Many other passages of the same kind from the poets and philosophers of antiquity may be found collected in a learned and curious work entitled, "Tobiae Pfanneri Systema Theologiae Gentilis Purioris." The whole position, however, of the text cannot be more beautifully illustrated than it is by Mr Stewart, in his "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," second vol. p. 66.

Note B. page 22.

MR HUME's doctrine, that the expectation of the continuance of the laws of nature is the result of the association of ideas, has been almost universally rejected by succeeding philosophers. Dr Campbell, indeed, has adopted it, but in a modified form; for an account of which, and for strictures upon it, as well as upon Mr Hume's original view, see Mr Stewart's Philosophical Essays at page 75 of the quarto edition."Till, therefore, some more satisfactory analysis of this expectation shall appear, than has yet been proposed, (continues this eloquent and judicious philosopher,) we are unavoidably led to state it as an original law of human belief. In doing so I am not influenced by any wish to multiply unnecessarily original laws or ultimate truths, nor by any apprehension of the consequences that might result from an admission of any one of the theories in question. They are all of them, so far as I can see, equally harmless in their tendency, but all of them equally unfounded and nugatory, answering no purpose whatever but to draw a veil over ignorance, and to divert the attention by a parade of theoretical phraseology, from a plain and most important fact in the constitution of the mind." P. 79.-In the attempt which I have made to analyze a little farther this fundamental truth,

I think I have conceded enough to the supporters of original or instinctive laws of belief, when I state them as predispositions to lead the mind into a course of observation which opens with the dawn, and is coincident with all the progress of reason; and as reason gains ground, I have the authority of Mr Stewart himself, as will hereafter appear, for the supposition that instinctive principles are more or less superseded. Mr Stewart's most ingenious colleague, Dr Brown, though always sufficiently disposed to carry metaphysical analysis as far as possibly can be admitted, and much farther than his great master and associate, agrees with him, however, upon this view of original principles of belief, though, in the very striking and beautiful manner in which he has stated it in the following passage, I think he comes nearer the idea which I have endeavoured to convey :-" These principles of intuitive belief," says he, " so necessary for our very existence, and too important, therefore, to be left to the casual discovery of reason, are as it were an internal neverceasing voice from the Creator and Preserver of our being. The reasonings of men, admitted by some and denied by others, have over us but a feeble power, which resembles the general frailty of man himself. These internal revelations from on high, however, are omnipotent like their Author. It is impossible for us to doubt them, because to disbelieve them would be to deny what our very constitution was formed to admit; even the atheist himself, if indeed there be one who truly rejects a Creator and Ruler of the universe, is thus, every moment in which he adapts his conduct implicitly and without reasoning to these directions of the wisdom that formed him, obeying, with most exact subserviency, that very Voice which he is professing to question or deride.”— Brown's Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, vol. i. p. 286, first ed.

Note C. page 27.

"IT is a general prejudice of our early years, and of rude nations, when we perceive any thing to be changed, and do not perceive any other thing which we can believe to be the cause of the change, to impute it to the thing itself, and to conceive it to be active and animated so far as to have the power of producing that change in itself. Hence to a child or to a savage, all nature seems to be animated; the sea, the earth, the air, the sun, moon, and stars, rivers, fountains, and groves, are conceived to be active and animated beings. As this is a sentiment natural to man in his rude state, it has on that account, even in polished nations, the verisimilitude that is required in poetical fiction and fable, and makes personification one of the most agreeable figures in poetry and eloquence. The origin of this prejudice probably is, that we judge of other things by ourselves, and therefore are disposed to ascribe to them that life and activity which we know to be in ourselves. A little girl ascribes to her doll the passions and sentiments she feels in herself. Even brutes seem to have something of this nature,—a young cat, when she sees any brisk motion in a feather or a straw, is prompted by natural instinct to hunt it as she would hunt a mouse."-Reid's Essays on the Active Powers, p. 19, duod. ed.—The above observation is finely illustrated in Adam's address to all the objects around him, as Milton has given it, immediately upon his creation:

"Thou Sun, said I, fair light,

And thou, enlightened Earth, so fresh and gay,
Ye hills and dales, ye rivers, woods, and plains,
And ye that live and move, fair creatures, tell,
Tell if ye saw how came I thus, how here?
Not of myself, by some great Maker then, &c.

Paradise Lost, book viii.

66

This quotation, too, illustrates happily enough, the position upon which all my theory hinges, that as Adam, a man created in the full use of his reason, immediately turns to the apprehension of the Being who created him; so man, in every situation, whenever reason begins to operate upon him, must have a feeling after" the same conception, and must have all his natural principles of belief influenced by this idea, however obscurely it may lurk in his mind. It is very evident that, to a person in the situation of Adam, the return of the sun, after he had observed its frequent rising and setting, would be expected solely from his conviction that its regular recurrence at the stated periods was intended by its great Creator,-and the same conviction is at the bottom of the natural belief of all his progeny, although in them it does not assume what it would do in him, the distinct form of religious trust and dependence.

Note D. page 28.

A PASSAGE, which I thought I had read in Mr Stewart's "Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers of Man," illustrative of this position, has, unfortunately, escaped my search in again looking for it. What I have found nearest my recollection of it is the following paragraph, which occurs in the course of his argument for our immortality, and which I quote with additional satisfaction for the sake of that argument: "We may safely affirm," says he, "that the doctrine of a future state and of a future retribution is sanctioned by the general voice of mankind, in whatever manner the principles of their nature may be modified by the place they occupy in the scale of civilization. The refinement of their sentiments on the subject varies indeed

with the cultivation which their faculties have received, but in no state of society are they altogether deprived of those hopes of futurity which lighten the pressure of their present sufferings. That these hopes originate partly in the infirmities and prejudices of men, affords no presumption whatever against the reality of the objects towards which they are directed; for here, as in many other instances, the tendency of our prejudices coincides with the conclusions of an enlightened reason, and affords to those who enjoy the comprehensive views of the universe which philosophy opens, an additional ground of gratitude to that Providence, which, as, in the case of the individual, it guards his animal existence by means of implanted instincts in the infancy of human reason, so, in the case of society, it often anticipates the conclusions of philosophy by prejudices inspired by our weaknesses and necessities."-Vol. ii. pp. 241, 242.

It is with great pleasure that I refer to the work now quoted, the last legacy to the world of a truly enlightened and benevolent man, for a very full and persuasive view of the whole argument for Natural Religion, so imperfectly stated, in many particulars, in the present volume.

Note E. page 30.

AN ingenious friend has suggested to me, that I have made a distinction here without a difference, and that what I say of cause and effect ought to have fallen under the same division with the speculation on the Course of Nature. There is, however, a slight distinction. The bare observation of the course of nature scarcely suggests the idea of causation. I believe the regular rising of the sun to be a part of the plan of the universe, but I do not look out for