to counteract that union of sentiment, which, with him we feel anxious to promote. On two of the three points in which he comprises the whole ground of the dispute, viz. the discrimination between figurative and literal language, and the character in which men are contemplated in the provision of an atonement, we think he has laid a solid basis for an agreement in opinion. And we have little to regret respecting this part of his work, except that he did not, in an additional chapter, bring the principles which he has so fully established, to bear on the parties by a distinct and direct pressure towards the point of union. To the distinction, however, which he makes between atonement and merit, we strongly suspect that his brethren, from whom he differs, will not subscribe, and that if there be any real defect in the work, which secures the failure of his design, it consists in this distinction, and in the points which it involves. We had therefore spared ourselves and our readers much labour, had we not hoped to contribute something toward an amicable adjustment of the contro versy. We profess not the skill, nor do we entertain the hope, of reconciling by explanation or construction, many of the over-statements of rash and prejudiced combatants, nor indeed of showing the consistency between all the positions and inferences which the more sober-minded disputants have adopted. But we flatter ourselves that those statements of their views, which are made with caution and discrimination, made to exhibit truth, rather than to defend the minute points of subtle disputation, may be so explained to the satisfaction of each of the parties, that whatever objections either may have to the terms used by the other, their opinions on some points of the discussion will not be considered as greatly at variance. Indeed we are much deceived, if the magnitude and importance of the dispute may not be greatly diminished, and the whole ground of controversy narrowed to a single point. We shall therefore conclude by stating some of the more prominent points of controversy, with those explanations which may serve to shew to what extent diversity of opinion exists, and tend to unite the parties at issue. To the great question, for whom did Christ die? there is at least one answer in which the parties will agree, viz. he died for the elect. The following, and similar passages of scripture, are relied upon to prove that Christ died for the elect: "I lay down my life for the sheep." "The church which he purchased with his own blood." It is, however, admitted that 'these and such like passages do not in so many words declare that he died for no others.' And if they in any way imply that Christ did die only for the elect, it is difficult to see why the declaration of Paul, "who loved me, and gave himself for me," does not also imply that he died for none but the apostle. As a fair specimen of the strength of this argument, we give the following from the Christian's Magazine: "The sheep for whom Christ laid down his life, are those who, in time, believe in his name. Ye believe not because ye are not of my sheep. The assertion settles three points, 1. No one who does not belong to Christ's sheep, shall ever, in fact, believe. 2. Every one who belongs to this fold doth believe. 3. Those who do in fact believe, are the very persons for whom he laid down his life; HIS SHEEP." Now the truth of the above position, and the force of the argument by which it is supported, will be readily admitted by both parties. Christ did die for his sheep, for the elect, for all who shall ever believe, whether he died for others in any sense or not. It is also agreed, as Dr. G. admits, p. 211, that God would not have provided an atonement, "if he had not determined to * Vol. iii. p. 436. We shall refer to sevthe ablest discussion published in this coun eral essays in this work on the subject, as try on this side of the question bestow the gift of faith and consequent salvation on the elect." If then the inquiry respect the grand design and ultimate end of the atonement, that without which it would not have been made, and that of course on account of which it was in the highest sense made, the answer of both parties is the same, viz. the actual sanctification and salvation of the elect. 66 2. It is agreed that the salvation of the elect was not the whole end or design of the atonement. "Other ends besides the salvation of the elect," say the Editors of the Magazine, are indeed answered by the atonement." "By the atonement God is glorified." "Sinners are left without excuse by the atonement of Christ." "Sinners are left without excuse, because a great portion of the damned are gospel despisers.— Men who hear the doctrine of the atonement taught do not believe itwho have the bible do not love it who are required to ask salvation through a redeemer, but do not comply with the commandment-men to whom the blessings of the gospel, eternal life in Christ Jesus have been affectionately offered, and yet make light of it."* Whether therefore the parties can agree in the specification of all the "other ends" of the atonement, beside the salvation of the elect, or not, they agree in the general fact, that there were "other ends." They agree also to some extent in the specification of these other ends; particularly that sinners are without excuse for rejecting "the blessings of the gospel, eternal life in Christ Jesus," which "have been affectionately offered,"-" through a redeemer." 3. "By the atonement," say the same writers, we mean, that which effectually removes the offence of sin, and procures for the sinner reconciliation with God." In this definition, however, they cannot intend to include the whole design and efficacy of the atonement, for it leaves out 4. Another part of the controversy respects the imputation of sin to the surety. That Christ bore our sins in his own body on the tree, will be readily admitted by both parties.— The question is, in what sense did he bear them? One answers, "he did not bear them as a mass of matter bound upon his body. He did not bear them as immoral qualities, tinging his soul with pollution. They became his by a legal transfer. He bore them by imputation. He be came a public representative, and pp. 378, 379. thus our guilt our liability to punishment was laid upon him."* Let us now hear Dr. G. who undoubtedly speaks the sentiments on the opposite side of the question: "Christ," says he, "was treated as a sinner on our account. I plead for a practical imputation, and deny only a legal one. Nor do I make it consist in the effects of sin and righteousness. I fully admit the imputation of sin as to every practical purpose. But such an imputation as made Christ guilty in the eye of the law, I do not understand." Now as it respects a legal transfer, in what do these writers differ, except in the meaning which they attach to terms? Neither main tains that our sins are so imputed to Christ, as to be his in the same sense in which they are ours; in other words, so as to pollute his moral character. But if the imputation of our sins to Christ did not make him a sinner in the same sense in which we are sinners, what more could be true, than that he was treated as a sinner on our account; what more can be meant by imputation or legal transfer? But it is said that "our guilt was laid upon him." By this remark, the writers do not mean that Christ became the subject of personal ill-desert, which stained his soul with moral pollution; they do not mean that the ill-desert, which is the ground or reason of our exposure to punishment, was so laid on Christ, that he was obnoxious to punishment for precisely the same reasons that we are, i. e. as the actual perpetrator of our crimes; for by our guilt, they explain themselves to mean "our liability to punishment." Nor do they mean that the obedience and sufferings of Christ did in themselves render our punishment inossible, for they maintain that the c trience and sufferings of Christ wots have been wholly in vain apart from the covenant with the Father. But the parties will certainly agree that the Fa p. 92. *p. 378. ther covenanted with the Son to deliver some from punishment on the condition of his obedience unto death, aud that thus their liability to punishment (not their personal ill-desert,) was taken away. 5. It is maintained by one of the parties that it would be unjust to condemn those for whom an atonement is made. This mode of speaking is one for which the writers in support of a limited atonement, seem to have a strong partiality, and one to which their opponents have as strong an aversion. The question is, what are the ideas intended to be conveyed by this phraseology, and whether in these the parties will not unite? And here it is necessary to enquire whether a transaction can be spoken of as just, in more senses, than one, or whether justice is exercised toward different objects? We have already answered this question in our remarks on the different operations of justice, and we are happy to find that in these views we substantially agree with the writers last quoted. "But however variously," say they, "divine justice may be exercised about its several objects, we have no reason to believe that there are three different attributes of justice, or even that the principle in man which induces him to act honestly in commercial transactions, and to give to every man his due is any way different from the principle which influences a good magistrate to conduct with equity his public administration. It is one principle exercised upon various objects." Upon what object then is justice in the present case exercised, or what is the precise nature of the obligation which renders it unjust to condemn those for whom Christ died? The writers last alluded to, as we have seen, have abundantly declared, that the sufferings of Christ "abstractedly considered" would have been in vain-that their whole value depended on the covenant of the Father. The justice Vid. C. M. Vol. III, pp. 685, 688. ↑ Page 679. * concession in some form may be found in almost every writer who advocates a limited atonement. "It is a common observation," say the Editors of the Christian's Magazine, "that the blood of Jesus, is abstractedly consid And if, by this expression, it is in- therefore which binds the Father to save any is that operation or exercise of justice which respects the fulfilment of covenants. Of course that operation or exercise of justice which respects personal merit, or merit which exists independently of all covered of such value as to save worlds. enants, is not the exercise of justice intended, when it is said that justice requires the salvation of the elect. This is justice in the commutative exercise of that attribute, or justice as it obliges to the fulfilment of promises or covenants. And to this meaning of the declaration, that justice requires the salvation at least of the elect, our readers will see that neither Dr. G. nor ourselves object; and we think that none who advocate a general atonement would object. Whether it would be unjust in the sense now explained to condemn any for whom atonement is made, must depend wholly on the fact whether the atonement and the promise to save, are coextensive. That there is a sense in which God is (faithful and) JUST to forgive us our sins, if we confess our sins, is undeniable; a sense too in which the parties agree. as we understand it, is really all we can ask on this point. If Christ by his obedience and death, conferred infinite honour on the divine law, and satisfied divine justice to the utmost, then no more honour to the law, nor satisfaction to the justice of God can be necessary to constitute an ample provision for the salvation of all men. If the obedience and death of Christ had been sufficient to save all men, had it been designed actually to save all men, then it must be sufficient without such a design. A feast that is sufficient for ten men, is sufficient for them, whether it be designed for five or for ten. No design respect ing the number of partakers could alter the quantity of food, or its rela tive sufficiency to the wants of a giv en number. We know not but there is some concealed ambiguity in the term sufficient as used by the conten ding parties. If by this term it is meant by one, that the death of Christ had actually sufficed for, i. e. secured the salvation of all had it been so designed, still this cannot be true, unless there was a sufficiency for the purpose without such a design. The purpose to save all, or the want of such a purpose must leave the obe 6. We now come to a more important point in the controversy, viz. did Christ die for none but the elect? We have already seen that the parties agree that Christ did not die for any in the same sense in which he died for the elect, that he did not die with the design actually to save the nonelect; that he did die actually to save the elect, that so peculiarly for the elect did he die, that had there been no design actually to save them, he would not have died. We have also seen, that the parties are agreed in the general position, that "other ends besides the salvation of the elect are answered by the atonement."-dience and sufferings of Christ still Nor will either deny that whatever ends were answered by his death, those ends were designed. Further it is admitted, or at least it is not denied by those who maintain the limitation of the atonement, that it is sufficient for the salvation of the whole world had it been so designed. This the same on the end had been designed and accomplished, it is not pretended that the sufferings of Christ must have been increased ; and therefore they would have been su ficient for the end, though the end * Page 378. were not designed. Indeed so far as we are acquainted with this part of the subject those who maintain the sufficiency of the atonement for all men, maintain nothing more in this respect than that the obedience and death of Christ conferred "infinite honour on the divine law and satisfied divine justice to the utmost." On the point then whether the death of Christ be sufficient for the salvation of all men, the parties are agreed. Nor can there be any diversity of opinion on the point whether this degree of sufficiency itself, was designed. If it be a fact that the death of Christ is sufficient for the purpose in question, if it be a fact that it conferred infinite honour on the divine law and satisfied divine justice to the utmost, such was the purpose of God. The next question is, was any end answered by the death of Christ, except the salvation of the elect, any with respect to the non-elect? This question, as we have already seen, is decided in the affirmative. "Other ends besides the salvation of the elect are answered by the atonement."Some of these ends are specified and agreed to by both parties. It is then a conceded point, that the ends of an atonement are not necessarily confined to the elect. What are these "other ends" of the atonement; or, to bring the inquiry to the single point to be decided, did God, by an atonement, design to make, and actually make such a provision for the salvation of all men, that, on the ground of the sufficiency of that atonement, he truly offers pardon and eternal life to all men, who, as agents, will believe? This we conceive to be the real and only point of difference in which mere explanation of terms would not effectually reconcile the sincere inquirers after truth, who are engaged in the present controversy. And here too we think the parties must unite, if they will abide by their own principles. They certainly agree, that all who will believe shall be saved, that the offer of pardon and life is affectionately made to Vol. II....No. III. 20 all, that there is a designed sufficiency in the atonement for the salvation of all, so far as the claims of law and justice are concerned, and that men are bound, as agents, to believe.— These points are sufficiently supported by the quotations we have made, except the last; to support which we cite the following passage: "What is the amount of that expression: in the mouth of some, a flaunting excuse, and of others, a bitter complaint-I cannot?--The inability created, the necessity imposed, by the ENMITY of the carnal mind against God? It is the inability of wickedness, and of nothing else. Instead of being an apology, it is itself the essential crime, and can never become its own vindication."* And now what more is necessary to constitute a real offer to men, as agents, of pardon and eternal life, on the ground of an ample provision? Here is the offer the ample provision in the sufficiency of Christ's obedience unto death. Here are the agents, prevented from believing by nothing but the inability of wickedness.— Here is the condition, and here is the promise. Such is the matter of fact; and now, did God design it should be so? If he did, then the mission of the Lord Jesus Christ into this world was designed to answer other ends besides the salvation of the elect, and one of these ends was, that the world through him MIGHT be saved. We intended to have shewn how far the controversy results from ascribing consequences to an opinion, which are denied by the party who holds that opinion; and that to a considerable extent, explanation would show that they are not legitimate consequences from it. We have only room to remark, that the distinction which we have made between the general benevolence and the general justice of God, effectually relieves the doctrine of an unlimited atonement from the imputation of leading to the doctrine of universal salvation. * C. M. Vol. ii. p. 415. |