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dency to reaction. The only possible great movement now is toward reunion, which is not sensational. The bringing about of agreements does not agitate men like the bringing about of differences. The activity of the church is in its dividing rather than its reuniting, the latter being growth or accretion, which is slow and not convulsive.

movements.

Another difficulty preventing great uprisings is the circumstance that the people have the facts as soon as the preacher, so that there is not the ignorance necessary for universal By relying on the press instead of the pulpit for information, men anticipate movements and discuss them as laymen as ably as do ecclesiastics. No class can come to another class with anything very new in religion; and since we are acquainted with events in their causes long before they occur, we are not the subject of surprises so much as formerly; and important matters do not receive universal attention at once, which is necessary for sensational movements. Such world wide awakenings as those of Wesley, Luther, Huss, and Peter the Hermit, would be impossible now.

Modern sensations will, therefore, be generally individual rather than connectional, identified with a man or event rather than a denomination, and will have only a proportionate magnitude. They may, however, for that reason be more numerous, so that church interest becomes thereby distributed Instead of Methodism, Presbyterianism and Catholicism, the sensations are Beecher, Moody, Prohibition, or some other subject affecting mainly a congregation or a day. One may make a sensation of himself if he cannot of his church (which now approaches other churches and is too much approached by them). Sensational preaching, sensational services, and sensational Sunday school and pastoral work are among the means for this. He must be a poor clergyman who cannot do something to interest his people; and if the people of every congregation are interested the whole will be interested, and the benefits of a great organization measurably attained without reliance on the organization. Since the individualizing of Christianity the individuals themselves must get up the inter

est instead of relying on the whole. There is no end of possible sensations calculated to hold the children, from whom memberships may be formed. In fact, keeping the people instead of gaining them, is the line in which effective church work is now to be done; a change which becomes necessary when a church is once established, and the masses as a whole have been swept in. The church having the new generation must see to not letting them go. It becomes in this age conservative instead of aggressive. If Methodism did not let its children fall, it would not need to convert very many. Nursery work would dispense with revival work. The Roman Church makes its progress by holding its own its natural increase. It is only the first age of a church that need be its missionary age. The following ages should be educational. Methodism makes the mistake of keeping up too exclusively its revival agencies when it has already revived the people, instead of changing itself into a sensational upbuilding church. Austin Bierbower.

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ARTICLE XV.

The Relation of Memory and Conscience.

THE essential condition of that state which we call Heaven, is invariably assumed to be one of perfect happiness. But if our individual Consciousness is unchanged by our entrance upon another stage of existence, we cannot reflect upon this conception of perfect happiness without encountering the question, What is to be done with the memory of things painful to recall? Those theologies which teach the endless misery of some souls, have a double difficulty to meet in the continuous action of memory; their dogma must give rise not only to unhappiness in the remembrance of past evil, but of past good.

A variety of reconciling theories have been offered, none of which sees satisfactory. To say that,

"Some draught of Lethe must await
The slipping through from state to state,"

is only starting a new question which involves as great psychologic as moral difficulties, since self-identification must be lost if Memory "sleeps the sleep that knows no waking." The form the question takes with Universalists is fully stated in Question thirteen of Mr. H. W. Ballou's article in the QUARTERLY for July, 1883: "Will the memory of past sins make man unhappy, when he has ceased to do evil and learned. to do well, and realizes that God has made even the sins of men to minister to His benevolent designs, and that what they meant for evil He meant for good, thus making all things praise Him? and if so, will he not be unhappy while memory lasts?" The substance of this question was also discussed in the QUARTERLY for July, 1879, in the "General Review," but no decisive answer was given.

It is my object to give an answer based upon our present knowledge and experience, involving no change fundamental to our present mental constitution, to indicate how complete happiness is attainable under conditions now assumed to be known.

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The question narrows itself to the relation between Memory and Conscience, because we are considering Heaven only in its moral aspect, happiness only so far as it is contingent upon moral conditions; but psychologically the question is the relation of Memory and Emotion, and the difficulties that have prevented a solution of the question, arise from the in correct assumption that Memory is the cause of emotion, whereas it will be found on reflection that memory is not the cause, but only the antecedent, of emotion. For, first, we remember many things without any emotion; second, the same memory may not only antecede different emotions in different persons, but different, and even opposite emotions in the same person; third, the fact may be recalled without any of the emotion formerly excited.

What, then, is the direct cause of emotion? or, perhaps more correctly, What is the causal link between memory and

emotion? It seems to me to consist in the ethical or æsthetical relation sustained to the fact as a cause of pleasure or pain. A present fact must excite pleasure or pain, or it will not awaken emotion, and the emotion varies with the effect as to intensity. In the moral order pleasure or pain depends upon our ethical relation to the act. Shame is an emotion arising from the ethical relation of guilt; remorse is a more complex emotion having the same source, if the connection were immediate between memory and emotion it would be indissoluble, and man would never be freed from that deepest of hells, the hell to be his own accuser." But since the connective is variable psychologically, it remains to be seen how the ethico-psychological change is effected.

It is necessary to the understanding of what I conceive to be the nature of this change, to distinguish between remorse and disapprobation. So long as guilt remains the consequent emotions remain, but when guilt is removed by repentance and forgiveness, and by amending the evil we have done, we remove it so far as is possible,-- then in proportion to the completeness with which this is done our remorse is lessened. We do not consequently, however, feel any gratification from our wrong act, but with our moral growth our disapprobation increases. To feel any complacency in a wrong act is to nullify our repentance, and to refer the remedial good to a wrong source; for the evil has not been causatively productive of good, but a power has interposed which has intercepted the consequences of our evil act, and effected results different from the unrestricted action of the evil. The good is not in the evil, but the good by its own activity destroys and displaces the evil. The weeds which are removed to make way for a wheat crop might as well claim to be the cause of the crop as evil to be the cause of good.

When, by the destruction of the remotest consequences of evil evolved in our act, our ethical relation to it is wholly changed, then there will remain only the memory of the deed to guard us against its repetition, and strengthen our moral perception. The happiness we gain by this perfect reconcilia

tion with the Supreme Righteousness implies no abatement of memory; without memory we might indeed be perfectly happy and perfectly justified, but we should have no consciousness of the relation between our present and past conditions. Perfect happiness and unchanged consciousness are, however, only reconcilable for all beings on the ground of our faith, that evil will be finally and forever destroyed. If any evil remained then there would remain the fear that some of the guilt of that evil attached to us, through the evil activities our deeds had animated. There would then be no Heaven, for the truth is not that the abolition of Hell is the abolition of Heaven, as not a few teachers of endless torment have affirmed; but unless Hell is abolished, there can be no perfect Heaven. We shall enter upon the "joys which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived," when the conquest of evil is complete, when "old things have passed away and all things have been made new" through the reconciliation of man the child with God the Father.

Georgianne E. Watson.

ARTICLE XVI.

"The New Covenant."

The New Covenant. Volume I. The Four Gospels. By J. W. Hanson, D.D. Boston and Chicago: Universalist Publishing House. 1884.

THE Introduction to this work contains an interesting and generally accurate summary of the defects and merits of the Established and Revised Versions, the purpose and method of the translator, his judgment of the value of the chief codices and editions of the New Testament. He rightly regards the edition of Westcott and Hort as the one most nearly approaching perfection. On page vii. is the inaccurate statement that only eight manuscripts, none clder than the tenth century, were accessible in the days of King James. Codices Bezae and

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