"Some draught of Lethe must await
The slipping through from state to state,"

is only starting a new question which involves as great psychologic as moral difficulties, since self-identification must be lost if Memory "sleeps the sleep that knows no waking." The form the question takes with Universalists is fully stated in Question thirteen of Mr. H. W. Ballou's article in the QUARTERLY for July, 1883: "Will the memory of past sins make man unhappy, when he has ceased to do evil and learned to do well, and realizes that God has made even the sins of men to minister to His benevolent designs, and that what they meant for evil He meant for good, thus making all things praise Him? and if so, will he not be unhappy while memory lasts?" The substance of this question was also discussed in the QUARTERLY for July, 1879, in the "General Review," but no decisive answer was given.

It is my object to give an answer based upon our present knowledge and experience, involving no change fundamental to our present mental constitution, - to indicate how complete happiness is attainable under conditions now assumed to be known.

The question narrows itself to the relation between Memory and Conscience, because we are considering Heaven only in its moral aspect, happiness only so far as it is contingent upon moral conditions; but psychologically the question is the relation of Memory and Emotion, and the difficulties that have prevented a solution of the question, arise from the in correct assumption that Memory is the cause of emotion, whereas it will be found on reflection that memory is not the cause, but only the antecedent, of emotion. For, first, we remember many things without any emotion; second, the same memory may not only antecede different emotions in different persons, but different, and even opposite emotions in the same person; third, the fact may be recalled without any of the emotion formerly excited.

What, then, is the direct cause of emotion? or, perhaps more correctly, What is the causal link between memory and

emotion? It seems to me to consist in the ethical or æsthetical relation sustained to the fact as a cause of pleasure or pain. A present fact must excite pleasure or pain, or it will not awaken emotion, and the emotion varies with the effect as to intensity. In the moral order pleasure or pain depends upon our ethical relation to the act. Shame is an emotion arising from the ethical relation of guilt; remorse is a more complex emotion having the same source, if the connection were immediate between memory and emotion it would be indissoluble, and man would never be freed from that deepest of hells, the hell to be his own accuser." But since the connective is variable psychologically, it remains to be seen how the ethico-psychological change is effected.

It is necessary to the understanding of what I conceive to be the nature of this change, to distinguish between remorse and disapprobation. So long as guilt remains the consequent emotions remain, but when guilt is removed by repentance and forgiveness, and by amending the evil we have done, we remove it so far as is possible,-- then in proportion to the completeness with which this is done our remorse is lessened. We do not consequently, however, feel any gratification from our wrong act, but with our moral growth our disapprobation increases. To feel any complacency in a wrong act is to nullify our repentance, and to refer the remedial good to a wrong source; for the evil has not been causatively productive of good, but a power has interposed which has intercepted the consequences of our evil act, and effected results different from the unrestricted action of the evil. The good is not in the evil, but the good by its own activity destroys and displaces the evil. The weeds which are removed to make way for a wheat crop might as well claim to be the cause of the crop as evil to be the cause of good.

When, by the destruction of the remotest consequences of evil evolved in our act, our ethical relation to it is wholly changed, then there will remain only the memory of the deed to guard us against its repetition, and strengthen our moral perception. The happiness we gain by this perfect reconcilia

tion with the Supreme Righteousness implies no abatement of memory; without memory we might indeed be perfectly happy and perfectly justified, but we should have no consciousness of the relation between our present and past conditions. Perfect happiness and unchanged consciousness are, however, only reconcilable for all beings on the ground of our faith, that evil will be finally and forever destroyed. If any evil remained then there would remain the fear that some of the guilt of that evil attached to us, through the evil activities our deeds had animated. There would then be no Heaven, for the truth is not that the abolition of Hell is the abolition of Heaven, as not a few teachers of endless torment have affirmed; but unless Hell is abolished, there can be no perfect Heaven. We shall enter upon the "joys which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived," when the conquest of evil is complete, when "old things have passed away and all things have been made new" through the reconciliation of man the child with God the Father.

Georgianne E. Watson.

ARTICLE XVI.

"The New Covenant."

The New Covenant. Volume I. The Four Gospels. By J. W. Hanson, D.D. Boston and Chicago: Universalist Publishing House. 1884.

THE Introduction to this work contains an interesting and generally accurate summary of the defects and merits of the Established and Revised Versions, the purpose and method of the translator, his judgment of the value of the chief codices and editions of the New Testament. He rightly regards the edition of Westcott and Hort as the one most nearly approaching perfection. On page vii. is the inaccurate statement that only eight manuscripts, none clder than the tenth century, were accessible in the days of King James. Codices Bezae and

Claromontanus, both of the sixth century, were, as early as 1582, in the possession of Beza, on whose edition (1598) of the Greek Testament the authors of the King James Version largely relied.

If

1. It is of the first importance to determine the text. No accurate translation can be made from an inaccurate text. The author regards Sinaiticus and Vaticanus and the Greek Test. of Westcott and Hort of the highest authority. Two courses were open to the translator. Confiding in the judgment of the editors, he could have simply rendered as accurately as possible the text they place before him; or he could enter the lists as a competitor with them for the honor of reproducing most nearly the autographs of the New Testament books. It is greatly to be regretted that the latter alternative was chosen. The task demands a fulness of critical apparatus far exceeding the ability of any one man to collect and master. It requires a delicacy in the weighing of evidence which can only be obtained by long training and complete familiarity with the whole ground traversed. Sin. and Vat. were the only first-class sources of the text, with Alex. as a secondary source, yet holding the balance of power, and other codices, versions, patristic citations, could be left out of account, the problems before the textual critic would be simple and easily solved. But no one can study the three hundred pages which Dr. Hort devotes to a presentation of the problems and methods of textual criticism in Vol. ii. of Westcott and Hort's Greek Testament, or examine the essay of Dr. Warfield on the same topic, in Dr. Schaff's "Compan panion to the Greek Testament," without seeing how infinitely complex the problems may become, and how patient and delicate must be their handling. This attention the author has not been willing to bestow, and as a consequence, the text he adopts is far inferior to that of Alford, Tischendorf, or Westcott and Hort.

(a) The author sometimes adheres to the readings of the Authorized Version, though they are contrary to those of Sin. and Vat. and the critical editions. Here belong John iv. 36,

NEW SERIES. VOL. XXI.

14

where the word "also" is retained; Luke vi. 48, where "upon the rock" is given, though the phrase, ènì tηy nétqav, is absent from Sin. and Vat. In Luke ii. 14 we read "good will among men," though evdoxías is the reading of Sin., Vat., W. and H., and the Revised Version. A notable instance is Mark vii. 16, which whole verse is inserted on the authority of Alex., while Sin., Vat., and modern editors omit it. In Luke vi. 9, the weakly attested reading of Griesbach, inoxreiva, "to kill," is retained, while codices Sin., Vat., Bezae, and following them, Lachmann, Tisch., and Westcott and Hort have aлoléoal, "to destroy." Other examples might be given.

(b) Undue weight is given to the readings of Codex Sinaiticus. Tischendorf, the discoverer of the Codex, has been justly charged with partiality toward his " darling." But here Tischendorf himself is surpassed. An instance of this is John xx. 31, where the word "æonian," aivov, is inserted, which is rejected by Tisch. Here may be mentioned Matt. xii. 30, where, against the judgment of Westcott and Hort, and Tisch.," me," ue is introduced. The same is true of John iii. 5, where we read ideiv, "see the reign of heaven," instead of loveir, "enter": 31, iv. 24. It is especially in the Gospel according to John that this undue preference is manifest. Chapters iv., vii., viii., xi., contain many instances.

(c) There are omissions of words or phrases. At John iv. 6, ovras, "thus" is wanting, which is all the more siguificant since it undoubtedly occasions a real difficulty, and is relied upon by Matthew Arnold and other critics, as proof that the author had certain logia or sayings concerning Jesus, which he inserted, sometimes unskillfully, into his narrative. Luke i. 65, the words, dihakeiro navra, are omitted entirely from the translation. In Matthew ii. 9, autous," them," is omitted.

(d) There are traces of haste and want of care. One reads on page xii. of the Introduction: "The words in Italics are found either in the Sinaitic, or Vatican, or both, and are not in the Greek of Westcott and Hort." The author, it is to be assumed, intended to state the matter correctly, but he either forgot to exercise due care, or changed his method.

As a