judge of what is fitting than they; for he must be acquainted with many facts of which they are ignorant, without a knowledge of which a correct judgment cannot be formed.

The practice of writing in newspapers; making anonymous reflections on the character, military or otherwise, of their brother officers;-or finding fault with the measures of those placed in authority above them; - is another which is much to be deplored. It is unmanly, and strikes at the root of all discipline and good feeling.

This chapter may fitly be concluded by quotations from Livy's description of the famous Greek general Philopomen, and from the maxims of Napoleon.

Philopomen was a man of great skill and practice in conducting a march and in occupying ground; and to this, as well as to everything connected with the military art, he had directed his attention not only in war but also in peace.

"When, during a march, he came to a difficult defile, he would examine the ground on all sides; if alone, he would meditate on the subject; if attended by his staff, he would inquire of them what plans they would suggest in case an enemy should attack them in front, on either flank, or in the rear.

*

"By inquiry and reflection, he determined on the ground he should choose for his camp; how

large a space he should surround with a rampart; what advantages there were for obtaining water, forage, and wood; where on the next day he could march on striking his camp with the greatest advantage; and what order of march he should adopt,

&c.

"From his youth he had so occupied his mind with cares and deliberations of this nature, that on such subjects no device was new to him."

A perfect knowledge of the correct application of the principles of war in theory may easily be acquired by all officers of average intellect; their correct application in practice, before an enemy, belongs to a great commander alone.

But no man, whatever may be his natural genius for war, can hope to become a general without arduous study; in support of which, the following maxim of the great Napoleon is here given :

"Lisez, relisez les campagnes d'Alexandre, Annibal, César, Gustave, Turenne, Eugène et de Frédéric; modelez-vous sur eux; voilà le seul moyen de devenir grand capitaine, et de surprendre les secrets de l'art de la guerre. Votre génie, éclairé par cette étude, vous fera rejeter les maximes opposées à celles de ces grands hommes."

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EXAMPLES OF BATTLES TO ILLUSTRATE

THE FOREGOING CHAPTERS.

BATTLE OF LOWOSITZ.

As has already been related in the sketch of the campaign of 1756, Marshal Braun, at the head of the Austrian army, 40,000 strong, advanced from Kollin and crossed the Eger at Budyn, with the design of relieving the Saxon army which was blockaded by Frederick in the camp at Pirna.

On the 30th of September, Frederick quitted his camp at Aussig, and advanced to meet Braun; on the same evening as he approached the village of Lowositz he observed the Austrian army in position. (See Plate V.)

Austrian Position.

The right rested on the Elbe behind Lowositz; the front was covered by a marshy stream; the left was beyond the village of Sulowitz. The position was about 5000 yards in length.

Frederick perceiving that the enemy had failed to occupy the heights of Lobosch and Radostitz, and sensible of their great importance, pressed forward

at once with his advanced guard to take possession of them, without waiting for his main body; he was therefore obliged to content himself with placing 4 battalions in the valley between the two mountains, and 4 other battalions near the village of Woparna to watch another valley which extends to the Elbe behind Lobosch, by which an enterprising enemy might attempt to surprise him. In the course of the night, the Prussian main body having come up, Frederick ordered the Prince de Bevern to occupy Lobosch with the left, while Prince Henry with the right occupied the heights of Radostitz.

Frederick could not believe it possible that the Austrian general would have neglected to occupy those important heights had it been his intention to march by the left bank of the Elbe to the relief of the Saxon army; he therefore concluded that the Austrian army had passed over to the right bank, and that a body of Austrian cavalry, and some light troops posted in the plain between Lowositz and the Prussian position, whom he descried through the obscurity of a very foggy morning, were only a rearguard. Frederick, on this supposition, formed the plan of wheeling his own line forward on the left as a pivot, and of thereby enclosing the supposed Austrian rear-guard between his army and the Elbe.

Frederick's position being rather too extensive for his numbers, his infantry occupied it in one line

only. The Prussian cavalry were drawn up in three lines in rear, between the two mountains.

Frederick commenced the battle by ordering the cavalry to pass through intervals in the line of infantry, and to charge the Austrian cavalry in the plain; the effect of which was, that the Austrian cavalry was driven back to Lowositz, where it reformed under the protection of the fire of the infantry who occupied that village in force. The Prussian cavalry retired in its turn pursued by the Austrians, but a second charge completely routed the Austrian cavalry which was pursued by the Prussians up to the muzzles of the Austrian infantry. The Austrian light cavalry now attacked the victorious Prussian squadrons, broken up as they were by the charge and pursuit, in flank, and would have inflicted a serious loss upon them but for the opportune aid of the Prussian reserve; but the heavy fire of artillery and musketry, and the arrival of fresh Austrian squadrons, not only compelled his cavalry to retire, but convinced Frederick that he had to do with the whole Austrian army instead of a rear-guard. At the same moment the fog cleared away.

Marshal Braun, now fully sensible of his fault in neglecting to seize the heights in his front, made a vigorous attack on the hill of Lobosch, which was repulsed with great loss, and the Prussian infantry,