session, being formed either by your own frontiers or by those of a friendly power. If A is the position of

a hostile army which has advanced from the base c d with the design of invading your frontier a b, you may apply Principle 2 by entering the theatre of war at e and operating against A's line of retreat. But this subject will be fully considered in a subsequent chapter.

No. 4. The relative value of the hostile armies. 1st. With respect to numbers.

If their real effective force were represented by their numbers, this 4th consideration would be very simple; but actually the following items enter in general far more into the determination of the effective force of an army than the mere numbers: 2nd. Organisation and discipline.

Are the troops opposed to you veterans or raw levies? Are they well or ill officered? Are they of one race, or composed of men of different races fighting for a dominant people whom they detest? Can they manœuvre with rapidity and precision?

With a veteran army opposed to young troops; with an army well officered opposed to one ill officered; with an army of one race and feeling opposed to one of different races as above; with an army which manœuvres well and quickly opposed to one which can do neither; act boldly, endeavour to force your enemy to a general action, which may be decisive, as soon as possible.

Reverse the conditions, and it is your interest to avoid a decisive battle; to gain time to discipline and drill your men; to engage in partial contests where the chances are very great in your favour, to give your soldiers confidence. If forced to fight let it be in a position naturally strong, and increase its strength in every possible way artificially; and above all take care that your line of retreat is easy and open, and have your plan of retreat perfectly matured in your own mind.

3rd. The spirit of the soldiers, arising from former defeats or victories.

Napoleon understood probably better than any modern commander how to avail himself of the enthusiasm with which his victories inspired his soldiers, as well as of the discouragement they occasioned to his enemies. A fine example of this is afforded by his resolution to draw out his forces into the plain at Arcola to attack the Austrian army on the third day, after the previous two days' hard fighting. Napoleon

judged that the spirit of the Austrians must have been seriously depressed by their continued repulse during those two first days by an army of only half their numbers; and he was induced by that consideration, combined with that of the actual physical loss sustained by his enemies, to adopt the bold and apparently hazardous resolution of attacking them in the open country.

4th. Rapidity of marching.

The importance of rapid marching has been sufficiently dilated on in the Introductory Chapter. It may here merely be remarked that one army may be moving on " interior lines" with respect to another solely by reason of its moving more quickly, although every other element, such as distance and obstacles, may be in favour of that other.

5th. The character and skill of the commander. The following remarks of Napoleon will illustrate this better than the most elaborate treatise :

"The commander-in-chief is the head; he is

everything to an army. It was not the Roman army which conquered Gaul, but Cæsar. It was not the Carthaginian army which made Rome tremble at her gates, but Hannibal. It was not the Macedonian army which marched to the Indus, but Alexander. It was not the Prussian army which defended Prussia for seven years against the three most powerful states of Europe, but Frederick."

The foregoing considerations must be carefully weighed in the mind of a commander, and that plan adopted which combines the observation of them all in the highest degree, it being well understood that, where a choice may seem to be at all nearly equally balanced between a prudent course which promises no very decided success, and a bold course whose results would be decisive, the bold plan is the one to adopt.

It is seldom that unforeseen circumstances do not modify the best-concerted plan of a campaign or a battle; and one of the surest tests of genius in a commander is his promptitude in adapting his plans to such circumstances. Such promptitude is doubtless much assisted by the habit of meditating well, in deciding the plan of a campaign or a battle, on every possible counter-combination the enemy may make, and of being prepared in his own mind for a decided course of action in every contingency that may arise:

The following is one of Napoleon's maxims:

"A plan of campaign should have foreseen all that an enemy may attempt, and should contain within itself the means of frustrating his designs. Plans of campaign are subject to endless modifications, arising from actual circumstances, from the genius of the commander, the nature of his troops, and the topography of the theatre of war."

DEFINITIONS.

Strategical Points.

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Every point on the theatre of war, whatever be its nature, which conduces in any manner strengthen your line of operation or of communication, is a strategical point.

Decisive strategical points are those only which are decisive in insuring the success of any operations of strategy either for offence or defence.

For instance; any point which, when seized, would enable an army to bring its mass into contact with successive fractions of the enemy, or to apply Principle 1 at his expense; any point which, when seized, would enable an army to operate on the communications of an enemy at the same time that it covers the communications of the army, or to apply Principle 2 at his expense; or, in general terms, any point the possession of which would enable an offensive army, by acting in accordance with the principles of war, to gain a decided advantage over an enemy; and any point whose possession by the enemy would enable him to frustrate an army's plan of campaign, or to endanger its communications; - is a decisive strategical point for offence.

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