had rather be a Brute than a Man : neither could you by this means avoid these natural Evils which you NOTES. concerned in the Attainment, and unworthy of the Enjoyment of them. This is the great Spur and Incitement to many noble actions here, and will be part of the Crown and Reward of them hereafter, (as is illustrated at large by Dr. Scott in the first Vol. of his Christian Life, and by Dr. Jenkin, in his ReaSonableness of Chriftianity, 2d vol. C. 12. prop. 2.) And tho we cannot properly merit any thing at the hand of God, yet the Confciousness of having performed such Actions as are in themselves acceptable to, and rewardable by him, and of receiving Blessings from him in return for such Actions, must very much increase our Happiness in the Enjoyment of these Blessings, both in this World and the next, (as is shewn in the fame places.) Nor lastly, could we receive this Pleasure which now results from our Choice and Action, if we were determined in every thing by the Deity, supposing that Determination concealed from us, and we only made to believe that we were really free to choose and act. For, as our Author observes, this would be to arrive at the End without the Means, and to have the Effect without the Cause. All our Ideas of Merit arise from, and are entirely founded in Free Choice: this (as far as we can apprehend) is the necessary Medium to such Moral Happiness; and we can no more conceive how one should come without the other, than how we should fee without Eyes: and for us to have this Pleasure, tho' another did the Action, would be the same as for one Man to be confcious of his doing what some other really did, or for him to see by fome other's Eyes. Such Suppositions as these would breed endless Confufion. For we must either know whether another did this Action or not; if we do know this, then how can we attribute that to ourselves, or pride ourselves in that which we know belongs to another? If we do not know this, then how can we attribute to ourselves, or please ourselves in any thing? Since every thing in and about us may, for what we know, be done by another, and so we in reality may never deserve either praise or blame. The natural consequence of which is, that we might as well never aim at Defert, or strive to do any thing at all: and this is the genuine Product of all fuch Suppositions as question the Veracity of our Faculties, and would make us suspect that we may be imposed upon even in the regular Operations of our own Minds. The same Arguments with those of Bayle, as well as the like method of reasoning, are made use of by the Author of the Philofophical Enquiry, p. 98, &c. and p. 71, 72. Where he thinks, " may not be improper to observe, that some of the Pleasures Man "It you dread so much as foolishly to wish yourself a Brute, left you should fall into them. But supposing it were convenient for you to be a Brute, yet it could not be convenient for all Nature: The System of the Universe required free Agents: without these the Works of God would be lame and imperfect; his Goodness chose the Benefit of the Universe rather than that of yourself; especially when this is better for you too, tho' you should be so ungrateful as not to confefs it. gents are Divine V. Fourthly, As it would be prejudicial to Man, Free Ato all Nature, for God to hinder bad Elections by placed as his absolute Power, so nothing can be conceived it were to be more disagreeable to himself. We have faid out of the that God made the World in order to have fome- reach of thing wherein to exercise his Attributes externally: Power, But fince he has feveral Attributes, he cannot exer- the Gocife them all in every thing alike. His Power there- vernment fore exerts itself chiefly in one thing, and his Wif- of these dom and Goodness in another. He exercised his is the proPower in creating the World, and putting it into per ExerMotion; his Goodness and Wisdom in the Order cife of the therefore Divine and Agreement of things : But the Divine Wisdom Wisdom, seems to have fet apart the Government of Free wherein Agents as its peculiar Province. Herein it fully ex- God deerciseth itself, and acts up to its Infinity; for if it lights. were finite it would not be equal to fo great a Tafk. NOTES. It " Man receives from Objects are so far from being the Effect " of Choice, that they are not the Effect of the leaft Premedi"tation, or any Act of his own, as in finding a Treasure on "the Road, or in receiving a Legacy from a Person unknown "to him." But has a Man the fame Pleasure in these Cafes as if he had done something to deferve a Treasure of the Public? or had the Legacy conferred on him as a Reward for his good Deeds to the deceased Person, his late loved Beneficiary or intimate Friend? If this Author can find a difference in these two Cases, this Observation of his must be improper : if he cannot, I am sure he has a different Sense of things from the reft of Mankind, and of consequence is not to be argued with. 1 It does not seem a very extraordinary thing for God to be able to govern and absolutely direct such Beings as are merely passive, and deprived of all Motion of their own, whereby they might make any Resistance. For those things obey easily which do not move but when they are moved. Neither is there need of infinite Wisdom to govern them; for infinite Power, with a moderate use of Wisdom, would have been fufficient. That there might be a Subject therefore whereon the infinite Wisdom of God should difplay itself, he created Free Agents; which, being as it were put out of his Power and left to themselves, might act in a manner independent of his Will. 'Tis evident to any Person how much more difficult it is, and how much greater Exercife of Wisdom it requires to direct a Multitude of these to a certain End, and make them conspire to the common Good, than to order Brute Beafts, and fuch as have no Power of themselves, in what manner you please. To them that confider the vast Multitude of Free Agents, which is almost infinite, and their Independence (fince every one is, at least in many Cafes, absolute Master of his own Actions, and is permitted by God to act according to that Liberty) God seems to have given a Specimen of the Extent of his Wisdom, which is able thus certainly and effectually to bring to the End propofed, fo many Free Spirits, so many Agents that were in a manner set at Liberty from his Dominion, and committed every one to his own Government. Here is the proper place for Wisdom, wherein (fetting afide, and in a manner suspending the Exercife of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pass that so many jarring Wills depending on themselves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no fuch thing, shall yet conspire together to promote the Good of the Universe. 'Tis impossible that this this Exercise of Wisdom should not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be esteemed agreeable to him. But if he were obliged to interfere with his Power, t'would feem to argue a Defect of Wisdom; for what occafion is there for him to interpose and stop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wisdom could provide fufficiently for the Good of the whole without altering his Plan ? * It VI. From hence it seems sufficiently evident why the would God would not interpose his Power, or intermeddle be neither with our Elections, since that could neither be ad- agreeable vantageous to ourselves nor to the whole System, to God, nor agreeable to God. "Tis no wonder then that nor useful absolute Goodness permits Evil Elections, fince for God the most part they could not be prevented without should algreater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's ways hinno doubt but God will take care that the very best der bad shall be done. (70.) NOTES. SUB (70.) What has been urged in the foregoing Subsection about the Divine Interpofition in human Elections must be understood in a limited Sense, viz. as relating only to an immediate Influence, or an absolute Determination of the Will, i. e. to such an intermedling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subsection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interposition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular fort which would fubvert their natural Powers, or be destructive of their Freedom. Though God has established general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left these entirely to themselves, but influences, directs, and governs them in such a manner as is most conducive to the great End for which he designed them; which End could not be attained without fuch a particular Influence, as will be shewn below. In determining the manner of this Government we must beware of the two Extremes of supposing either first, that the Deity always influences second Causes or acts (as Malebranch terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural or Moral World; which would dissolve all Laws of Nature, destroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every thing : Aa4 : * See Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. C.12. p. 240, &c. 5th Edit. to us, that Elections. Devout Men hope for a change in the course of Nature, their SUBSECT. IV. Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer. I.COME ISO not fo that God is may apprehend NOTES. con through thing to Fate: or secondly, that he never interposes in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of MePrayers. chanism or of Liberty take their natural Course, and operate as it were independently of himself; which would entirely destroy a particular Providence, and render the general one in a great measure useless. The bad Consequences which would attend the former of these Schemes have been touched upon above: The latter (which is particularly espoused by Leibnitz in his System of Pre-established Harmony, and by Mr. Whiston in his New Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in the following Subsection. I shall here only add the Opinion of Mr. Colliber on the present Subject; " [5.] 'Twas highly suitable to the Divine Wisdom in the Government of the World, "both to pre-ordain some of the principal Events with "relation to the entire human Community, or to the more " confiderable parts of it, and to reserve to himself a Right " of interposing and influencing particular Agents, as in other "Cafes, so more especially in order to the accomplishment of "these Events. That he has actually done so is abundantly "clear from Scripture Prophecies, and Histories. And that " in so doing he has acted in a manner most worthy his Wif"dom, is no less manifest. For hereby it appears that the " Divine Government is equally opposed to Chance and Destiny. Had the Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the Conduct of his own Inclinations, and na"tural Effects in general to the Influence of their Causes, "without ever interpofing to direct them to the attainment " of his great Design; this would have been almost in effect "to divest himself of the Government of Rational Agents, " and to fubject their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard of "the utmost Disorder and Confufion. Or had he on the con trary abfolutely or fatally determined every Event, tho' this " would have been far enough from divesting himself of the "Government of the World, yet it would have been a Go [s.] Impartial Enquiry, &c. p.115. vernment : |