eculations on morals! But it is now incument on us to enter more particularly on an exnination of the work before us. In an introductory chapter, Mr. Payne prents to the consideration of the reader, the inicements to enter on the study proposed, and chibits briefly-perhaps too briefly-the bearg of rental philosophy on science in general, nd its tendency to promote, in a very high egree, the most beneficial discipline of the ind We fully concur with him in the opion, that no studies can be better adapted to duce habits of accuracy and of energy, in the cercise of intellect, than the researches of ental science. In the second and third chapters, Mr. Payne oints out the Object of Intellectual Science; e node in which our inquiries should be conucted; and the true nature of the powers and Isceptibilities of the mind. He very clearly nd correctly states, that "the faculties of the ind, or its powers and susceptibilities, are not › be distinguished from the mind itself. The ords denote the constitution it has received tom its Creator, by which it is capable of exting in all those different states which form he consciousness of life. The states of thought nd feeling, in which the mind is capable of xisting, which constitute the phenomena of ne mind-all, indeed, which can be known of he mind-are incalculable in point of number. et, the mind is not made up of parts; it canot therefore consist of a number of separate usceptibilities. But. though simple and indiisible, it may be capable of producing and unergoing changes, which are not in their naure less different from each other, than are the ircumstances in which they arise. We are ot to conceive of the emotions of joy, sorrow, ope, fear, &c. as so many feelings laid up, so o speak, in the mind-feelings distinct from he mind: they are the mind itself, in different tates, or affected in various ways. They only xist, accordingly, when they are felt." In the sixth chapter, Mr. Payne proceeds to he Analysis and Arrangement of the Mental Phenomena. We concur with him in the opiion, that the classification given by Dr. Reid, and in part adopted by Mr. Dugald Stewart, is Ear from accuracy. Dissatisfied with all previous arrangenents," says our author, "Dr. Brown presents is with one entirely original. The reader will observe, that it is in harmony with the leading principles of his system, viz. that the business of the intellectual philosopher is to analyse and classify the phenomena of mind; which phenonena are to be no otherwise regarded than as he mind itself in various states of thought and eeling." Of these leading principles, we have already expressed approbation, but we are not prepared to follow Mr. Payne's guide in his classificaion and designation of the mental phenomena. "Of these states or affections of mind, when we consider them in all their variety, there is ne physical distinction that cannot fail to Some of them arise in consequence trike us. we have a ground of primary division. The phenomena may be arranged as of two classes, -the External Affections of the mind: the Internal Affections of the mind. The former of these classes admits of very easy subdivision, according to the bodily organs affected. The latter may be divided into two orders; Intellectual states of mind and Emotions." Now it might be shown, that Emotions, which, according to Dr. Brown, must arise from "mere previous feelings of the mind itself," do very often arise also from the operation of external causes. But, waiving any remarks upon the philosophy of the division, we must enter our decided protest against the nomenclature employed. If it be reasonable to require accuracy and precision in the use of terms, from writers of any class, and on any subjects, unquestionably these qualities are to be expected and demanded in the Lectures of an Intellectual philosopher; and if on any points they are of paramount importance, they must be so, when the writer is in the very act of laying the basis of his system, and selecting the terms and phrases which he may have occasion to employ in every discussion, and which should be so well chosen, and so well defined, as to be placed beyond the danger of misconstruction. We should have been greatly surprised if Mr. Payne had not pointed out the inaccuracy of Dr. Brown's language. Justice requires us to notice his animadversion. "I would not be understood as expressing full approbation of the phraseology of the first general division, viz. the external affections of the mind. I am well aware that the concluding words will sufficiently indicate, to those who are accustomed to think on such subjects, that the adjective external is merely intended to suggest that the cause of these affections is out of the mind. It may, however, be misunderstood It may lead some to imagine, that there are affections which are not in the mind, &c. I am disposed to regret that some other mode of designation was not employed by this writer; yet, as the matter is of subordinate importance, and as a uniform nomenclature in intellectual science, as well as in physical, is very desirable,-it is not my intention to deviate from it in the subsequent discussions." This determination on the part of Mr. Payne, we cannot but regret. We readily admit the desirableness of a uniform nomenclature, but we should deprecate the adoption of Dr. Brown's, were it not for the conviction we feel, that this is unnecessary, and that there is no danger whatever of its being generally approved. Having arrived at the sixth chapter, Mr. Payne appears to abandon the division of his work into chapters. We presume he must have altered his plan of arrangement, after the first part of his volume was in print. This, although not very important, produces a want of symmetry in the general structure of the book. Much valuable information and able discussion will be found in our author's "General Vision-the INTERNAL AFFECTIONS. Adopting | country and age would have had anotl Dr. Brown's arrangement, he subdivides these into the two orders of INTELLECTUAL STATES OF MIND and EMOTIONS. All the varieties of the Intellectual states of mind, he refers to two classes; viz. Simple suggestions and Relative suggestions. This part of the work before us is in a high degree interesting and important: at the same time, we feel it to be unnecessary to attempt a particular analysis of its trains of thought, as it professedly, though ably, follows the guidance of Dr. Brown. After stating, according to Dr. Brown's theory, the primary and the secondary laws of suggestion, Mr. Payne has the following passage, which we give to our readers as a pleasurable relief from the perusal of our general strictures, and as a favourable specimen of the author's style. "The general power of suggestion itself may be more vigorous in one mind than in another; or there may be, in different minds, original tendencies to different species of suggestions to transmit to the reverence and the e of the ages that are to follow.'" The illustration is interesting, and sage is eloquent; but is Dr. Brown representing memory as nothing mo species of suggestion, and therefore a no claim to rank among the simple an faculties of the mind? Mr. Payne th he is, and maintains, that "memory distinct power, but conception, i. e. su co-existing with the notion of time. remembrance," he affirms, "of a past the notion or conception of that ev past event; or in other words, it is th combined with a feeling, that it stan relation of priority to our present ness." Now we confess that this a not, in our estimation, satisfactory nothing of the singular use of the wo ing," and the phrase "feeling of a which Dr. Brown so often employs, tion may be asked, how is it to be for, that a conception of a past event. impression, arises in the mind, and is r by the mind as one, not now awaken first time, but only revived? And answer, we conceive, must be, that t of our being has endowed us with a f that express purpose, to which distin we are accustomed to give the name ry. The mere principle of suggestio appear to us available for the purpos it is applied. Too much is ascribed ration. It is true, that one thought gest another thought to an indefini but if, to the energy of the suggesti ple, there be ascribed the revival of and its recognition as the past, then that there is attributed to the princi gestion that which it cannot ach which has its own characteristic pe that which is one of the most wond the operations of the human mind-t in short, we usually understand by To illustrate this subject, let us suppose, that, in three individuals, the principle of suggestion exhibits the following varieties. To the mind of the first, the objects which he beholds habitually suggest resembling objects; to that of the second, contrary or contrasted objects; to that of the third, contiguous objects. The splendid imagery of the poet is built upon analogy-upon the shadowy resemblances of objects to each other, or rather upon their tendency to awaken similar emotions. There is thus an analogy between a veteran chief, to whom the remembrance only of glory remains, and a majestic oak, stripped by age of its verdure; the sight of one may therefore recall the other. But if there be not a natural tendency to suggestions of analogy, or if the mind of an observer be dull and cold,-the two objects, in consequence of the faintness of the resembling and connecting emotion which they produce, will not be likely to suggest each other. In order to the suggestion, in this case, it would be necessary, that some master mind should have previously placed them before his Mr. Payne distributes emotions view in the relation of contiguity; and then classes: those which are immedi they will of course, recall each other by the which are retrospective, and those third law of suggestion. In the former case, prospective. To the first class are re the man is a genius; in the latter, a mere imi-emotions awakened by the pleasure tator. An equal variety and beauty of imagery may flow from the pen of an inferior poet; but his splendid figures are not the creations of his own mind; i. e. they are not the suggestions of analogy, but of contiguity. Copious readings and a retentive memory,' says Dr. Brown, 'may give to an individual of very humble talent, a greater profusion of splendid images than existed in any one of the individual minds on whose sublime conceptions he has dwelt, till they have become, in one sense of the word, his own. If half the conceptions which are stored in his mind, and which rise in it now in its trains of thought, by simple suggestion, as readily as they arose in like manner, in accordance with some train of thought in the mind of their original authors, had but risen by the suggestion of analogy, as they now arise by the suggestion of former proximity; what we call memory, which is, in truth, only the same suggestion in different ciranmal those which arise from moral appro disapprobation-from love and hat sympathy-from pride and humility class of retrospective emotions are such as arise from anger-gratitu and gladness-remorse and self-ap It is on the last of these only, thai will allow us to offer any strictures. considers Conscience "as the susce experiencing those emotions of appr disapprobation and condemnation, awakened by a retrospect of the m rit, or the moral excellence, of our duct." "By an original law of the mind, bation, or self-condemnation, arises, vidual conceives himself innocent whether that conviction be well or This view of the nature of conscie it is imagined, from the objections idgment, nor does it render it independent of he judgment. It accounts for the diversity of s operations, and it confines its influence to urselves." This representation of conscience appears to s to be defective, rather than inaccurate. It oes not seem objectionable as far as it goes; ut it does not, in our view, go far enough. It loes not extend to a full analysis of those opeations and emotions which are usually ascribed o conscience. The "susceptibility" of which Mr Payne speaks, is, we conceive, only one of he elements which enter into its nature, and one which is roused to emotion by certain inellectual decisions. Now, these decisions obiously proceed on some principles or notions of merit or demerit, derived either from reason or from revelation. There is a comparison frequently effected, indeed, with almost instantaneous promptitude) between some acknowledged standard of rectitude and our own conduct; and the result of that comparison is, first, a decision, either acquitting or condemning, and then, a correspondent emotion pleasurable or painful, consequent on that decision. That comparison and that decision we ascribe to the judging faculty; for, by the faculty of judgment, we understand the power by which we compare together our ideas, and ascertain their agreements or their differences. To this faculty we attribute all the decisions of the mind, whether on questions of morals or questions of facts, or any other questions on which the mind may employ its energies. We do not, indeed, “identify the judgment with the conscience," because we regard the decisions of the judgment as constituting only a part of the operations of conscience; neither can we, with Mr. Payne, identify conscience with the "susceptibility" of certain emotions, because we regard that susceptibility as constituting only a part of that complexity and combination to which we give the name of conscience. The latter part of this able work, consisting of about eighty pages, is an exhibition of the ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE. For this province of inquiry, we regard our author as highly gifted; and we should have considered his work as still more valuable, had he devoted an ampler proportion of his volume to ethical discussions. The reasons for a conciseness on this part of his subject, such as the title of the book scarcely prepared us to expect, are thus stated in the close of the preface. "A regard to brevity has prevented the author's enlarging on some points upon which he wished to enter more fully. He deemed it, on various accounts, inexpedient, that the work should extend beyond one volume. Should it happen to obtain so much favour from the public, as to render a second edition necessary, he has it in contemplation to expand considerably that part which treats on Moral Science." We sincerely hone, and even with no small only to differ in opinion from Dr. Brown, (as, indeed, he never hesitates to do, if his judg ment dictate a variation,) but altogether to abandon his guidance; and we cannot but regard the exposure of the fallacy of Dr. Brown's ethical reasonings, as among the most valuable and important of the services which Mr. Payne has rendered to the cause of truth. He justly observes, that "Dr. Brown's theory of morals proceeds on a practical forgetfulness of the distinction which exists, as he himself admits, between what is, and what ought to be, in human conduct. We must either admit that every state of mind, of every human being, is rightand right because it exists;-or that we must seek for some moral rule, by which to try its rectitude. Now Dr. Brown places that standard. not in the law of God, but in the mind itself. Those actions and affections which excite certain emotions of approbation, are right, and right on that account. Taking this for granted, the system supplies us with no certain measure of the rectitude of any action, or of any affection of mind whatever.-The whole system of morals is thus involved in doubt and uncertainty." We will only add a few sentences, which exhibit the leading views which Mr. Payne himself entertains and enforces, and of which we wish to express entire and unqualified approbation. "Our existence as creatures is to be ascribed to the mere good pleasure of God. The relations which bind society together, depend entirely upon the sovereign will of Him who gave us our being; but the conduct to which these relations oblige us, is by no means arbitrary. Having determined to constitute the relations, He could not but enjoin upon us the conduct which His word prescribes;-He could not but fail to command us to love and obey Him.Since the relations we sustain were constituted by God, since he is the Judge of the affections and conduct which harmonize with these relations,-that which appears right to Him, being right on that account-Rectitude may be regarded as conformity to the moral nature of God, the ultimate standard of Virtue.-Now, we know nothing of God but what he has revealed to us; that Revelation, then, must be the standard of rectitude, by exhibiting to us his perfect and glorious nature.-And if the Bible present us with a more full development of the Divine character than the external and visible universe, it must be a more perfect criterion of rectitude.-It must demand and deserve the most implicit obedience. I agree with Dr. Chalmers in thinking that the question is not What thinkest thou? but, How readest thou?-The Divine authority of the Bible being established, the sole office of reason is, to ascertain the meaning of its communications; and not sit in judgment upon the reasonableness of those doctrines which are clearly should depart from this rule, and adopt that of expediency, or any other, in preference to it, is to me, I acknowledge, passing strange." Ungentle hearts, and strangers rude, As a whole, we strongly recommend this work to the attention of our readers. It con-Gone—even the trees he planted ther tains more valuable information, more correct sentiment, more clear, condensed, and conclusive reasoning, on the subjects of mental and moral science, than any single volume we ever perused. We recommend it especially to theological students and young ministers; nor do we think it unworthy of the distinction of a text-book in those Seminaries, in which the study of mental philosophy is justly regarded, not only as interesting in itself, but also as a most important instrument in accomplishing the purposes of intellectual discipline. From the Eclectic Review. EPHEMERIDES; or Occasional Poems, written in Scotland and South Africa. By Thomas Pringle. 12mo. pp. 220. Price 6s. London, 1828. THIS volume is in part a republication of the Author's earlier compositions in verse, comprising all that he deems worth reprinting. Of these, the leading piece is the autumnal Excursion, which gave its title to the former volume, and of which, nine years ago, we made a favourable report, as the most pleasing descriptive poem that had appeared since Leyden's Scenes of Infancy. The scene of the excursion is laid in "The scented heath, the sheafy vale, The hills and streams of Teviotdale;"the haunts where the Author's earliest "life and loveliest hopes were nursed." The poem is modestly styled "a rhyming epistle;" and it is all the better for being so. It has the ease, and flow, and warmth of epistolary composition, combined with the grace and melody of verse. Delicacy, rather than force, tenderness and elegance, rather than brilliancy, together with an unaffected simplicity, characterize the attempt to recall and picture "The heaths which once his fathers trod, Amidst the wild to worship God; The tales which fired his boyish eye With patriot feelings, proud and high; The sacred Sabbath's mild repose; The social evening's saintly close, When ancient Zion's solemn song Arose the lonely banks among; The music of the mountain rills; The moonlight sleeping on the hills; The STARRY SCRIPTURES of the sky, By God's own finger graved on high On Heaven's expanded scroll-whose speech To every tribe doth knowledge teach,When silent Night unlocks the seals, And to forgetful Man reveals The wonders of eternal might, * * "Now scatter'd far the smiling flowers -Yet still, dear Friend, methinks twe "Long from those native haunts estra My home, but not my heart is change Amid the city's feverish stir, 'Tis still a mountain wanderer! Since the date of this poem, the bodings" have been fully realized; second part of his volume consists o written in South Africa. The land now changed indeed, and the Author's tive powers are exercised upon scenes unvisited by the muse, unseen by po Campbell (but not Thomas Campbell) and Burchell, Dr. Philip and Mr. Ti have made us acquainted with the gen racter of South African scenery: it reserved for Mr. Pringle to give us, no eye, but a bard's eye view of the wild and to make its barren wilds tributar fancy. We do not much like the rough the following lines, but we forgive the for the sake of the poetry, as we sho jolting road leading through a beautiful "Afar in the Desert I love to ride. And malice, and meanness, and falsehood, and folly, Dispose me to musing and dark melancholy: When my bosom is full, and my thoughts are high, "Afar in the Desert I love to ride, With the silent Bush-boy alone by my side: And the stately koodoo exultingly bounds, Is heard by the fountain at fall of day; And the fleet-footed ostrich over the waste Far hid from the pitiless plunderer's view, Which the snake and the lizard inhabit alone, Where grass, nor herb, nor shrub takes root, But the barren earth, and the burning sky, And my soul is sick with the bondman's sigh-Tell to the heart, in its pensive mood, There is rapture to vault on the champing And to bound away with the eagle's speed: "Afar in the Desert I love to ride, By valleys remote, where the oribi plays; beest graze; And the gemsbok and eland unhunted recline, By the skirts of grey forests o'ergrown with wild vine; And the elephant browses at peace in his га "And here,-while the night-winds round me And the stars burn bright in the midnight sky, A "still small voice" comes through the wild, NEAR!' Some of Mr. Pringle's minor poems have appeared in Mr. Thompson's Travels in South Africa; and the very spirited 'Song of the Wild Bushman" was copied into our pages from that work. We shall take another sketch of African scenery from the lines entitled |