d'appui, about five marches from Osopo. He thus had on his line from the Adige to the Simmering, of about 240 miles, a place of depôt every five or six marches.

1805.

Napoleon again marched on Vienna, but this time by the Danube. He took Ulm; but the fortifications had been levelled, and he did not therefore form magazines there. He marched to the Lech and made Augsbourg on that river his place of depôt. Thence he marched to the Inn and secured Braunau on that river, which gave him a bridge. This was his second depôt, which permitted him to go on to Vienna. He also secured a bridge over the Danube at Lintz, and covered it with strong works, as a tête-de-pont. Vienna being beyond reach of a coup de main, he entered Moravia, and took possession of the citadel of Brünn, which was immediately armed and provisioned; situated at 120 miles from Vienna, that place became the point d'appui for his operations in Moravia. He fought the battle of Austerlitz at one day's march from Brünn. Had he been defeated in that battle, he had two lines of retreat across the Danube, one by Vienna, one by Lintz.

1807.

The Oder was Napoleon's base; he had on that river the fortresses of Custrin, Glogau, and Stettin.

In this campaign the Oder was the primary, the Vistula his secondary base, from which he would have invaded Russia had he not made peace. He advanced on the Vistula, crossed it at Warsaw, and fortified Praga, the suburb of that city on the east bank; because it served as a tête-de-pont to assure him the passage of the river, and as a depôt at the same time. He also fortified Mödlin and Thorn on the same river. He besieged Dantzic, which became, when taken, his place of depôt and the base of the operations which led to the battle of Friedland.

1809.

Augsbourg was again his principal point d'appui, as in 1805; but the Austrians had in the meantime levelled the defences of Braunau. Napoleon therefore fortified Passau, a much more advantageous place, because, situated at the confluence of the Inn and the Danube, it secured him a passage over both those rivers; he secured another passage of the Danube at Lintz by covering its bridge with works of great strength. His army, arrived at Vienna, had choice of two lines of retreat; one on Bavaria by Lintz or Passau and Augsbourg; the other on Italy by Gratz and Klagenfurth.

1812.

The base of the Vistula which Napoleon had pre

His

pared with so much care in 1807, by the occupation of Dantzic, Thorn, Mödlin, and Praga, became now his primary base for the invasion of Russia. secondary base was the Niemen, strengthened by the possession of Kowno and Grodno on that river; the connecting link between his first and second bases being Veilau on the Pregel. Smolensko was his grand depôt for the movement on Moscow; Wilna and Minsk the connecting links between Smolensko and the Niemen. On his extended line of operations he had a fortified place as a point d'appui every eight days' march. All the intermediate post-houses were loop-holed and entrenched, and occupied by a single company and one gun. These precautions rendered his communications so secure that during the whole campaign not a courier nor convoy was intercepted.

In the campaign of 1796, Cherasco, Tortona, Pizzhighittone, Peschiera, were Napoleon's strategical points. Verona and Legnago were decisive strategical points, since they gave him the command of the Adige, and covered the siege of Mantua from the attempts of an enemy coming from the east of that river.

In the campaign of 1805, Brünn became a decisive strategical point, being the base of manœuvres which led to the battle of Austerlitz.

In 1807, Dantzic became his decisive strategical

point, since it was the base of the manœuvres which led to the battle of Friedland. A glance at the map will show that roads branched from it to Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, the fortresses in his possession on the line of the Oder, his primary base. Dantzic therefore covered his communications, while it enabled him to strike a blow against the enemy.

In 1809, Passau, at the confluence of two great rivers, and Lintz, were decisive points, since their possession enabled Napoleon to march to Vienna, and could cover his retreat.

In 1812, Smolensko became a decisive point, since the operations which led to the battle of Borodino, and the fall of Moscow, were based upon it.

H

CHAP. III.

MAXIMS.

Maxim 1.-NEVER abandon your line of communication from over-confidence. (Napoleon.)

Example. In 1757, Frederick the Great was besieging Prague. He advanced to engage the

Austrian succouring army under Marshal Daun at Kollin, leaving a part of his force under Marshal Keith to blockade the town. His natural line of retreat, therefore, was upon Prague. The Austrian position was a range of low hills which swept round in the arc of a circle, of which the road by which Frederick was advancing formed the chord. Frederick carried his whole army by a flank march to turn the Austrian right. By this movement, which was in presence of, and within the range of grape from, the Austrian position, he abandoned his line of retreat on Prague, which, when defeated, he could not regain, as he would have had to run the gauntlet back again along the road by which he had advanced, within reach of the victorious army. He consequently was obliged to relinquish the siege of Prague, and to cross the Elbe