In the history, no action of either is recorded, save the bringing of their oblations. Hence, if we be guided by the context, and not by our own unwarranted conjectures, we must plainly refer God's expostulation with Cain, not to any FANCIED antecedent diversity of character between the two brothers, but to the DECLARED difference of their several offerings. This, I scruple not to say, is required by the context : and, if we depart from this, we may give the reins to our own imagination, but we certainly propound nothing that has been revealed.

between the two brothers, from its superficial plausibility, has not only been very commonly adopted, but is likewise of high antiquity in the Church. It was the solution, resorted to by Irenæus in the second century.

Ab initio enim respexit Deus ad munera Abel; quoniam cum simplicitate et justitia offerebat: super sacrificium autem Cain non respexit; quoniam cum zelo et malitia, quæ erat adversus fratrem, divisionem habebat in corde. Iren. adv. Hær. lib. iv. c. 34. § 2.

This, no doubt, is very plausible: but it is mere CONJECTURE, wholly unsupported by PROOF. We have no evidence whatsoever, that Cain entertained any malice against his brother previous to their sacrifices: on the contrary, his malice was plainly generated by the rejection of his offering. Such, accordingly, is the very just opinion both of Athanasius and of Jerome. Πρῶτον ἁμάρτημα φθόνος, ἐπὶ τῇ προτιμήσει τοῦ ̓Αβελ. ARTIKEL TO "ABEλ. Athan. Dict. et interpret. Sacr. Scriptur. Oper. vol. ii. p. 336. Commel. 1600. Tam gratè sacrificium ejus (scil. Abelis) acceptum Deo fuerit, ut fratrem in invidiam concitaret. Hieron. ad Demetriad. de Virgin, epist. i. Oper. vol. ix. p. 2. Colon. Agrip. 1616.

Here then is the difficulty, attendant upon that interpretation of God's language, which, as I have allowed, seems, on the first view, abundantly plausible.

The interpretation is wholly UNWARRANTED by the context and it rests upon nothing more solid, than the sandy basis of UNAUTHORISED

CONJECTURE.

If the context be attended to, and if conjecture be thrown aside, God's expostulation with Cain MUST refer to the recorded diversity of the two offerings: for, in the context, there is nothing else, to which it can refer. The nature and spirit, therefore, of Cain's sacrifice was the matter, which stamped him with the character of evil: and, on the other hand, the nature and spirit of Abel's sacrifice was the matter, which impressed upon him the character of righteous

ness.

Now, under this view of the subject, it is certain, that God's expostulation, which allowedly was intended to account for the marked difference put between the two offerings, conveys, in our common version, no distinct and intelligible explanation whatsoever. We learn not from it, WHY the one offering was accepted, and why the other offering was rejected.

2. As God's expostulation, according to our common English version, conveys no distinct explanation of the difference which was made between the two offerings; so neither does it seem to exhibit the Almighty, as speaking in a manner suitable to his own wisdom and dignity.

From long habit, our English ear has become familiarised to the phrase of sin lying at the door of a person: and, when we employ the phrase, we mean to intimate by it, that the person, thus characterised, is a sinner.

Now, on the supposition that such is the just and proper import of the phrase as it occurs in the original, we actually find ascribed to the divine speaker nothing better than a mere unmeaning tautology. For, in that case, the clause, If thou doest not well, sin lieth at the door, is precisely equivalent to the declaration, If thou art a sinner, thou assuredly art a sinner. The proposition, indeed, is undeniably true: yet it required not a voice from heaven for its communication. Clearly, we cannot, for a moment, dispute it:

yet I can with difficulty believe, that God, by a voice from heaven, would authoritatively declare to Cain, that, If a man BE a sinner, he certainly is a sinner.

But it may be more than doubted, whether the idea, which we annex to the now familiar phrase of sin lying at a person's door, can be legitimately extracted from the original. If the word Chattath, in the present passage, be rendered sin; the whole clause, according to the strict sense of the Hebrew, ought to have been rendered in manner following. If thou doest not well, sin, like an animal, coucheth at the door. Such, if the word Chattath be rendered sin, is the language, of necessity, ascribed to God: and this language, to my own apprehension at least, is utterly and hopelessly unintelligible*.

Under these circumstances, it is not the part of prudence to retain a translation either grossly tautological or hopelessly unintelligible, if an

* I readily admit, that the glosses of Bp. Hall and Bp. Patrick, with all other glosses framed on the same principle, are quite intelligible: but then their intelligibility results from their introducing the idea of VENGEANCE or PUNISHMENT, which, as we have seen, the Hebrew word Chattath will not bear. The PUNISHMENT of sin may be figuratively said to couch in the attitude of a wild beast ready to spring upon its victim: but sin itself cannot, with any regard to decorum and propriety, be thus described. Accordingly, what fully shows the justice of this remark, we may observe, that both Hall and Patrick, as if conscious that the simple idea of sin would not serve their turn, gratuitously introduce the idea of PUNISHMENT. See Bp. Hall's Paraph. on Hard Texts, Gen. iv. 7. and Bp. Patrick's Comment. on Gen. iv. 7.

other equally possible translation, altogether free from such formidable objections, should readily and naturally present itself.

III. The 'Hebrew word, employed in the second clause of the expostulation, is the precise word which has been litigated by Mr. Davison and myself.

That this word Chattath primarily denotes sin, is acknowledged by all: that it secondarily denotes a sin-offering, is likewise universally acknowledged. Mr. Davison contends for yet a third sense, that of punishment for sin: but, unless I have wholly failed of my purpose, we have not a shadow of EVIDENCE, that the word is ever employed as bearing such a signification. I venture, therefore, to think, that the ascription of any such sense to the word can never be legitimately made the basis of a serious argument; because the ascribed sense rests upon mere CONJECTURE, not upon solid PROOF: I venture to think, and I shall continue so to think until I meet with PROOF to the contrary, that the word does NOT denote a punishment for sin: I venture to think, that the word does NOT grammatically import sin with punishment of necessity implied as its consequence.

Under such circumstances, I take upon me