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dollars per year, and provision should be made for annual meetings with no limit upon the duration of the session. Such a body would be small enough to be efficient, yet large enough to secure the representative quality which is essential to a legislature. Election from fewer and larger districts than at present and the payment of a more adequate compensation would insure the selection of abler men upon the average. Half of the members would always have had previous legislative experience because of the use of the "holdover” principle. The presence of abler and more experienced men would decrease the tendency to play petty politics. An objection to providing for "holdover” members is that it might delay the retirement of members whose legislative record did not meet with popular approval; but since such retirement would be delayed for only a short time, it does not seem to overbalance the value of retaining experienced men. Increased frequency of legislative sessions would mean the adaptation of the law to changed needs as they became manifest, while fixed and adequate compensation for time spent at sessions would do away with the present tendency to "steamroll" necessary business and finish the session as soon as possible after sixty days have elapsed. The unicameral legislature would be more efficient because the process of lawmaking would be cut in half and friction between the two houses eliminated; it would be more responsible to the people because they would have only one house to watch instead of two as at present, and the blame for unwise or vicious legislation would rest squarely upon that house.

Relationship Between Governor and Legislature In outlining the above suggestions for reorganization of Oklahoma's legislative department, no mention has been made of the relationship between the Governor and the Legislature. It has been assumed that the people wished to continue the present independent status of the legislative and executive departments. However, this separation is very undesirable from the standpoint of administration. It is likewise a contributing factor in some of the outstanding failures of our legislative system. The fact that these two branches of government are independent, each deriving its authority directly from the people, creates friction between them and increases the likelihood of political by-play at the expense of good government. Lack of legislative leadership has been another cause of inefficient lawmaking. Good laws cannot be framed overnight or by well-meaning amateurs; they require expert knowledge and careful drafting. The Governor, because of his position as head of the state administration, because of his ability to command expert technical information and assistance, is preeminently in the best position, if otherwise qualified, to make legislative plans. But plans, no matter how well-drawn, must be transmuted into law before they are of any benefit to the state, and so long as the legislative and the executive branches of government remain separated there is no method by which the Governor's plans are very likely to be made into law. His messages are listened to perfunctorily, and religiously forgotten. He has no right to introduce bills, and if he had, legislative jealousy of "executive domination" would for the most part doom them to an early death. Legislative irresponsibility is fostered by the fact that the power of veto is vested in an independent branch of the state government. The exercise of that power, actual or threatened, furnishes an excellent way of explaining to the folks back home, the failure of popular measures.

If the Governor were elected by the Legislature from its own membership and held accountable to it for the proposal of governmental policies and for the manner in which those policies were carried out, if in other words a responsible form of government were established, these evils would be largely eliminated. Important legislative plans would for the most part emanate from the administration and would therefore be much better, both in form and in substance, than is usual today. Complete democratic control would be retained since the representatives of the people would be vested with all of their present power to discuss, amend, accept or reject, proposed legislation and would be strengthened by the fact that legislators could no longer present the Governor's opposition as an excuse for inaction to their constituents. Deadlocks between the Governor and the Legislature would cease, for a "break" over an important matter of policy would result in the choice of a new executive, or in a dissolution of the Legislature and an appeal to the people on the part of the Governor. In either case, harmony between the branches would be the eventual result. A further advantage would be that, if the Legislature were the road to the governorship, more men of ability and ambition would seek places in that body, and thus raise the standard of its average membership. Incidental benefit would result from the elimination of the present statewide primary and general elections for the governorship, with their costly campaigns, all too frequent "mud-slinging," and temptation to political irregularities, which to a large extent, discourage political ambition in men of moderate means or high ideals.

Thus this recasting of the relationship between the legislative and the executive departments of our government offers many advantages. The possible arguments against it seem on examination to be either untenable or negligible in comparison with the advantages to be gained. It does not afford opportunity for governmental tyranny and encroachment upon individual rights. The most efficient safeguards against such evils are a vigilant popular control of the government, and fundamental constitutional limitations enforced by an independent judiciary. Opportunity for exercising the first of these is amply secured by popular election of the legislators, while the latter is entirely consistent with a government organized on the responsible system. As has been pointed out, such an organization is entirely democratic, for the final responsibility for the government rests in the hands of men chosen directly by the people.



University of Texas



Washington, D. C.

The treaty of Ancon, 1883, which put an end to the war between Peru and Chile, commonly known as the War of the Pacific, stipulated the cession to Chile of the Peruvian province of Tarapaca in perpetuity and the cession of the provinces of Tacna and Arica for ten years, at the expiration of which a plebiscite was to be held to determine whether they desired to stay under the control of Chile or to pass again under the sovereignty of Peru.

Unfortunately, the treaty did not establish the rules and the form in which the plebiscite should be conducted; and when ten years had elapsed the parties could not agree on a method of procedure. The Chileans insisted upon having control of the voting and that the Chileans who had taken up residence in the two provinces in recent years, should be entitled to vote. The Peruvians, on the other hand, would not accept either of these conditions and contended that only the native population from Tacna and Arica should have a voice in determining the disposition of these provinces.

Arbitration by the King of Spain was proposed by Peru in the Billinghurst-Latorre protocol in 1898, of the ques

In an earlier article Professor Herman G. James sketched the history of this contr sy from its beginning to March, 1920. The purpose of this paper is to bring the data relating to the subject down to date, keeping in mind Professor James' statement, “The purpose of this presentation is informational, not argumentative." (See Southwestern Pol. Sci. Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 2, Sept., 1920, pp 155169.)

tions: Who shall vote? Shall the voting be public or secret? Chile, however, refused to agree to the arbitration.

The diplomatic discussion of these matters dragged along for twenty-seven years. The situation culminated in Peru's breaking off diplomatic relations with Chile in 1910. In 1912, the Government of Peru accused Chile of "Chileanizing” the disputed provinces through the persecution and expulsion of the Peruvian elements and the closing of Peruvian schools and the suppression of Peruvian newspapers. This the Chilean government denied. The proposal was also made in the convention of 1912 that the plebiscite be postponed until 1933.

When the World War ended, Peru submitted the case to the League of Nations at its first session; and Bolivia, which had become a third party to the dispute, also introduced it at the second session of the League. Consideration of the question by that body was opposed by the Chilean delegation because it constituted a purely American problem, and it was finally referred to a committee.

Bolivia, which, as the ally of Peru, had been defeated in the War of the Pacific, failed to conclude a treaty with Chile until 1904. By this treaty she ceded to Chile the province of Antofagasta and this left her without an outlet to the sea. When the Versailles treaty was signed, Bolivia, pointing out the cases of Poland and Jugoslavia, asked the signatories to the treaty that Arica be given to her in order to provide her with a port to the Pacific. Both Chile and Peru opposed this; and as a countermove Bolivia turned around and denounced the treaty of 1904 and demanded the restoration of Antofagasta.

The legal and diplomatic situation remained substantially unchanged except that relations became more estranged and it was rendered more intense by the withdrawal of Peruvian consular agents in 1918, until December 12, 1921, when the Chilean foreign minister, Senor Ernesto Barros Jarpa, took the unusual step of dispatching a note directly to the Government of Peru, inviting it to participate in a plebiscite as provided for in the treaty of Ancon. Peru replied,

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