precisely the absence of proof which renders their position untenable : and yet, because the correspondent to whom we refer insisted upon this assumption, unless invalidated by direct evidence, he is accused of "not writing to the purpose." Alas!

Against this showing, the Peace Society urge, that the fact of the military profession being in these instances passed without censure, furnishes no presumption that it was lawful: for St. Paul has commended the harlot Rahab for her faith, and yet omitted to condemn her occupation. But if this argument were ever worth anything, it is certainly destroyed by the Peace Society themselves, when they own that War is not forbidden by name in the Bible. Now, harlotry most assuredly is; and hence the cases are no way parallel. To prove harlotry unlawful, we are not obliged, as in the case of War, to make elaborate deductions from doubtful texts, to publish thick volumes of Prize Essays, and to flood the religious world with a deluge of Tracts; a few references to well-known passages are decisive. The prohibition is so express, that the Christian is not reduced to argue the question at all and besides, we have the desiderated direct evidence, that, after she had "received the spies with peace," and approved her faith, Rahab did quit her profession. The Peace Society must admit her marriage with an ancestor of King David, as conclusive on this head.

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11. Whenever, however, the Peace Society can wrest from the facts an apparent presumption in their own favour, they are ready enough to exult at the dilemma on whose horns they have impaled their adversaries. "The argument," asserts Mr. Jonathan Dymond, in one of their Tracts,* "to which, perhaps, the greatest importance is attached by the advocate of War, and by which thinking men are chiefly induced to acquiesce in its lawfulness, is this: That a distinction is to be made between rules which apply to us as individuals, and rules which apply to us as subjects of the State; and that the pacific injunctions of Christ, in his sermon on the Mount, and all the other kindred commands and prohibitions of the Christian Scriptures, have no reference to our conduct as members of the political body. Now, it is obvious that the proof of the rectitude of this distinction must be expected from those who make it. Christianity propounds general rules, of which, in some cases, the advocate of War denies the applicability. He, therefore, is to produce the reason and the authority for the exception."

With Mr. Dymond's statement of the argument condemned, we shall not pause to quarrel; but shall at once reply, that we claim no exception from any general rule whatsoever. We hold, that the duties of states and individuals are similar, so far as their circumstances are similar; for it is an equal absurdity to argue, either that individuals are subjected to a moral law, while nations are subjected to none, or that such moral law, in dissimilar cases, is not accommodated to the several

* Observations on the Applicability of the Pacific Principles of the New Testament to the Conduct of States; and on the Limitations which those Principles impose on the Rights of Self-Defence.

points of opposition or contrast which may be presented. A law, unaccommodated to these varieties of application, could be termed law only by a misnomer; and the provisions for such varieties, so far from being exceptions, are essential to its integrity and perfection. To the proper elucidation of this subject, it is therefore requisite to reduce states to the level of individuals, and to consider what would be the condition, and consequently the duties, of individuals placed in a like relation one to the other. Let us suppose a country in which each man is altogether independent of his fellow, and enabled to do "that which is right in his own eyes." Let us further suppose that certain regulations of prescriptive sanction and acknowledged utility supply the place of law, but possess no other guardian, no other executive, than public opinion. But, inasmuch as the due observance of this law is the only security of the weak against the oppression of the strong, and the only means by which the strong can assure the continuance of the tranquillity which is the occasion of their own prosperity, all have an equal interest in vindicating its majesty by the condign punishment of the ambitious fool who should viclate any of its provisions to the injury of his neighbour. Under an efficient code of law and government, to forbear is a duty; but in this case, not to resent, would be a fatal treachery, tending to undermine the salutary terror which is the sole restraint of the ill-disposed, and to make all law, moral or other, inoperative and a mock.

12. "But," objects Mr. Jonathan Dymond, "it happens to this argument as to many others, that it assumes that as established which has not been proved, and upon the proof of which the whole argument depends. It assumes, that the reason why an individual is not permitted to use violence, is, that the laws will use it for him. And in this the fallacy of the position consists: for the foundation of the duty of forbearance in private life is not that the laws will punish aggression, but that Christianity requires forbearance." We rejoin, that, though the command of our Lord be the proper motive of forbearance, yet it is the supremacy of the law which renders such forbearance possible. Christianity contemplates man as already arrived at that social elevation which allows of the highest virtue, and as living under an operative system of law and government: for what would mean the injunction of obedience to magistrates, if there were no magistrates to obey? or to honour the king, if there were no king to honour? These conditions are recognised by Christianity as existing, and necessary to its own success; and to the mere worldly polity, and to the mere worldly motives to obedience, it adds a more excellent rule and a more excellent motive; and inculcates forbearance, not only because magistrates, in the words of St. Paul, "are the avengers to execute wrath upon them that do evil," but likewise because forbearance is one of the chief of Christian virtues. Mr. Dymond, we are aware, asserts that "the duty of forbearance is antecedent to all considerations respecting the political condition of man;" but how does he support his assertion? By an assumption involving the whole dispute-namely, that the "rules of

Christianity" do not admit of that degree of resistance which would amount to War. But they do admit it; therefore the duty of forbearance is limited. "The only truth," Mr. Dymond continues, "which appears to be elicited by the present argument, is, that the difficulty of obeying the forbearing rule of Christianity is greater in the case of nations than in the case of individuals: the obligation to obey it is the same in both." Granted, the obligation to obey is the same in both; but the conditions supposed by the rule differ, therefore the rule itself; for it is contradictory to maintain that any law can command obedience under circumstances which, as we before observed, would render such obedience destructive of all law. Christianity was not preached to a nation of wild and half-civilised barbarians; nay, when the Almighty deigned to reveal a religion to a people yet rude and stubborn, that religion permitted of Wars of extermination, the sanguinary justice of retaliation, and the rage of the avenger of blood. Christianity was wisely delayed until the dominion of Rome had spread civilisation, and banished that ruthless brutality of manners which would have stifled the practice of its virtues; and even now, is it ever successfully preached to untutored tribes, unless the missionary, besides the purity of doctrine, carries the refinement of civilisation in his train? Doubtless, the Peace Society will ask, Where is the text which excepts nations from the full operation of the Christian rule of forbearance? We might retort, Where is the text which includes them? All the rules of Christianity are addressed to individuals, those individuals being surrounded by certain recognised social conditions. Nay, if we merely think of the frightful anomaly presented by the very phrase, "a Christian savage," how can we decide any Christian duty to be "antecedent to all considerations respecting the political condition of man," as vainly asserted by Mr. Dymond? So far as the conditions applying to individuals apply to states, so far their duties are similar, but no further: a conclusion justified equally by religion as by reason, and from which no escape is afforded by either.

Leaving the more abstract section of the subject, we shall now consider those arguments of the Peace Society which are better calculated to obtain extensive popularity. At the very outset we must correct a misapprehension which has been pressed into the service—we refer to that involved in the argument deduced from the insufficiency of War as a means of redress. Now, redress is in this world simply impossible; and War is in a no worse predicament, than are the most regularly administered systems of jurisprudence. The criminal may be punished; but for the injury he has effected, no redress can ever be afforded. Will the apprehension and conviction of my assailant, heal a single wound, or assuage the anguish of a single bruise? If I am wronged, though damages be awarded, or my rights restored, will such damages or such restoration be any real compensation for the weariness of spirit, the anxiety, the turmoil, I have endured? And if not, can it be said that I have obtained redress? Yet, are we therefore to infer that Courts of Justice are ineffective and absurd? Though they give no redress to the

individual, they protect society; and tend to prevent the repetition of offence, by demonstrating that it cannot be committed with impunity. And thus is it with War. It does not, indeed, pretend to redress, for redress is not in human power; but it is the means by which nations chastise the wrong-doer, and caution others against the like turpitude. Two pamphlets,* written by "a lady," and eulogised by the Peace Society's scribe, as exhibiting a "happy combination of literary talent and of correct moral principles that has rarely been excelled," must engage somewhat of our attention. Believing "the arguments against War derived from the tenor of Christianity," to remain "unanswered and unanswerable," the authoress proceeds to write for the benefit" of the generality, whose opinions are regulated far less by a sense of abstract right, than by their conformity with the standard of supposed expediency." She accordingly demands, "Now, in what manner is the question of expediency to be tried in the present instance?" and, answering, "Surely by an appeal to experience," reduces the question in debate to this: "Are the results of War, deducting all its accompanying mischief, yet productive, upon the whole, of a counter-balance of good to the parties engaging in it? If not, does there nevertheless exist a class of exceptions, sufficiently marked and numerous to authorise a departure from the general rule, which an extensive collation of facts may have enabled us to deduce?" History is then ransacked, to prove that Wars have been uniformly ruinous and unprofitable.

Now, we must admit, once for all, that, upon a shopkeeper's calculation of profit and loss, the maintenance of War, in common with that of all other correctional establishments, be they named Law, Police, or what else, is, if a necessary, yet an altogether unproductive, outlay; but such a calculation is extremely fallacious. It is not sufficient to trace a War from its origin to its conclusion, and critically estimate the gain and loss in square miles of territory, or in pounds, shillings, and pence; we must question history more philosophically, if we wish for a satisfactory response. The authoress laboriously reviews the several wars in which England has been successively implicated, and deduces numerous unfavourable conclusions; but we ask, for what did England make war? Was it for glory? She has attained it! Was it for dominion? The sun never sets upon her empire! Putting aside their justice or injustice, it is quite clear that England has gained by her Wars all those worldly advantages which can be supposed to tempt the ambition of nations. Therefore, in a worldly and ambitious view, they have not been either ruinous or unprofitable. The broad result of England's past history has been to crown her the first of nations, and to establish her supremacy in every quarter of the globe. Against this ultimate fact, no petty cavilling at the provisions of a treaty or the event of a battle, a campaign, or even of an entire war, will avail; granting her to have fought (which was not the case) merely from a selfish

"An Examination of the Principles which are considered to support the Practice of War;" and "Historical Illustrations of the Origin and Consequences of War."

motive of aggrandizement, England has evidently compassed her end. The very distress of which her philanthropists complain, is a proof of her greatness; for extreme poverty is ever the concomitant of extreme wealth; and abject destitution, of the highest luxury. Were it a branch of the subject we cared to pursue, the same reply, a little varied, would dispose of all the other "Historical Illustrations.' One more example, however, we must quote: "It is worthy of notice," she remarks, "that nearly all those wars, by a series of which Rome obtained the dominion of the world, were undertaken on the pretence, not always unfairly alleged, either of self-defence, or of generous protection afforded to her injured neighbours. From the very circumstances of her settlement, Rome was early an object of suspicion to the surrounding states: they attacked her repeatedly, and she was victorious: her growing power spread the alarm into remote provinces, and the Samnite and Tarentine Wars, by the conclusion of which Rome became mistress of Italy, appear to have originated in the provocations she had received. It was under pretence of defending the Mamertines, that she attacked the Carthaginians and conquered Sicily. At the commencement of the second Punic War, she really acted in a great measure defensively; but found it necessary in her own defence to begin and finally complete the conquest of Spain. The Macedonian king had joined her enemies, and she was obliged, still in her own defence and for the protection of her allies, to reduce the whole of Greece to a Roman Province. She next discovered that the entire demolition of Carthage was essential to her own security; and it was by assisting her Numidian friends that she acquired the sovereignty of the north-west coast of Africa. The Romans afterwards applied their force to check the devastations of Mithridates; and in consequence of their success in this conflict, Syria, Armenia, and a great part of Asia Minor, were compelled to submit to their yoke. In their wars with the Gauls, the latter were certainly the original aggressors, and furnished their enemies with the plea of necessity for subduing the whole of Cisalpine Gaul, as well as a considerable territory on the other side of the Alps. Then the Roman province was never secure from the incursions of hostile neighbours, and the Gallic allies demanded the assistance of Cæsar against their enemies: these enemies received aid from the Britons, and Cæsar, in short, found himself obliged to bring the whole of Gaul and a great part of Britain into subjection. These instances have been adduced to prove, that even in those wars which, if we might judge by their results, seem the least likely to admit of it, the plea of self-defence has been made available.”

If we grant this showing, what then? How are we to "judge" these wars, "the least likely to admit the plea of self-defence?" By "their results," because they were successful! What strange argumentation is this! Because it appears from the facts of history that these wars were just, and because they were successful, we are therefore to conclude-not that their success was a consequence of justice-O, no! but that they were merely wars of selfish ambition and aggrandizement, and destitute of any justice whatever! Nay, and "the advocate of