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of the author's previous works, “ Bible Proofs,” “ Bible Threatenings Explained,” and “ Aion." This republication will cause the really valuable matter of those earlier works to reach a larger circle of readers. Of the remaining half, some twenty pages consist of citations from Drs. Paige, Clarke, Thayer, Demarest and others, in support of the positions taken, and are both useful and generally convincing. The remainder, some fifteen or twenty pages, is new, original matter. Much of it is good. But some blemishes should at once be remedied.
On page 4 it is said that in the earlier part of the Revised New Testament, the phrase nevévua dylov is usually rendered Holy Spirit. But this is an error.
On page 17 it is affirmed that “ Greek had been the prevailing language of Judea for several centuries.” Since the introduction of Greek dates from the era of the Ptolemics and the Seleucidæ, the word “ several” is clearly out of place, while as to the adjective prevailing, we are informed by the author, on page 329, that “ the cominon speech of the Jewish people had become a corrupt dialect, Syro-Chaldaic' or “ Aramaic.'”
On page 75 we are informed that the oldest Targum is that of Jonathan Ben Uzziel. This is news indeed. That of Onkelos on the Pentateuch has hitherto counted as the first.
On the same page the date of the latest writings of the Old Testament Apocrypha is put as 150 B.C., and the next page contains a statement to the same effect. But 1 Maccabees brings the history of the Asmoncan family down to 135 B.C., and was not written until after the death of John Hyrcanus, 107 B.C., and 2 Maccabees is of later origin still.
On 219 one reads that the Gemara Babylonicum was written“ probably during the Babylonish captivity," and, some lines below, that it was written during the seventy years' captivity, that is, between 588 and 537 B.C. But this is surely about a thousand years too early.
The author had before him a task of the utmost difficulty and delicacy; the greatest wonder is that he had the courage
to undertake it. The ground to be traversed is so vast, and yet the knowledge demanded so minute, detailed, accurate, that a certain measure of failure was inevitable. And while recognizing gladly many excellencies, judgment must be rendered that we have here no really important addition either to the list of translations extant or to our own denominational literature.
Prof. H. P. Forbes.
Reaffirmation of the Universalist Exegesis of 2 Cor. V. 10.
In my original article on “ Certain Controverted Texts of Scripture," but little space was devoted to the one above cited. The aim was merely to justily, from the Greek original, the position usually taken by our writers, that the words “ done” and “ in,” supplied by the Common Version, really had no right there. This position was confirmed, not only from the most obvious construction of the Greek text, but by the renderings of two of the most ancient and most valued of the early versions, the Peshito Syriac, and Latin Vulgate. It was especially insisted upon that, in the phrase "may receive the things,” etc., the term "things” (Gr. tà), as object of the verb, must be considered as the things received, and not things done, this word being supplied. This was confirmed from Dr. Barnes, wlio, as to what the term “things,” here used, ineans, replies: “ The appropriate reward of the actions of this life." If, then, the word "things” means the reward, it cannot mean “ the things done,” and if it means the reward, it must be the reward received, since it is the object of the verb “receive,” expressing what is received. Instead of this, the Common Version assumes that it is the things done” which are received, which is pure nonsense. If the Common Version had read, “may receive reward for the things done,” it would at least make good
seuse out of the phrase ; but the Gr. Text, normally construed, expresses no such idea. We inust thus, with Dr. Barnes, take the term “things” in the sense of reward, and of reward received. Yet Dr. Barnes, of course, holds the common orthodox view of the passage in question.
Now, to avoid the force of this reasoning, it is liged that the verb “ receive," here, actually in volves the whole idea given above: “may receive reward for," etc. ; and two texts are cited for justification of this construction (Col. iii. 25 ; Eph. vi. 8). Yet these passages afford not a particle of ground for such construction, nor are they thus construed by the great mass of exegetes. Take the first cited (Col. iii. 25): “But he that doeth wrong shall receive (for) the wrong which he hath done.” Here, the word “ for” is supplied. Literally, we should translate : “ he that doeth wrong shall receive the wrong, which he hath done.” As will be seen, " the wrong," here, is the object of the verb " receive.” That which Winer ineans, in his note on this text, is, that “the wrong" is to be taken in the sense of reward ; " lic shall receive back the wrong, in the shape of reward.” This is precisely the sense of the things," in 2 Cor. v. 10: "may receive the things”; i. e. the reward. But does the verb “ receive,” in Col. iji. 23, include in itself the notion of “ reward for?” By no means. It has the sense of “shall receive," and nothing more. That which is received is expressed in the verb's object, “the wrong," i. e. in the shape of reward. according to Winer's note. Precisely the same remarks apply to Eph. vi. 8: "whatsoever good thing any man doeth, the same (good thing, in the shape of reward) siiall he receive.” Does the verb " receive,” here used, include the notion of " reward for?” Noi at all; that which is received is not expressed in the verb, but in its object. To make Winer, Athenagoras, or any other critic, responsible for the former idea, is to do him the greatest injustice. Yet it is claimed that the verb “receivo,” in 2 Cor. v. 10, does include the sense o “reward for," and the two texts above are cited in justification of it. They afford not a particle of
proof of it ; and this I have insisted upon before. In each of these three texts, the word receive” has its regular object, expressing what is received ; namely, the reward ; this is not expressed in the verb.
I have said thus much in reply to Pres. Cone's “ Rejoinder," in the Quarterly for January, 1884. Having quoted the two texts, Col. iii. 25, and Eph. vi. 8, as parallel to the one in question, he remarks: “ Take out the idea of reward from its verb in each of these passages, and what intelligible notion do they convey ?” My reply is, that “the idea of reward," in these three passages, is not oxpressed in "its verb,” is not contained in nor denoted by “its verb," which means ceive," and nothing more. The 6 idea of reward” in cach of these three texts is expressed only in the object of " its verb.” The sole function of the verb, here, is to express the notion of " receive," while the sole function of the verb's object, here, is to express that which is received ; i. c. the re-. ward, or that which is to be taken in the sense of reward, “ the wrong," the “good thing,” or “the things.” Is not my critic able to distinguish here, between these two functions ? the one of the verb, the other of its object? If not, it is useless to discuss this point further with him. But I repeat it, in none of these texts, does the verb) * receive” take any other sense but " receive"; that of reward, which is received, is expressed by its object.
But Pres. Cone has favored us now, with the very words of a recognized authority, in support of his position ; namely, Dr. Griinın, in his Clavis Novi Testamenti, who says: “xouiGeohu id quod fecit, facti vel præmium vel pænam,” which Pres. Cone renders : " to receive that which he has done, to receive the reward or penalty.” Under this, Grimm cites our three texts as examples. Now, what does this author mean liere ? that the verü - to receive" takes also the sense of reward for,” according to Pres. Cone? No; the farthest from it possible. He means simply that, to receive “ the wrong,” in Col. iii. 25, or “the good thing done,” in Eph. vi. 8, or “the things done,” in 2 Cor. v. 10; —" to receive the
reward or penalty,” in each instance; and this is precisely what Winer meant, and no more, in his note before cited by me. Grimm takes 2 Cor. v. 10, for an example, only because he assumes that the word done, in " the things done," is a part of the text, the same as “the wrong" received, in Col. iii. 25. But taking it for granted, a moment, that Grimm attaches to tlie verb " receive,” here, the sense also of “ reward for,” according to Pres. Cone, let us test this by introducing the extra idea, thus : “ To receive (reward for) that which he has done = to receive (reward for) the reward or penalty.” This operation, it will be seen, wholly changes the sense of the first clause, and utterly destroys the sense of the last clause. It is evident, then, that my critic las mistaken the aim of his authority, just as he has Winer's note and the passage from Athenagoras; not one of them gives the least support to his extra idea attached to the verb " receive." But the worst of all is, that Grimm's statement overthrows Pres. Cone's exegesis of 2 Cor. v. 10, and establishes mine, even granting the word done as regular, thus : “ the things done,” here =" the reward or penalty,” the same as "the wrong," or the good thing” done, in the other examples. Consequently “ may receive the things done, in the body," – " to receive the reward or penalty, in the body," ctc. I am satisfied with this if my opponent likes it. It will be per. ceived that both Grimın and Winer reject the sense usually attached to the words, - things done in the body," which is, “ the deeds done in the body.” Instead of this Grimm and Winer interpret “ the things done,” as “ reward received in the body," the same as “ the wrong" and the “ good thing" done is the reward received in the other two examples. As in these other examples, “ the things done,” in 2 Cor. v. 10, express what is received, and this is thic reward or penalty ; precisely that which I have maintained from the first; this reward or penalty being received either in the body or through the body, just as my critic prefers. Grimin's allthority for the Universalist exegesis of this text is thus very important, for which we are indebted to Pres. Cone.