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reference to external objects; and our own experience every day assures us, that reason is not an infallible guide in regard to even the plainest truths. But, does it follow that the existence of an external world is a matter of uncertainty, or that mathematical demonstration is void of conclusiveness, though depending on the exercise of a faculty, for which it would be too much to claim the attribute of infallibility? These are consequences established by a process of reasoning exactly similar to that by which Dr Wardlaw has tried to subvert the authority of the natural faculties of man.
It is a truth which cannot be too frequently impressed on those who fancy, that by thrusting religion into the room of philosophy, they are doing a service to the interests of the former, that all revealed religion presupposes, and is built upon the prior religion of nature; and if this religion be the worthless thing which some are fain to make it, be it remembered, that the building is insecure in direct proportion to the badness of the ground on which it rests. Revelation does not, for the first time, inform us of the moral differences of actions; it assumes, as Dr Chalmers somewhere observes, that prior to the religion of the New Testament, the virtuous and the praiseworthy were objects of general recognition;' and that human nature as such, not only occa'sionally exhibited what was just and true, and of good report,' but also could render to such an exhibition the homage of its ' regard and of its reverence.' The proper design of revelation, as Dr Paley has fairly stated, was to add sanctions and to supply motives, for the fulfilment of those moral duties which the law of nature clearly enough indicated, but which it wanted power adequately to enforce upon the consciences of men. Be it so that our reason is so depraved as to have lost its character of authoritative certainty, in regard either to physical or moral truth, then, in the first place, we are deprived of all assurance respecting those fundamental truths which natural theology has been generally supposed to teach; and, secondly, if we be referred to faith in confirmation of their reality, still the evidences of that faith have no power of affecting our minds, except through the medium of those very powers whose authority has been previously thrown aside; so that this absurd endeavour to thrust Christianity into the room of philosophy, ends in the palpable triumph of scepticism over both.
This was a subject upon which Mr Stewart's noble eloquence poured some of its strongest lights; and it is because we see a repetition of attempts similar to those which he stigmatized, that we have been induced thus to notice them. In the preface
to his last work, he mentions it as one of the circumstances which had induced him to devote so large a portion of it to a systematic illustration of the doctrines of natural religion, that certain Scotish divines had discovered a disposition to set the evidence of these doctrines at nought, with a well-meant but shortsighted view to strengthen the cause of Christianity; not being aware, says he, that they were only repeating the language of Bayle, Hume, 'Helvetius, and many other modern authors of the same description, who have endeavoured to cover their attacks upon those ' essential principles on which all religion is founded, under a pre'tended zeal for the interests of revelation. It was not thus,' he adds, that Cudworth, and Barrow, and Locke, and Clarke, and 'Butler reasoned on the subject. "He" (says Locke, who has 'forcibly and concisely expressed their common sentiments) "that takes away Reason to make way for Revelation, puts out ⚫ the light of both; and does much the same as if we would 'persuade a man to put out his eyes, the better to receive the light of an invisible star by a telescope!"'
We have already stated generally the distinguishing feature of Dr Young's system of mental philosophy; namely, its classification or resolution of all the phenomena of consciousness into three primary powers, sensation, memory, and judgment. Whether that classification is not liable to some of the objections which he
The Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man; published in 1828, immediately before the death of the author. We deeply regret that the proper time for duly noticing this admirable work passed away, without our being able, owing to the pressure of other avocations, to carry our intentions in regard to it into execution. Admirable we will call it; for whatever may be thought of its theory of moral approbation, or of some of its metaphysical classifications, it takes so wide and so comprehensive a view of its truly important subject, illustrates it with such varied learning, and elevates it with such noble lessons of wisdom and virtue, delivered in such winning language, as to render it beyond all question, one of the most instructive, improving, and agreeable presents that philosophy, warmed by benevolence, and adorned by genius, has yet conferred upon mankind. The fine sentences which close the section on Mr Stewart's writings, in Sir James Mackintosh's Dissertation on the Progress of Ethical Philosophy — another admirable work which also, alas! strongly reproves our backward labours -can only be fully appreciated by those who have perused the almost posthumous treatise to which we have been alluding. The same philosophy which he had cultivated from his youth upward, employed his dying hand. Aspirations after higher and brighter scenes of excellence, always blended with his elevated morality, became more earnest and deeper as worldly passions died away, and earthly objects vanished from his sight."
has himself urged against the similar attempts of others, and whether it is founded upon a sound and complete investigation of phenomena, are points which would require a far more extended enquiry than we can at present enter upon. We must not, however, leave his work without observing, that though it occasionally contains some acute strictures on metaphysical systems, its author does not always express himself in a way calculated to give a just or correct account of the views of preceding enquirers. In commenting, for example, upon those systems which group all the mental powers under two grand heads, the Understanding and the Will, or, which is nearly equivalent, the Intellectual and the Active powers, he speaks as if those who adopted that classification were either ignorant of, or had overlooked the fact, that the mind, in all its operations, is essentially active. 'We might be led,' says he, from this division to imagine that there was 'no activity in the intellectual powers, but that they were perfectly 'stationary and quiescent, accompanied by no changes, and pro'ducing none. Nothing,' he adds, could be more erroneous. Unquestionably nothing could be more erroneous;' but who is the philosopher who has either advanced or countenanced such an error? Reid and Stewart are the most illustrious of those who, in modern times, have adopted the arrangement in question; and what is their language in regard to it? Although,' says the former, this general division may be of use in order to our pro'ceeding more methodically in our subject, we are not to under'stand it as if, in those operations which are ascribed to the Un'derstanding, there were no exertion of will or activity, or as if the Understanding were not employed in the operations ascrib'ed to the Will; for I conceive there is no operation of the understanding wherein the mind is not active in some degree.'In studying our internal frame,' says Mr Stewart, it may be 'convenient to treat of our Intellectual powers apart from our Active propensities; but in fact, the two are very intimately, and indeed inseparately connected in all our mental operations.' We thus see that Dr Young has said absolutely nothing in regard to this classification that had not been said by the very writers who form the subjects of his critical strictures.
Of his Lectures generally we have pleasure in saying, that they show him to have been a man of considerable mental vigour and acuteness; and that though composed solely for his class, and labouring under the disadvantages of posthumous publication, obviously much greater in the case of Lectures than in that of any work written from the first for the press, they are yet marked by a perspicuous and manly style, which sometimes rises to nation, if not to eloquence. We shall conclude with an.
in regard to the question whether Metaphysical as well as
Physical enquiry, is capable of turnishing any positive additions to our previous knowledge; and which will at coce serve as a specimen of his style, and of his manner of thinking on surò, subjects.
• The study of the philosophy of our mental constitutia finis v with the knowledge of important truths-In cagestica ta tia 7 I been asserted that the subject of mind admits of no sormenes: that s real powers are not only inherent in ali, but are equallȚ INVI 17 H peasant and by the palosopher. To's controversy has been excret sy the sanguine hopes expressed by some meragcrscans of the guy progress which may be expected in intelectal pelosophy 37 bowing the Baconian method of induction. The prodies of 2007 i chemistry, and the rapid and apparently intermina ve ataacement of the arts, have been referred to as the triumphs of the Euronian school; an we have been called upon by some to expect sale sferts in the sophy of the mind. It must be aimed. I time tu vier mal indulge this expectation will assuredly be Esappointed. The range of external nature is so immense; it admits of being pacsi a mum in entless variety of combinations; the same substance can be contemplated and modded by so many different agents at the same time; and the ma terials are so completely in our power, and so cations 26 ser senses, that the effect of philosophy on the bodies are 17a je
more striking and various than on our intelectual nature.
This view of the subjects of intellectual and memanca polussgezin given rise to ample discussions, the decision of which Lira
on the meaning of a word. It is maintained that the tuman mind ein g only of observation, and not of experiment: that exZEITT VETA m plies the capacity of exerting some power over the eIJAS SL WISH TE employ it; and that, as we have no power to chates he wentai ware of intelectual phenomena, we have nothing left want to Cosette tie-97 For my own part I can see no reason for the inmaten så the tarn ense riment. By all men it is understood to signify some tra that a mate either for the observation of facts, or the productica of mae new mullfication. Observation is obviously then the means of mate in 136 riment. It is surely consistent with commca act and commen sense, when you have gained the knowledge of any fair 1g shwemalo, to desire me to make a similar experment You shmoney mad should make a trial or experiment of the offsem produce on my opinions. The whole contromangy, thanfum, Love the limits of observation and experiment, seems to sets to progres TIE 50 cloud the argument. But along sterren, vien netrvat der a particular purpose, is of the same nature with experiment, not very vi undoubtedly vary in their results in proporces me time of ae materials on which they are employs We are never, *desire, 's 12pect the discovery of a new mental power, as we may expert to new ể a new metal, or a new air: and if the study of muestra pn wonen? » to be deserted till it can promise Lorena at the sorten m... we lae steam engine, we must, I am afraid, ahaston is forever, and content queselves with that easy knowledge walch we are tout a umace to pity human being.'
ART. V.-Thoughts upon the Aristocracy of England. By ISAAC TOMKINS, Gent. London. 8vo: 1835.
HIS tract relates mainly to the privileges of the Aristocracy and their House of Parliament. It is very small, but very sharp, -indeed bitter. There is no doubt that it is rather a sketch than a finished picture, and a sketch somewhat bordering upon caricature. It will therefore not offend one class so much, as it will gratify another. The Aristocracy will say it is exaggerated— and they will also feel that it is too general to hurt individuals sorely; but the middle classes, in whose favour it is very warmly, and indeed most feelingly, conceived, will no doubt exceedingly enjoy it. We have an entire sympathy with Isaac Tomkins, gentleman, in his affectionate and even zealous attachment to his 'order'-the hope, the stay, the comfort, and the true ornament of their country; but without altogether concurring in the caustic remarks which the follies of the upper classes have drawn from him. Nevertheless we can in no wise doubt that the ancient and unpopular reign of the privileged few has of late been rapidly verging towards its close; and that the discussion of their pretensions to govern us cannot be longer delayed. The present pamphlet may help to bring on this controversy.
The reason why we thus speak of the Patrician reign is this: Formerly what we were accustomed to call our limited monarchy, was much more like an Aristocracy. The powerful influence of the Peers and their connexions in the House of Commons, and their direct sway in their own House of Parliament, gave them in reality the government of the state. We used to deny the evils of monarchy, as compared with a republic on the one hand, and an aristocracy on the other; and used to ascribe confusion, anarchy, and fickleness to the former, and pride, tyranny, corruption, and all other abominations to the latter-wrapping ourselves up in our self-satisfaction, and delighting to look down upon democratic France and aristocratic Venice-without once reflecting that when the people, as in America, are well educated and accustomed to freedom, self-government is a lesson they have learnt, and can easily and safely practise ;-without once seeming to be aware, that a government with an almost nominal King, may be an aristocracy, just as well as a government with an almost nominal Doge. In truth, England was, until 1832, governed by the Lords and their natural connexions; for both King and Commons were subject to their sway. The Reform Bill happily controlled the Lords, and, restoring our rights, gave