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finality exhibited in the actions springing from the will? The designs which characterize the actions of man are known to spring from self-conscious intelligence. To what source shall we ascribe the finality which we have shown to characterize matter?

Finality in matter is due to a conscious force, or an unconscious force. There is no alternative. In choosing the latter, however, we are adopting the theory of Hartmann. Here the will, posited by Schopenhauer as the substance of mind and matter, is combined with the reason or intelligence posited by Hegel as the substance of all being, and we have as a result, the union of will and intelligence for the groundwork of all existence. But, since Hartmann regards consciousness as the result of the organism, consciousness cannot exist without an organism. This intelligent will, therefore, the source of all being, is unconscious. The operations of nature, then, are conducted as intelligence would conduct them, but the intelligence is not self-conscious. It is aware of neither means nor end. It is not even aware of its own activity.

The logic here can hardly be called indisputable, however, since it has never yet been proved that consciousness depends altogether upon the organism. It has never been shown that matter and motion are actually transmuted into perception, memory, imagination, thought.

But for the sake of the argument, let us admit that there is an unconscious intelligence immanent in the universe; that it is the all-pervading essence, while all differences are transitory; that it is the one reality, while all else is phenomenal ; that it is the perfection of existence, the Absolute, the Uncaused. The gem, the flower, the sunset, are all transformations of this substance. The statue, the picture, the poem, are all appearances put on by the Unconscious. But, having assumed such an existence, we must inquire whether this cause-unconscious intelligence-is capable of producing all these effects, self-conscious mind as well as an orderly universe.

If finality in nature is due to unconscious intelligence, if the parts of the eye come together with the purpose of pro

ducing sight but without being aware of this purpose, this finality must be due to a power somewhat analogous to the instinct of animals. Instinct works for ends without being in the least aware of the fact. The spider weaves its web, the bee gathers its honey, with no conscious design. If the action of matter forms the eye as the bird builds its nest, matter, like the bird, has a power of working for ends which are unknown to itself. When we say that matter forms the world according to design, but is not conscious of that design, we say that the present world is the result of instinct. But modern science regards instinct as only a lower form of intelligence. Instinct is only a tendency to adapt the organism to surrounding circumstances. A change in the environment produces a change in the habits of the animal. Whatever the origin of the primary instincts, their whole development is determined by the surroundings and by the laws of heredity. At best, instinct-unconscious intelligence-is governed by the circumstances, while reason conscious will has some control over circumstances. Instinct is moulded by external forces, intelligence is moulded by both external and internal forces. Unconscious intelligence, then, is a lower form of existence than conscious intelligence.

It is a well known principle that an effect cannot be greater than its cause. We can conceive of conscious intelligence creating conscious intelligence; but we cannot conceive of unconscious force creating conscious force. The one is capable of producing the effect, the other is not. In our search for a First Cause we are seeking one that is capable of accounting for all the facts-conscious mind as well as unconscious matter. Here we have, in an unconscious intelligence as cause, an hypothesis which does not explain all the phenomena. In the scientific world every such hypothesis is cast aside. The superiority of intelligence to instinct measures the inability of unconscious intelligence to account for conscious intelligence.

But by denying intelligence to this unconscious force, we might assume with Schopenhauer, that the will alone is an

adequate cause of all being. However much may be said in defence of will, or blind force, ruling the universe, it still remains true that the will to do necessitates the conscious choice.

We have already regarded will as a moving force, not as a guiding force. Although design is co-extensive with the will, the will did not originate the design. Will alone could not act as intelligent will would act. To say that will can act without intelligence is to say that will can act without a motive. This is impossible, and the motive itself necessitates knowledge which shall determine the motive. But since we have shown that finality is everywhere in the world, and since finality, design, purpose, is an attribute of nothing but intelligence, the final cause certainly could not derive its existence from the will alone, a source which has neither conscious nor unconscious intelligence.

We see, then, that the will, or the force, or the power, whatever its name, which works in the universe, through causes arranged as intelligence would arrange them, must be guided by intelligence, and by a self-conscious intelligence.

We have found that man uses the action of efficient causes as means for an end. We have seen, too, that the uniformity of law indicates that the effect of the action of efficient causes was a designed effect. But the further proof that the finality in matter can only be due to conscious mind reveals the fact that through law, efficient causes, the term common to both design and law, always become means for an end. It declares that as the designs of man are due to intelligent will, the uniformity of nature's laws must also be due to an inteligent will. It shows that not only does final cause depend upon the action of efficient causes, but that the action of efficient causes themselves must be determined by mind. The picture is the result of human agency, the flower is the result of super-human agency. Design is the expression of human intelligence. Law is the expression of Divine Intelligence.

In following a line of argument which proves that finality is universal, and in afterwards showing that this finality in matter must be due to conscious intelligence, we have already

deprived of their force many objections to the argument from design. To say that nature need not follow the same method in her works as man does in his, is hardly a valid objection to the intelligence of the Creator. That it is an argument from analogy is true. That the argument from analogy is frequently very questionable is also true. Yet, on the other hand, practically, many of our most positive inferences are deThe rived in this way, and can be derived in no other way. only evidence we have of the intelligence of our fellow-men The one mind of rests upon an argument from analogy. which we have an immediate knowledge is our own. works of other men lead us to infer that intelligence is the source, but we have no immediate knowledge of their intelligence. The more accurate the thought displayed in the book, the higher do we rank the intellect of the author. The same analogy which convinces us of the intelligence of our fellowmen exists to convince us of the intelligence of the First Cause. The world of science, literature, and art, convinces us of the intelligence of man; the universe of created matter, harmony, and law, convinces us of the intelligence of God.

The

Another objection to the argument from design, however, is advanced by those who maintain that the search for final causes hinders science, and turns attention from the study of efficient causes. This may be true. It is true. But it is just as true that science, in searching for final causes, is overstepping her boundaries. We ask science how the force of gravity acts. We do not expect science to tell us why the force of gravity exists. Efficient causes alone are the objects with which science is concerned. Final causes belong to an entirely different line of investigation. Moreover the inability to point out the final cause is no sign that it does not exist.

When, however, Mr. Mill says that intelligence implies contrivance, and that intelligence, consequently, implies a limitation of power, he formulates an objection often urged against the argument from design. The criticism applies, however, to the nature of the intelligence, not to the existence of intelligence. Although this objection applied to the present ar

gument is irrelevant, it still remains true that Mr. Mill overlooks the fact that will can choose. That the controlling will could accomplish its purpose by adaptation of means to ends as well as by direct fiat, does not seem to have occurred to him. If we grant the existence of design, we grant also that the possibility of fulfilling this design rests upon the alternative, direct fiat or the use of means and end. Why the Divine power did not decree instant perfection to the human race is no concern of ours. We only know that from the possible alternate the Divine Will did choose to use means to accomplish the end.

Again, when Mr. Mill says that discord and disorder are evidences of a less admirable contrivance, he assumes either that the means are not suitable to the design, or that the design is not what it should be. But what are the data which justify us in assuming the one or the other in declaring that the means are inadequate, or the design imperfect? We have not attempted to prove that some particular design exists in this created world. We have merely maintained that

The character of the design
The argument is concerned.

design of some sort does exist. we have not even tried to show. only with the intelligence of God, not with His moral qualities. Yet, even after following a different logical process and demonstrating a benevolent God, it is evident that we should not set up a particular design a priori, and then, finding facts opposed to our theory, declare that the means are not sufficient to accomplish the end. The shot which aims to destroy the evidence of design is wide of the mark when it hits, instead, the means of accomplishing the design.

But here comes the evolutionist with his mass of nebular mist condensed into shape by the action of an incident force. He attacks the historic arguments, and deems them vanquished at a single blow. Scarcely does he glance at the battle-ground, not even does he care to re-inforce his position, when, suddenly, he finds himself powerless. His ammunition has only served to increase the strength of the enemy.

Grant that evolution is the method of creation; grant that

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