and shroud himself in clouds and darkness? There is proof enough of this in every quarter of his works, without a resort to such means. All heaven and earth bear witness that his ways are often past finding out. And would he resort, then, for the sake of making this impression, to such means as those now under consideration? The suggestion seems derogatory to his majesty and dignity. To make a revelation—and yet that revelation (so called) be entirely unintelligible? How can we conceive of his sporting with the hopes and expectations of men in such a way? To make one, moreover, which for thousands of years remains a perfect enigma to his church-is this any relief of the difficulty? To my own mind, at least, it is none at all.

There is a still

But this is not the end of the matter. more serious difficulty to be met. We are told that 'the prophecy will be understood then, and only then, when the thing predicted comes to pass.' What then is the thing which comes to pass? I may surely be permitted to ask this question. What is the thing predicted? It is conceded, that by the laws of language no proper meaning has been, or can be, made out from the prophecy in question. But after 2000 years, something will take place, it is said, to which we may apply it. Apply what? If an event is compared with a prophecy, the only means of comparison possible is, that we first assign some definite meaning to the prophecy, and then compare the event with that meaning. If this be not the case, then we merely make a comparison of a known thing with one that is unknown. How then are we to ascertain that they agree, when we confess that one of the two things compared is (so to speak) an unknown quantity? So long as it is unknown, or treated as unknown, we can have no means of ascertaining whether there is an agreement, or not, in the case supposed.

Is not this whole matter, moreover, mere reasoning in a circle? The prophecy (an unknown something) agrees with the event, because the event agrees with the prophecy! Some laws of language then, after all, must first be applied to the prophecy, in order to make out any definite meaning; and if so, why could not these have been applied at a period antecedent, as well as now? It seems impossible to vindicate with success any such method of reasoning-such a complete vστegov лgóτegov as this. A prophecy which is unintelligible by the laws of language, can never be a revelation; nor can there ever be any certainty among uninspired men, that it is truly and correctly understood.

It would not be proper, however, to dismiss this topic without some additional remarks, which may aid us in explaining the ground, why the principle in question has been so extensively admitted, among many interpreters whose piety and learning cannot well be called in question.

Words are the signs of things. Words, as originally employed by a writer or speaker, designate the view of things which exists in his own mind. But it must be remembered, that words, which have been formed by men whose knowledge is imperfect, (and all words are so formed), cannot, from the nature of the case in many instances, convey complete or perfect ideas or make complete representations of many things. The reason is, that there is much belonging to most objects of which men speak, which is not understood or known by them; and what is unknown they do not, and cannot, definitely describe. For example; the words God, heaven, hell, soul, etc., while they convey the definite ideas that men have concerning these respective objects, yet do not convey to our minds any description of that which is unknown to us, but which at the same time belongs to these objects. There may be

then, and in respect to most objects there are, many things appertaining, which no human language describes or can describe; and this for the simple reason, that language is employed to describe what we do know, or suppose ourselves to know, and not to describe that of which we have no knowledge or conception.

It does not make against this view of the subject at all, that there are many words which stand as signs of things which are for the most part unknown to us. For example; the word gravity, or the phrase power of gravity, designates a something in the earth and planets which attracts material objects toward them, while, at the same time, we pretend to no complete knowledge of the real nature, attributes, place, manner of existence, etc., of that something, but only so far as the attraction just mentioned develops them. After all, then, the words gravity, or power of gravity, designate only so much of that something as we know, or at least suppose ourselves to know.

So in many other cases; we see developments of powers or of substances, (as we suppose them to be), which afford us only some twilight-rays to aid us in the cognizance of those substances and powers themselves. For example; electricity, magnetism, and light, are words that convey ideas to our minds which are definite to a certain extent. But beyond this they designate nothing specific. If these words are still employed by any one in order to designate a supposed something beyond our knowledge, they are, if I may so speak, like some exponents in algebra, the mere signs of a quantity unknown.

But we will suppose now, that some being who has a perfect acquaintance with the substances named, employs the same words to designate them. To these words he may affix a meaning, of course, which corresponds with the extent of his knowledge. But he cannot expect others,

possessed of only an imperfect knowledge, to understand the words in all respects as he does.

We will admit now that God, (if we may, with reverence, suppose him to employ human language), having a perfect knowledge of all things, connects with that language many ideas unknown to us, and in our present state not knowable to us. Still, what God knows in and of himself, is one thing; what he reveals, or designs to reveal, is quite another. Surely no one will say, that God undertakes to reveal to us that which we are incapable of knowing. To suppose this, would be virtually to impeach his wisdom, his paternal kindness, and even his perfect knowledge. When God speaks to men, it is that he may be understood by them; for on any other ground he does not truly speak to them.

It is not then all which is in his mind, that the words of Scripture are intended to designate. It is only so much as may be revealed; and if revealed by words, then those words must bear the sense which the usus loquendi gives them, or else no revelation is made by them.

When predictions of future and distant events are uttered, no words, it will be admitted, can of themselves describe all which appertains to those events. God indeed knows all; but he does not communicate, nor does he design to communicate, all his knowledge to men. To assume that a prophecy is designed to reveal all which the divine mind knows respecting the event predicted, is such an assumption as no reason or laws of language can justify.

The question then comes fairly before us: How much does the Holy Spirit mean to convey, by the words of any particular prophecy? The answer is not difficult. God speaks by men, and for men. The prophets were inspired by the Holy Ghost. But why? In order that they might

with certainty and authority give information respecting things past, present, or future. To give information necessarily presupposes, that they themselves possessed it. If the Holy Spirit employs such a medium of communication, i. e. speaks through prophets, it is plainly in order that human language may be addressed to human beings. The language employed, therefore, means just what the writers designed it should mean. Every book is fully interpreted, when the exact mind of the writer is unfolded.

Were the prophets then omniscient, even when inspired? Plainly not. The Bible is full of evidence, that inspiration teaches only what pertains to religious truth and duty, not the arts and sciences. And even religious truth is not taught in a manner absolutely complete and perfect, but only relatively so. In our present state, we can only "know in part, and believe in part." "We see through a glass darkly.” All that is now needed by us is revealed. So much, therefore, the prophets understood. But if they uttered words as mere automata, which they did not themselves understand, then they neither received nor imparted any revelation. At least, what they did not understand was no revelation to them. And if they, even when illuminated and guided by the Holy Spirit, could not understand what was imparted to them, is it reasonable to suppose that others, who were addressed by them and were uninspired, could understand such communications? Surely such a supposition would be altogether unreasonable. And how can that which is not known, and cannot be known, be called a revelation with any propriety?

I am well aware that I shall be met here with the allegation, that the Scriptures often represent the prophets as not understauding what they uttered, and therefore the meaning of their language, it is said, cannot be limited to what they meant to say. But although this has been often