If Scripture is plain, so is Antiquity.

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and contend for: and there is nothing that offends us more, than that many persons will endeavour notwithstanding, by violent contortions, far-fetched subtilties, and studied evasions, to elude and frustrate these plain things. Such conduct, on the adverse side, makes it the more necessary to have recourse to antiquity, for the greater security against all such attempts: for while Scripture is plain, antiquity is plain also; and two plain things are better than one. God himself hath taught us, by adding his oath to his promise, not to think any confirmation superfluous, which he is pleased to afford us. His word alone might be safely depended upon, being certain and infallible: but two immutable things afford the stronger consolation; and God considers the infirmities of mankind. In like manner, though Scripture be very plain to reasonable men, so far as concerns necessaries, yet by taking in antiquity to it, the evidence, upon the whole, becomes both plainer and stronger. There is so much weakness commonly in human nature, and so much reluctance shown to the reception of divine truths, that we have need of all the plain things we can any where procure; and had we twenty more as plain as these, we could make use of them all, and indeed should be obliged to do so, lest otherwise we should be found guilty of despising the blessings of heaven. It is certain that there is something very particular in the concerns of religion, that plain things there have not the same force or weight as they have any where else. It is the only subject in the world wherein a man may dispute the most certain facts, and most indubitable proofs, and yet be allowed to be in his senses; for if any one, in the common affairs of life, were to make it a rule to believe nothing but what he sees, or were to reject the faith of all history, he would undoubtedly be despised or pitied by

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Rejection of Antiquity unreasonable.

every body, as not well in his wits. Seeing, then, that the case of religion is so widely different from all others, and that the plainest evidences there often lose their effect, we can never be too solicitous in accumulating evidence upon evidence, and testimony upon testimony, to do the most we can towards relieving the weakness, or conquering the reluctance of men slow to believe.

If it be said, that common Christians, at least, can reap no benefit from antiquity, nor make any use of it, that will not be reason sufficient for throwing it aside, so long as the learned may. But even common Christians do enjoy the benefit of it, if not at first hand, yet at the second, third, or fourth; and that suffices here, as well as in other cases of weighty concernment. How do they know, for instance, that Scripture is the word of God? They know it immediately or proximately from their proper guides, or other instructors, who in the last resort learn it from the ancients. So, then, ordinary Christians may thus remotely have the use of antiquity (not to mention other nearer ways) with respect to the sense of Scripture, as well as with regard to its authenticity. We admit, as I before said,

that Scripture is very plain in necessaries. But notwithstanding that all these things are so plain, yet considering that we are not the first men that ever looked into Scripture, but that others, who had as good eyes as we, and as upright hearts, and a competent measure of common sense (besides some peculiar advantages beyond what we can pretend to), have perused the same Scripture before us; I say, considering these things, it would be something of a mortification to us, or would appear somewhat strange, if such persons should not have found the same doctrines then, which we have the pleasure to find now. For whatever is 6

Scripture as plain to the Fathers as to us.

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really plain to moderns, and necessary, must, one would think, by parity of reason, or for a stronger reason, have been plain to the ancients also, and necessary to them as well

1 Waterland on the Use and Value of Ecclesiastical Antiquity. Works, vol. v. pp. 282-287.

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Practical and moral benefits of the Rule.

CHAPTER VI.

SUFFICIENT proof has, I trust, been given that the Rule of Faith, as expressed in the foregoing Sermon, is the principle distinctly recognised by the reformed Church of England, and also by the Church of primitive times: and enough has been said to show how the two great departures from it are akin to each other both in their errors, and their evil results. Having also attempted to show the application of the true rule, in confirming the right interpretation of Scripture, I would refer very shortly to the practical and moral benefits to be expected from a faithful endeavour to hold, and to promote in others a recognition of it: and so will conclude.

Now, after all other objections are spent, men commonly end by saying, that it is too alien from modern feelings, and would, if admitted, require a thorough remodelling of popular religious opinions. They argue, therefore, that it is impossible to recover it, and more than imply that it is not to be desired.

It is, however, as possible as it is necessary. The very alienation of the minds of men, and the acknowledged contrast of modern religion, in form and spirit, with the primitive faith and temper, while they are indeed hinderances to its reception, are in reality the chief and most urgent reasons to demand it.

The true Rule of Faith produces agreement.

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The first effect of a hearty and honest submission of our minds to universal tradition, whensoever it is discernible in interpreting Scripture, would be to produce agreement.

Men have grown so familiar with the infinite diversity of religious opinion, that they have become incredulous as to the possibility of being united. They deny that there ever was such a thing as unity in opinion; and are, therefore, content to differ, and either to compromise differences at the cost of truth, or to contend for them at the cost of peace. And this has fostered, on the one side, exclusiveness leading to every form of division, and, on the other, liberalism leading to indifference. It is remarkable, as a summary test of these mental habits, that the very word Catholic has lost its ancient, and got a modern meaning. Once, it signified the unity of all Christians distinguished from every perversion of Apostolical teaching: it was emphatically an exclusive term. Now it signifies the few lingering facts, the caput mortuum, remaining among all sects after the abstraction of all particular and distinctive doctrines. Again, it was once used to express the spirit of universal charity which followed upon universal agreement in the faith; it is now taken to mean the general habit of indiscriminate good feeling, antecedent to and regardless of all particular truth. The very idea of oneness in religious opinion is by some laughed at as a dream, and by others even censured as intolerance. To such a pitch is it come: and to such an unworthy acquiescent contentedness in our present unhappy divisions are we fallen. Still we must believe, until the contrary shall at least be made probable by evidence, that if men would only submit to universal tradition in other points of religious opinion, as they do in the doctrine of the Holy Trinity, they would differ just as little in understanding all passages of Scripture bearing upon

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