absurdity in supposing, that there may be beings in the universe, whose capacities, and knowledge, and views, may be so extensive, as that the whole Christian dispensation may to them appear natural, ¿e analogous or conformable to God's dealings with other parts of his creation; as natural as the visible known course of things appears to us...For there seems scarce any other possible sense to be put upon the word, but that only in which it is here used; similar, stated, or uniform.

This credibility of a future life, which has been here insisted upón, how little soever it may satisfy our curiosity, seems to answer all the purposes of religion, in like manner as a demonstrative proof would. Indeed, a proof, even a demonstrative one, of a future life, would not be a proof of religion. For, that we are to live hereafter, is just as reconcileable with the scheme of atheism, and as well to be accounted for by it, as that we are now alive is and therefore nothing can be more absurd than to argue from that scheme, that there can be no future state... But as religion implies a future state, any presumption against such a state is a presumption against religion. And the foregoing observations remove all presumptions of that sort, and prove, to a very considerable degree of probability, one fundamental doctrine of religion; which, if believed, would greatly open and dispose the mind seriously to attend to the general evidence of the whole.

Of the Government of God by Rewards and Pu nishments; and particularly of the latter.

THAT which makes the question concerning a fu ture life to be of so great importance to us, is our capacity of happiness and misery. And that which makes the consideration of it to be of so great im portance to us, is the supposition of our happiness. and misery hereafter, depending upon our actions. here. Without this, indeed, curiosity could not but sometimes bring a subject, in which we may be so highly interested, to our thoughts; especially upon the mortality of others, or the near prospect of our own. But reasonable men would not take any farther thought about hereafter, than what should happen thus occasionally to rise in their, minds, if it were certain that our future interest no way depended upon our present behaviour: whereas, on the contrary, if there be ground, either from. analogy or anything else, to think it does; then there is reason also for the most active thought and solicitude to secure that interest; to behave so as that we may escape that misery, and obtain that happiness in another life, which we not only suppose ourselves capable of, but which we apprehend also is put in our own power. And whether there

be ground for this last apprehension, certainly. would deserve to be most seriously considered, were there no other proof of a future life and interest than that presumptive one, which the foregoing observations amount to.

Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions: and we are endued by the Author of our Nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. We find, by experience, He does not so much as preserve our lives, exclusively of our own care and attention to provide ourselves with, and to make use of, that sustenance, by which he has appointed our lives shall be preserved, and without which he has appointed they shall not be preserved at all. And in general wè foresee, that the external things, which are the objects of our various passions, can neither be obtained nor. enjoyed, without exerting ourselves in such and such manners but by thus exerting ourselves, we obtain and enjoy these objects, in which our natural good consists; or by this means God gives us the possession and enjoyment of them. I know not that we have any one kind, or degree, of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care, we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet: or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable,

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i. e. to do what they know beforehand will render them: so. They follow those ways, the fruit of which they know, by instruction, example, experience, will be disgrace, and poverty, and sickness, and untimely death. This every one observes to be the general course of things; though it is to be allowed, we cannot find by experience, that all our sufferings are owing to our own follies.

Why the Author of Nature does not give his creatures promiscuously such and such perceptions, without regard to their behaviour; why he does not make them happy without the instrumentality of their own actions, and prevent their bringing any sufferings upon themselves, is another matter. Perhaps there may be some impossibilities in the nature of things, which we are unacquainted with*. Or less happiness, it may be, would, upon the whole, be produced by such a method of conduct, than is by the present. Or, perhaps, divine goodness, with which, if I mistake not, we make very frée in our speculations, may not be a bare single disposition to produce happiness; but a disposition to make the good, the faithful, the honest man happy. Perhaps an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with seeing his creatures behave suitably to the nature which he has given them; to the relations which he has placed them in to each other; and to that which they stand in to himself: that relation to himself, which, during their existence, is even necessary, and which is the most important

*Part I. Ch. vii.

one of all. Perhaps, I say, an infinitely perfect Mind may be pleased with this moral piety of moral agents, in and for itself; as well as upon account of its being essentially conducive to the happiness of his creation. Or the whole end, for which God made, and thus governs the world, may be utterly beyond the reach of our faculties: there may be somewhat in it as impossible for us to have any conception of, as for a blind man to have a conception of colours. But however, this be, it is certain matter of universal experience, that the general method of divine administration is, forewarning us, or giving us capacities to foresee, with more or less clearness, that if we act so and so, we shall haye such enjoyments, if so and so, such sufferings; and giving us those enjoyments, and making us feel those sufferings, in consequence of our actions.

But all this is to be ascribed to the general course of nature." True. This is the very thing which I am observing. It is to be ascribed to the general course of nature; i. e. not surely to the words, or ideas, course of nature; but to him who appointed it, and put things into it: or to a course of operation, from its uniformity, or constancy, called natural; and which necessarily implies an operating agent. For, when men find themselves necessitated to confess an Author of Nature, or that God is the natural governor of the world; they must not deny this again, because his

* Pages 36, 37.