trusted with the task of drawing them. The Judge who gives decisions on the meaning of a law framed by himself, may be the person to know best what he intended to set forth; but he is for that very reason ill qualified to decide whether the words he has chosen have really given expression to what he meant, and must so be understood by every person who considerately weighs them. He will decide according to his intention; but his Successor will decide according to the meaning of his words. For the same reason, Solicitors know that the most unsafe person of whom to take an opinion on the application of a statute, is the Counsel who framed it. It would appear, indeed, that those who are most acute in their judicial capacity, in weighing the value of subtle criticisms on acts, are not the best constructors of intelligible clauses, Perhaps their own ingenuity in discovering latent objections, makes them too diffident of clear, broad, simple phraseology; and anxious to surround it with explanatory and exceptional expressions suited to meet their own doubts. Lord Eldon, who boasted of being able to drive a coach and six through other men's statutes, was, it appears, himself a singularly confused draftsman. 'He one day,' says Sir Samuel Romilly, sent for me into his room at Lincoln's Inn Hall, and showed me two clauses which he had drawn, *Second part of Coke's Reports-Address To the Reader.' and which he proposed to add to the bill, and asked me what I thought of them. They were so obscure, that after reading them repeatedly, I found myself very reluctantly obliged to ask him what the object of them was. He explained to me, that they were intended to enable the heir of a trader who should die, seized of a real estate more than sufficient to pay his debts, to sell part of the estate, leaving the rest to answer the demands of creditors. Without this explanation, I certainly never should have collected, from the words of the proposed clauses, that that was their object.' * In the passage cited above from Sir Edward Coke, his allusion was probably not directed to the revisal of Parliamentary Bills during their progress by persons of skill; but to the ancient practice by which the judges framed the statutes out of the proceedings of Parliament. It is to the curious constitutional movement, by which a change was effected in this system,. that we must attribute the circumstance of the structure of the laws passed by Parliament having been neglected; while the internal forms of the legislative assemblies by which they are discussed and sanctioned, have been carefully refined to the utmost pitch of philosophical and practical precision. It has long been an essential principle in these forms, that nothing can make its appearance as the determination, sense, or will of Parliament, unless it has been put in writing before the discussion has begun; so that it shall be in the power of each member to know, not only the general purport, but the very words of that which he is adopting or rejecting. There was thus nothing left for any recording officer, but the statement of the vote as in the affirmative or negative; and no reliance was placed on the honesty or discretion of any official person as the organ of the proceedings of the legislative body. The practice of voting on amendments seriatim, and finally adopting or rejecting, by a distinct vote, the proposition in reference to which they have been proposed, is an essential part of this beautiful system; and, simple as it may appear, is one of the most exquisite designs of high logical art, for unravelling the various threads of a complex series of contending proposals, discussing each one separately from the others, and giving each the benefit of a distinct debate on its merits, if that be demanded by its opponents, and a deliberate vote of the House. This system, like many others that unite simplicity with high art, was the growth of ages. Hatsell tells us, that "It was the ancient practice for the Speaker to collect the sense of the House from the debate, and from thence to form a question on *Romilly's Life, vol. ii. p. 23. |